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Chapter 1
Introduction
Financial market anomalies refer to the observation of anomalous patterns in asset
prices that are hard to reconcile with standard economic theory. A cornerstone of
financial markets theory is the efficient market hypothesis of Fama (1970) which
essentially conjectures asset prices to reflect all available information. In its weakest
form the efficient market hypothesis implies that any investment based on historical
prices should not generate excess returns with respect to a given equilibrium asset
pricing model. However, empirical evidence appears to be at odds with weak-form
market efficiency: For instance, past winning stocks are found to deliver superior
returns in the short run while past losing stocks subsequently continue to perform
poorly. This rather simple momentum strategy represents a major financial market
anomaly. Usually, the observation of such a market anomaly is rationalized by either
risk-based or behavioral-based explanations; such explanations, however, are only
meaningful if the respective anomaly is not spurious in the first place. We address
the latter concern by testing for anomalous asset price patterns in different markets.
If the respective anomaly also prevails in other markets we additionally corroborate
the notion of a real anomaly.
In particular, we consider three distinct anomalies: The first anomaly originates
from the accounting domain and is commonly referred to as the accrual anomaly. It
has first been documented by Sloan (1996) and the related investment strategy es-
sentially aims to identify mispriced companies by assessing their earnings quality as
reflected in the amount of accruals. Second, we investigate the very momentum ef-
fect. Especially, we consider price and earnings momentum strategies, see Jegadeesh
and Titman (1993) and Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996); thus, we explore
the idea whether stock prices exhibit short-term return continuation following the
direction of past prices or analysts’ earnings revisions. The third anomaly that we
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investigate is the dispersion effect of Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) who find
that the dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts helps predicting future returns.
To begin with, we screen for the accrual anomaly in several markets following the
standard approach used in previous studies. Adjusting for common risk factors, we
identify abnormal returns for nine countries in a sample of 29 developed equity mar-
kets. However, when a vast number of strategies is being tested around the globe,
some strategies may excel by chance alone. Statistically speaking, there is a need
to control for data snooping biases given the multitude of tests involved. While
researchers have long been aware of data snooping biases, see Lo and MacKinlay
(1990), Sullivan, Timmermann, and White (1999) and White (2000), common sta-
tistical procedures are not always optimal in terms of power, and hence they are
most likely to reject any given anomaly. However, we aim to detect as many coun-
tries as possible where an anomaly actually exists. We therefore employ the recent
proposal of Romano and Wolf (2005), which achieves improvements in power due to
its stepwise nature and use of studentized test statistics.
These data snooping methods are first demonstrated by a thorough reinvestigation
of the accrual anomaly. To see whether multiple testing procedures might be too
conservative for return anomalies to show up in data sets with customary sample
sizes, we also subject the international momentum effect to the very same pro-
cedures. While we substantiate the latter when properly accounting for multiple
testing, the evidence for the accrual anomaly is rather spotty. Only for the U.S.,
the U.K., Thailand, and Switzerland do we reject the efficient market hypothesis,
if we focus on the accrual-based hedge strategies’ returns. Except for Switzerland
these countries operate under common law, and thus their accounting systems po-
tentially offer more flexibility with respect to accruals-driven earnings manipulation.
Regardless of the mispricings’ sources, we document a demise of the detected ac-
crual anomalies, thereby adding to the evidence of diminishing market anomalies
following their publication, see Schwert (2003).
With price and earnings momentum robustly defying capital market efficiency we
reinforce the need for a sound explanation of the origins of momentum. In exam-
ining the link between both momentum anomalies we test the recent conjecture of
Chordia and Shivakumar (2006) who claim that price momentum is merely a noisy
proxy for earnings momentum in the U.S.. This explanation is intuitive since price
momentum may well be rationalized in a model of investors underreacting to fun-
damental news as represented by earnings revisions. Along this line of reasoning we
check whether this explanation constitutes a broad pattern in a large sample of 16
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European countries. Our results are as follows: First, while we replicate the result
of Chordia and Shivakumar (2006) for their sample period ending in 1999, the con-
jectured pattern has recently become more subtle. During the market frenzy at the
end of the nineties, we observe a decoupling of price and earnings momentum in the
U.S., which suggests that this period may be dominated by investors’ over- instead
of underreaction. Second, considering an aggregate European momentum strategy,
we find that European price momentum appears to be a manifestation of earnings
momentum throughout the whole twenty year sample period. Third, while we can-
not replicate this argument in all European countries, there is considerable evidence
that earnings momentum is a crucial determinant in explaining price momentum for
most countries.
Having established a link between both anomalies we are still in need of a deeper
momentum rationale. Since we cannot pinpoint a decent relation between momen-
tum and macroeconomic risks, we suspect a behavioral-based explanation to be at
work. In fact, we find momentum strategies to be most profitable when restricted to
winner and loser portfolios characterized by proxies of high information uncertainty.
In other words, the noisier the fundamental information, the slower its incorporation
into prices, which is in accordance with underreaction of investors.
Regardless of the origins of momentum, be it risk or behavioral biases, it is most
puzzling why this anomaly is not arbitraged away. Explaining this observation Kora-
jczyk and Sadka (2004) and Lesmond, Schill, and Zhou (2004) detect trading costs to
be the single most important impediment to successfully implementing momentum
strategies in the U.S.. The amount of trading costs is not only driven by the huge
turnover but also by liquidity risk, hence, Chordia, Goyal, Sadka, Sadka, and Shiv-
akumar (2007) accordingly find the post-earnings-announcement drift to be confined
to illiquid securities. Even more so, Liu (2006) constructs a liquidity-augmented as-
set pricing model that almost captures the abnormal returns of standard U.S. price
momentum strategies. Extending this evidence, we find that international momen-
tum strategies also work better when limited to stocks with high idiosyncratic risk
or higher illiquidity, suggesting that limits to arbitrage deter rational investors from
exploiting the anomaly.
While momentum is a longstanding asset pricing anomaly, we lastly investigate a
more recent anomalous price pattern that has been discovered by Diether, Malloy,
and Scherbina (2002) for the U.S. equity market. We find that stocks exhibiting
high dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts do not only underperform in the U.S.
but also in some European countries. However, testing for the dispersion effect
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in many countries again calls for adequate multiple testing controls. Under this
paradigm it turns out that none of the na¨ıvely derived dispersion effects proves to
be a sustainable phenomenon—not even the U.S. dispersion effect.
At first glance, this result is highly unexpected and we feel the need for an economic
argument rationalizing the deficiencies inherent in the dispersion effects. A simple
analysis of the time series nature of the dispersion effect reveals that the positive
European return differentials amass in a very narrow time frame of three years, given
a total sample period of twenty years. On the other hand, the U.S. dispersion effect
provides a more favorable return pattern providing consistent abnormal returns most
of the time. Still, the U.S. and the European dispersion strategy have a common
characteristic in that they both have been very effective in hedging against the burst
of the technology bubble. However, we question the practicability of the respective
hedge strategy, because capturing the abnormal returns would have required short-
selling of technology firms way before their stock price peaks. Hence, most investors
following the dispersion strategy would have been squeezed out of the market by
margin calls just before the strategy would have become profitable. Our observation
that the latter bet appears to be the single driver of the na¨ıvely derived return
differentials therefore substantiates the doubts raised by our data snooping controls.
In further shaping intuition as to the dispersion effect’s nature, we find it to be
particularly pronounced among high and low dispersion stocks characterized by high
information uncertainty as measured by analyst coverage or total stock volatility.
In a related vein, Avramov, Chordia, Jostova, and Philipov (2008) find the U.S.
dispersion effect to be only profitable among the worst-rated firms while it is non-
existent for higher-rated firms. Likewise, Sadka and Scherbina (2007) show that
analyst disagreement is closely related to trading costs in the U.S.. In particular,
the mispricing is most severe for less liquid stocks. We corroborate this argument
by documenting the highest mispricing when limiting the sample to stocks with
high idiosyncratic volatility or to stocks subject to high illiquidity. This observation
suggests that high arbitrage costs additionally deter investors from exploiting the
dispersion effect.
To summarize, this thesis makes a strong case for using multiple testing procedures
when several hypotheses are examined at once. Especially, investigating three dis-
tinct types of financial market anomalies we demonstrate mechanisms and merits of
these recent procedures. Under this paradigm we find many anomalous asset price
patterns to be more apparent than real and, likewise, equity markets to be more
efficient than initially conjectured.
Chapter 2
The Accrual Anomaly
Judging a firm’s financial strength typically reduces to some bottom-line numbers,
of which earnings is the most important one. For earnings to represent a company’s
“real” periodic financial performance, accounting systems allow a company to record
its economic transactions for a given reporting period. Firms decompose earnings
into a cash flow and an accrual component. The accrual component gives the firm
the flexibility to attribute earnings to the current period, even if those earnings have
not yet been received in cash. Or the firm may reduce current earnings through de-
preciation expenses, although the corresponding cash transactions have been settled
in some prior reporting period.
Even though accruals are not bad per se, they allow for substantial earnings man-
agement. Hence, accrual accounting may be abused, since any firm’s management
wants to provide solid and sustainable earnings. In the words of Dechow and Schrand
(2004): “Manipulating accruals requires only a journal entry; manipulating cash
flows requires collusion with other parties or manipulations of transactions and/or
their timing.” For instance, to boost earnings, managers could increase accounts re-
ceivable by prematurely recording sales, or they could understate liabilities, or both.
Of course, heavy use of accrual accounting might trigger adverse earnings moves in
the future, because the accrual component of earnings is less reliable than is the
cash flow component. Therefore, low accruals may indicate high earnings quality,
while high accruals may indicate low earnings quality.
Most investors and analysts focus on earnings when judging the profitability of firms.
Therefore, it may well be that the additional information embedded in accruals goes
unnoticed and that markets might be inefficient in processing accruals-related in-
formation. To exploit this inefficiency, going long in firms with low accruals and
going short in those with high accruals is an obvious choice. Sloan (1996) docu-
ments abnormal returns of just such a hedge strategy in the U.S. equity market and
5
6 The Accrual Anomaly
various authors have confirmed his findings, subsequently referred to as the “accrual
anomaly.” For testing the robustness of the accrual anomaly it is straightforward
to investigate whether it does carry over to other equity markets. Given the U.S.
evidence and the literature on its potential causes, we can reasonably expect that
some of these arguments, behavioral or institutional in nature, carry over to other
equity markets even if accounting systems across the world are different.
2.1 Review of the Accrual Anomaly
To our knowledge, Sloan (1996) is the first author to document the accrual anomaly.
He argues that investors do not correctly appreciate the information embedded in
accruals, since they fixate on current earnings. To assess the impact of accrual
accounting, Sloan decomposes earnings into the cash flow component and the accrual
component. For computing the accrual component, Sloan uses the balance sheet
method
Accruals = (∆CA−∆Cash)− (∆CL−∆STD)− Dep, (2.1)
where ∆CA is the change in current assets, ∆Cash is the change in cash and cash
equivalents, ∆CL is the change in current liabilities, ∆STD is the change in debt
included in current liabilities, and Dep denotes depreciation and amortization ex-
pense.
2.1.1 Accrual Anomaly in the U.S.
Sloan (1996) provides empirical evidence that current earnings performance of U.S.
companies is more persistent for companies with low levels of accruals. As a result,
when forming their expectations on future earnings, investors tend to overweight
accruals and are subsequently surprised when accruals turn out to be less persistent
than expected. This overestimation of persistence in earnings that arise from accru-
als leads to abnormal positive returns for low accrual firms and abnormal negative
returns for high accrual firms. As Sloan (1996) shows for the U.S. market, the excess
returns of a hedge strategy based on accrual differences are statistically significant.
Following Sloan’s (1996) original finding, numerous studies have been published in
the financial economics and accounting literature, refining the measure of accruals
by further decomposing the accruals component to disentangle the underlying mech-
anisms. For instance, Chan, Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (2006) and Thomas
and Zhang (2002) identify inventories and accounts receivable to be the main drivers
of the accrual anomaly. Others relate the accrual anomaly to growth in net operat-
ing assets, e.g., Fairfield, Whisenant, and Yohn (2003) and Hirshleifer, Hou, Teoh,
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and Zhang (2004). Xie (2001) discovers that the mispricing is driven by abnormal
accruals as measured in Jones (1991). These abnormal accruals are also known as
discretionary accruals, suggesting that investors overprice accruals that are driven
by earnings management. All of these studies provide evidence that the accrual
anomaly is a stable and robust phenomenon in the U.S. equity market. Most re-
cently, Hirshleifer, Hou, and Teoh (2008) find that the effect of accrual mispricing is
reversed at the aggregate level. Aggregated accruals are a strong positive predictor
of market returns, making the accrual anomaly even more of a puzzle.
The literature has offered various explanations to rationalize the accrual anomaly:
Khan (2007) argues that the returns of the accrual-based hedge strategy compensate
for bearing distress risk, since companies with extreme accruals typically have a
higher risk of bankruptcy. Hirshleifer, Hou, and Teoh (2006) address these issues
by considering a generic accrual risk factor. Although this factor works well when
added to the standard Fama and French (1993) setting, one must be careful not
to jump to conclusions. As Hirshleifer, Hou, and Teoh note the accrual factor can
either capture risk or misvaluation. The authors further disentangle these effects
and conclude that the accrual anomaly is not consistent with a standard rational
asset-pricing framework.
Another line of research conjectures that the accrual anomaly is already subsumed
by some other empirical anomaly. For instance, Desai, Rajgopal, and Venkatachalam
(2004) find that the accrual anomaly vanishes when they control for value-glamour
effects. However, this result only holds if the ratio of operating cash flow to price
is the proxy for the value-glamour effect, which is rather uncommon in the finance
community. More common proxies for the value-glamour effect, such as book-to-
market, earnings-to-price, and cash flow-to-price, give different and inconclusive
results. Collins and Hribar (2000) relate the accrual anomaly to the post-earnings
announcement drift. Managers could use accruals to dampen the degree of earnings
surprise. However, providing evidence that a combined strategy yields even more
anomalous returns, Collins and Hribar conclude that both anomalies are distinct.
One may also wonder why the accrual anomaly is not arbitraged away. In explaining
this observation Mashruwala, Rajgopal, and Shevlin (2006) state that exploiting the
accruals’ mispricing is risky and costly. Within extreme accruals portfolios they find
small, low-volume stocks that have high arbitrage risk (which they measure by id-
iosyncratic risk arising from a standard market model). Thus, the accrual anomaly
persists, since arbitrageurs cannot find close substitutes. Also, Mashruwala, Raj-
gopal, and Shevlin evidence that the returns to the hedge strategy are too volatile,
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which might force the arbitrageur to either increase the margin or liquidate the
position.
Finally, Kraft, Leone, and Wasley (2006) argue that most of the accrual anomaly
studies lack appropriate robustness tests and suffer from selection biases. They
demonstrate the importance of robustness tests and suggest that the accrual anomaly
is mostly driven by outliers. Therefore, their result poses a significant challenge to
the question of whether investors truly fail to understand the low persistency accru-
als, as suggested by previous empirical research.
2.1.2 Accrual Anomaly—International Evidence
One way to test whether the U.S. accrual anomaly is just a statistical aberration or
whether it deserves deeper reconsideration of its behavioral and institutional causes,
is to use data from other countries. Following the line of reasoning presented in the
first part of the previous section, we might indeed suspect that the accrual anomaly
must also show up in other markets. However, in contrast to the U.S., evidence on
the accrual anomaly in other countries is sparse and conflicting.
The study of Pincus, Rajgopal, and Venkatachalam (2007) is the first published
international investigation that we know of. It is based on a sample of 20 developed
countries gathered from Global Vantage and spans the period 1994 to 2003. The
authors’ findings support accrual anomalous returns in the U.S., the U.K., Canada,
and Australia. They propose that the anomaly may be due to earnings management
and barriers to arbitrage. Using country-level data, they contend that the accrual
anomaly is more likely to occur in common-law countries, as opposed to code law
countries. Common law countries allow extensive use of accrual accounting and
have a lower concentration of share ownership and stronger shareholder protection.
However, there are different and contradicting theories arguing that the accrual
anomaly should be more or less pronounced in code law countries (e.g., Ball, Kothari,
and Robin, 2000).
LaFond (2005) also examines whether the accrual anomaly is a global phenomenon
and comes up with results that are different from those of Pincus, Rajgopal, and
Venkatachalam (2007). Except for the U.S., LaFond (2005) uses data from Datas-
tream/Worldscope over the 1989 to 2003 period. Within his sample of 17 developed
countries, he finds the accrual anomaly in 15 countries. According to LaFond, the
accrual anomaly is therefore not due to specific accounting measurement issues or
any institutional country-specific characteristic, but to the general use of accrual
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accounting. Using the same database for the period of 1989-2004, the study of Lio-
dakis, Brar, Gadaut, and Sharma (2004) supports LaFond’s findings. These authors
document high risk-adjusted performance of the accrual hedge strategy within a
broad sample of European countries.
2.2 Data
We use a comprehensive sample of companies domiciled in 29 equity markets gath-
ered from Datastream for the period from 1994 to 2007. We decompose earnings
into the cash flow component and the accrual component. For earnings, we use the
operating income that represents the difference between sales and total operating
expenses. To compute the accrual component, we use the balance sheet method in
equation (2.1) to ensure that our results are comparable to prior research studies
such as that of Sloan (1996). In essence, accruals are changes in non-cash working
capital less depreciation. To obtain the cash flow component, we take the differ-
ence between earnings and the accrual component. For comparison we standardize
accruals, cash flows, and earnings by the company’s total assets.
Table 2.1 contains information on the countries in our sample and the screening.
We classify the countries according to their legal system, i.e., whether they share
the common law or the code law legal tradition. We further categorize the code
law countries as being of German, French, or Scandinavian legal origin. For each
country, we collect companies by merging the live and dead research lists provided
by Datastream on July 2nd, 2007. The latter lists comprise companies in extreme
distress or those being merged, delisted, or converted; dead companies are included
to avoid survivorship bias. The combination of all live and dead research lists gives
an initial sample size of 99,591 companies.
To arrive at our final sample, we first adjust each country’s list for secondary issues
and cross-country listings to prevent double-counting. Second, we screen for non-
equity issues that may still remain, i.e., we exclude investment trusts, ADRs, and
the like. Third, we also exclude OTC stocks and stocks that are only listed on
regional exchanges.
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Table 2.1: Country Overview
The table contains descriptive information on the companies that have been domestically traded in the sample period (1994-2007). The screening of country lists depicts the evolution
of the countries’s samples. First, we give the total size of the country lists followed by the number of companies surviving the first screen for major listings. The column headed
final contains the number of companies surviving the last screen eliminating regional listings and the like. FMV is the average free-floating market value in million USD. Using this
metric we give the number of companies that exceed free-floating market values of 1000, 100 and 10 million USD. We further describe the sample of companies exceeding 10 million
USD in free-floating market capitalization. We give the number of a country’s dead companies (#Dead) and the number of companies with at least one accrual observation in the
sample period (#Accruals), along with respective percentage values (%-Dead and %-Accruals). The last two columns give the earliest month with sufficient Fama-French data and
the month of the filing deadline. The table provides information on common law countries in Panel A, while Panel B covers code law countries.
Country Region Screening of Country Lists FMV # Comps with FMV Sample: FMV> 10 Dates
Total Major F inal Mio. > 1000 > 100 > 10 #Dead %-Dead #Accruals %-Accruals FF filing
Panel A: Common Law Countries
USA America 36659 20030 7279 1917 1495 4206 6272 2554 40.7% 4111 65.5% Jul 92 3
Canada America 12313 7919 2826 626 286 1161 2179 838 38.5% 1230 56.4% May 89 4
Hong Kong Asia 1299 1170 1106 734 109 457 947 87 9.2% 759 80.1% Jun 97 6
Malaysia Asia 1381 1272 1109 246 53 316 853 58 6.8% 707 82.9% Jul 98 7
Thailand Asia 920 678 647 296 39 212 540 94 17.4% 391 72.4% Jul 98 3
Singapore Asia 778 671 592 643 62 242 525 68 13.0% 433 82.5% Feb 91 3
Australia Australia 3807 2375 2096 583 149 585 1441 257 17.8% 1038 72.0% Feb 91 4
New Zealand Australia 505 246 209 321 18 79 166 50 30.1% 94 56.6% Feb 91 4
United King-
dom
Europe 7677 3444 3232 1273 362 1135 2268 732 32.3% 1684 74.3% May 89 6
Ireland Europe 187 98 94 1580 23 56 85 26 30.6% 58 68.2% Feb 91 6
India Asia 3345 2668 2022 509 162 595 951 113 11.9% 515 54.2% Jul 97 6
Panel B: Code Law Countries
Germany Europe 10740 1833 1525 1050 140 469 1017 228 22.4% 626 61.6% May 89 8
Austria Europe 360 177 161 857 23 70 119 31 26.1% 65 54.6% May 89 6
Switzerland Europe 1130 387 316 3589 74 211 277 49 17.7% 193 69.7% May 89 6
Japan Asia 4995 4706 3463 1297 562 1880 3172 315 9.9% 2712 85.5% May 89 3
South Korea Asia 2683 2102 2055 386 115 590 1740 134 7.7% 817 47.0% Apr 00 6
Taiwan Asia 984 905 794 693 98 496 730 60 8.2% 651 89.2% Jun 97 4
France Europe 2643 1458 1368 1778 161 459 945 258 27.3% 641 67.8% May 89 6
Italy Europe 794 390 365 2557 99 234 345 95 27.5% 248 71.9% May 89 4
Greece Europe 523 393 360 569 35 177 338 57 16.9% 265 78.4% Jun 98 6
Indonesia Asia 656 486 386 278 23 131 270 19 7.0% 181 67.0% Mar 92 4
Spain Europe 311 204 180 3744 65 138 170 51 30.0% 131 77.1% Feb 92 6
Portugal Europe 296 146 134 786 21 51 92 48 52.2% 59 64.1% Jun 97 6
Netherlands Europe 791 272 250 3543 68 136 201 77 38.3% 156 77.6% May 89 5
Belgium Europe 1000 288 263 1164 39 110 206 40 19.4% 110 53.4% May 89 6
Sweden Europe 1203 549 441 1011 58 198 346 109 31.5% 273 78.9% May 89 6
Norway Europe 585 328 284 712 32 154 254 98 38.6% 194 76.4% May 89 6
Denmark Europe 685 365 230 761 32 118 197 55 27.9% 123 62.4% May 89 6
Finland Europe 341 190 180 1535 37 96 159 42 26.4% 131 82.4% Mar 91 6
All 99591 55750 33967 1199 4440 14762 26805 6643 32.9% 18596 69.4%
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We further exclude those having market capitalization below 10 million USD. While
these adjustments impact all country lists, the effect is most pronounced for the
U.S., where the final country list is restricted to stocks listed on NYSE, AMEX,
and NASDAQ. We further exclude those companies from the sample that either
have missing data in any of the above financial statement variables, or for which we
cannot compute the accruals, or both. These are mostly financial companies, for
which accruals are not very meaningful figures. Our final sample comprises 18,596
companies. Table 2.2 summarizes the number of companies with accrual levels by
country and year. The majority of firm-year observations is concentrated in the U.S.
(32,282), Japan (22,941), and the U.K. (11,461). The total of firm-year observations
is 132,493. When restricted to the time period and countries used in prior studies,
our universe is smaller than that of LaFond (2005) (77,571 compared to 130,188
firm-years) and slightly larger than the one of Pincus, Rajgopal, and Venkatachalam
(2007) (70,359 compared to 62,027 firm-years). Note that we exclude 0.37% of firm-
years due to observations with absurd accruals, i.e., the absolute value of the ratio
of accruals to total assets exceeds one.
2.2.1 Return Data
Ince and Porter (2006) show that one cannot detect the U.S. momentum effect using
raw Datastream data. Comparing Datastream with the CRSP tapes, they develop a
set of rules that enables researchers to nonetheless obtain valid statistical inference
from the Datastream database. In particular, they propose two major adjustments.
One is to remove non-common equity from the respective country research lists and
the other is to screen for irregular return patterns. Since we have already dealt with
the former when deleting preferred stock and other secondary issues, we only have to
address the quality of return data by following the suggestions of Ince and Porter.
We consider monthly local currency stock returns inclusive of dividends by using
total return figures. To represent the respective markets, we use common indexes.
For instance, we choose the MSCI USA for the U.S. and for Japan we choose the
TOPIX. Three-month T-bills of the respective countries serve as the risk-free rates.
Table 2.3 demonstrates the effectiveness of our screening endeavors. Panel A gives an
overview of the return data screening on country level, i.e., we track the total number
of changes made per country in absolute and relative terms. For instance, the U.S.
requires to change 0.07% of return observations which represents the smallest figure
in the sample, while Switzerland is at the other end of the scale with 0.85%. This
figure is on average 0.33% across all countries.
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Table 2.2: Companies with Accruals
The table displays the number of companies for which accruals can be computed for a given year. The two rightmost columns give the amount of absurd
accruals, i.e., observations where the absolute value of the ratio of accruals to total assets exceeds one. Panel A covers common law countries and Panel
B covers code law countries.
Country/Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Σ Absurd Accruals
#firm years absolute relative
Panel A: Common Law Countries
USA 1221 1317 1800 2015 2354 2750 3248 3145 2987 2920 2924 2883 2818 32382 111 0.34%
Canada 209 224 231 275 306 343 521 602 653 703 789 831 851 6538 36 0.55%
Hong Kong 69 73 99 161 224 249 253 277 414 552 643 705 715 4434 57 1.29%
Malaysia 118 121 139 201 225 252 260 279 405 477 509 578 645 4209 18 0.43%
Thailand 104 139 149 164 182 195 194 194 274 270 313 344 350 2872 14 0.49%
Singapore 61 63 80 120 135 145 150 168 237 285 326 357 389 2516 13 0.52%
Australia 98 100 113 144 175 187 223 286 399 625 668 732 834 4584 69 1.51%
New Zealand 17 17 26 33 40 45 47 51 54 62 65 69 71 597 4 0.67%
UK 581 606 637 656 841 924 950 928 942 999 1061 1148 1188 11461 57 0.50%
Ireland 29 31 32 32 42 44 46 46 46 46 45 44 45 528 2 0.38%
India 80 96 107 173 195 212 218 219 260 306 319 377 449 3011 4 0.13%
Panel B: Code Law Countries
Germany 209 242 251 255 341 431 469 476 491 469 487 492 479 5092 18 0.35%
Austria 20 25 33 33 39 48 51 53 54 51 50 47 46 550 1 0.18%
Switzerland 84 92 99 108 135 146 146 150 159 162 168 168 161 1778 0 0.00%
Japan 843 882 787 1460 1528 1542 1662 2166 2284 2406 2429 2461 2491 22941 7 0.03%
South Korea 28 53 140 161 199 241 325 514 570 636 732 755 770 5124 21 0.41%
Taiwan 22 37 87 162 180 193 198 308 397 610 627 632 630 4083 1 0.02%
France 215 233 241 259 348 406 457 476 477 463 476 476 477 5004 14 0.28%
Italy 81 83 93 99 120 147 167 182 190 191 198 202 196 1949 2 0.10%
Greece 65 75 79 78 108 123 134 167 197 214 208 205 205 1858 2 0.11%
Indonesia 47 51 53 76 86 91 92 107 147 160 167 166 171 1414 5 0.35%
Spain 64 66 68 72 90 92 99 102 105 102 102 105 99 1166 0 0.00%
Portugal 24 25 30 34 46 42 44 42 42 40 39 37 34 479 1 0.21%
Netherlands 96 101 103 106 128 146 145 126 120 117 113 112 103 1516 8 0.53%
Belgium 43 46 49 51 69 85 87 85 84 83 87 86 86 941 2 0.21%
Sweden 64 74 85 92 139 174 189 188 186 185 196 206 194 1972 10 0.51%
Norway 48 55 57 61 110 121 123 100 102 105 115 124 119 1240 2 0.16%
Denmark 70 72 75 77 95 104 107 99 94 93 93 89 87 1155 6 0.52%
Finland 50 56 58 59 79 96 99 98 104 103 98 99 100 1099 2 0.18%
Σ 4660 5055 5801 7217 8559 9574 10704 11634 12474 13435 14047 14530 14803 132493 487 0.37%
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2.2.2 Assessment of Data Quality
To measure the increase in data quality, we first use raw Datastream data to compute
the correlation between an equally weighted portfolio and a broad market index of
the respective country. Then we compare the initial correlation to the correlation
that we obtain using cleaned Datastream data. For Canada, Ireland, Spain and the
Netherlands, the results are especially startling. The initial return correlation of the
respective market index with an equally weighted portfolio comprising all stocks is
close to zero. Using the adjusted data correlations exceed 0.7 in all three cases.
However, data screening is also important for the remaining countries. For 15 coun-
tries we achieve correlation gains greater than 0.15, and for ten countries the gains
exceed 0.4, giving rise to correlations around 0.7 or well above for almost all coun-
tries. We note that the return issues concentrate in smaller-size companies, since the
gains in correlation are more moderate when we use only the largest 10% of compa-
nies as a benchmark. Only for India and Indonesia do we fail to obtain reasonable
correlation figures after cleaning.
To further demonstrate the quality of the adjusted database, we check for the well-
known price momentum effect before and after screening. Price momentum refers to
the observation that past winning stocks continue to deliver superior returns in the
short run while past losing stocks subsequently continue to disappoint. Particularly,
we compute the momentum-factor by using a standard approach, i.e., each month
we rank a country’s stocks according to their previous 12-month performance. The
returns of the momentum strategy are then given by the returns of a portfolio that
is long in the winner quintile and short in the loser quintile of each month. At first
glance, inferences do not appear to be severely impacted when using raw data. Our
analysis reveals significant returns for 14 (15) countries at the 5% (10%)-level for
the raw data while we obtain 17 (20) countries with significant returns in the case
of cleaned data. However, among the 29 test statistics, 16 do experience a change
in terms of statistical significance before and after cleaning. In particular, using raw
return data does not indicate a momentum effect for the U.S. and falsely detects
an Asian momentum effect while missing several European momentum anomalies.
After cleaning, the momentum effect for the U.S. is statistically significant. Hence,
using the cleaned database provides evidence that is consistent with prior results
on international momentum strategies as documented by Rouwenhorst (1998) or
Griffin, Ji, and Martin (2003, 2005).
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Table 2.3: Cleaning of Return Data
Panel A records the total changes made to the return data in absolute and relative terms. In Panel
B, we compare the correlation of an equally-weighted portfolio to a broad market index before and
after data cleaning, using all stocks or a portfolio of the country’s top ten %. Panel C reports
average monthly buy-and-hold returns to price momentum portfolios with t-statistics in bold face
if significant at 5% and in italics if significant at 10%. Data are from May 1994 to February 2007.
A: Issues B: Sanity Correlation Check C: Momentum
Country Σ Portfolio Correlation Before After
initial final Hi-Lo t-stat Hi-Lo t-stat
694 all stocks 0.609 0.750 Return -0.009 0.013
USA
0.07% top ten% 0.875 0.897 Volatility 0.168
-0.65
0.061
2.67
356 all stocks 0.049 0.728 Return -0.004 0.010
Canada
0.11% top ten% 0.726 0.778 Volatility 0.132
-0.33
0.049
2.57
413 all stocks 0.413 0.578 Return 0.018 0.007
Hong Kong
0.28% top ten% 0.753 0.784 Volatility 0.102
2.23
0.059
1.51
119 all stocks 0.844 0.847 Return 0.006 0.004
Malaysia
0.09% top ten% 0.906 0.923 Volatility 0.080
0.91
0.069
0.68
490 all stocks 0.627 0.750 Return 0.024 0.006
Thailand
0.59% top ten% 0.550 0.916 Volatility 0.129
2.33
0.085
0.93
60 all stocks 0.785 0.789 Return 0.010 0.007
Singapore
0.07% top ten% 0.878 0.892 Volatility 0.064
1.95
0.061
1.52
273 all stocks 0.475 0.617 Return -0.003 0.006
Australia
0.12% top ten% 0.218 0.869 Volatility 0.087
-0.39
0.047
1.71
33 all stocks 0.660 0.697 Return 0.012 0.010
New Zealand
0.13% top ten% 0.571 0.838 Volatility 0.068
2.27
0.050
2.48
364 all stocks 0.594 0.664 Return 0.018 0.014
UK
0.10% top ten% 0.825 0.843 Volatility 0.046
4.92
0.040
4.43
21 all stocks 0.049 0.703 Return 0.020 0.010
Ireland
0.16% top ten% 0.786 0.786 Volatility 0.110
2.27
0.068
1.77
500 all stocks -0.024 -0.027 Return -0.007 0.014
India
0.34% top ten% -0.010 -0.020 Volatility 0.469
-0.18
0.058
3.12
855 all stocks 0.267 0.725 Return 0.124 0.016
Germany
0.55% top ten% 0.397 0.867 Volatility 0.946
1.63
0.054
3.65
66 all stocks 0.188 0.784 Return 0.015 0.005
Austria
0.36% top ten% -0.061 0.799 Volatility 0.133
1.42
0.036
1.75
361 all stocks 0.322 0.806 Return 0.029 0.015
Switzerland
0.85% top ten% 0.108 0.848 Volatility 0.122
2.95
0.049
3.77
403 all stocks 0.623 0.743 Return 0.014 0.002
Japan
0.08% top ten% 0.329 0.876 Volatility 0.082
2.17
0.047
0.50
1490 all stocks 0.660 0.723 Return 0.029 0.003
South Korea
0.56% top ten% 0.859 0.879 Volatility 0.168
2.16
0.093
0.37
6 all stocks 0.848 0.849 Return -0.001 0.001
Taiwan
0.01% top ten% 0.933 0.933 Volatility 0.073
-0.22
0.068
0.16
590 all stocks 0.323 0.729 Return 0.092 0.012
France
0.41% top ten% 0.632 0.869 Volatility 0.790
1.45
0.049
3.09
66 all stocks 0.779 0.856 Return 0.016 0.011
Italy
0.12% top ten% 0.752 0.919 Volatility 0.067
2.94
0.053
2.57
117 all stocks 0.335 0.556 Return 0.027 0.016
Greece
0.22% top ten% 0.595 0.710 Volatility 0.115
2.96
0.071
2.85
183 all stocks -0.018 -0.128 Return 0.015 -0.002
Indonesia
0.44% top ten% -0.184 -0.177 Volatility 0.119
1.55
0.091
-0.29
153 all stocks 0.031 0.804 Return 0.035 0.012
Spain
0.58% top ten% -0.030 0.688 Volatility 0.174
2.49
0.052
2.92
108 all stocks 0.520 0.678 Return 0.005 0.008
Portugal
0.76% top ten% 0.293 0.859 Volatility 1.334
0.04
0.065
1.48
121 all stocks 0.086 0.768 Return 0.255 0.021
Netherlands
0.39% top ten% 0.577 0.759 Volatility 2.911
1.09
0.059
4.36
117 all stocks 0.140 0.811 Return 0.007 0.015
Belgium
0.37% top ten% 0.091 0.910 Volatility 0.560
0.16
0.041
4.44
221 all stocks 0.319 0.772 Return -0.013 0.021
Sweden
0.41% top ten% 0.636 0.812 Volatility 0.572
-0.27
0.073
3.67
112 all stocks 0.633 0.750 Return 0.023 0.021
Norway
0.29% top ten% 0.509 0.729 Volatility 0.103
2.84
0.065
3.98
233 all stocks 0.071 0.619 Return 0.064 0.012
Denmark
0.77% top ten% 0.353 0.777 Volatility 0.373
2.12
0.037
3.98
97 all stocks 0.709 0.721 Return 0.036 0.019
Finland
0.40% top ten% 0.628 0.758 Volatility 0.116
3.86
0.055
4.24
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2.3 The Traditional Route to the Accrual Anomaly
To quantify the accrual anomaly, we take the traditional approach and construct
a hedge strategy that is long in low accruals companies and short in high accruals
companies. We fix the holding period of companies in the hedge strategy to one year,
following the filing deadline of the respective fiscal year end. Hence, we assume a
given firms’ financial statements to be publicly available at that time. Since the
companies’ reporting periods do not necessarily coincide, we rank companies by
their annual accrual levels on a monthly basis. By doing so, we can react as fast as
possible to any given accruals signal.1 Each month, we build a portfolio that is long
in the lowest and short in the highest accruals quintile. We do not require companies
to have accruals figures for the subsequent year. Therefore, we circumvent the look-
ahead bias of other studies, as reported in Kraft, Leone, and Wasley (2006).
2.3.1 Risk and Return
Table 2.4 reports equally weighted monthly mean returns on buy-and-hold quintile
portfolios built yearly according to their level of accruals. For half of the countries,
the extreme quintile portfolios are the riskiest in terms of volatility. The remaining
quintile portfolios usually exhibit less volatility. However, the other half of the coun-
tries is characterized by volatility figures that are almost identical across quintiles.
To assess the profitability of the hedge strategy, we consider the return differential
along with its t-statistic. Using this metric, we identify eight out of 29 countries that
have anomalous accrual returns on a 5% level or better. The eight countries are the
U.S., the U.K., Thailand, Japan, Germany, Switzerland, France, and Denmark. If we
relax the significance level to 10%, no additional country appears to be anomalous.
Concerning the nine suspicious countries we note that the accruals screen is some-
times useful for detecting overvalued companies or undervalued companies, or both.
Hence, sometimes both extreme accrual quintile portfolios appear to be mispriced.
In this context, Chan, Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (2006) argue that if man-
agers are manipulating earnings, they will most likely opt for higher earnings figures
instead of lower ones. As a consequence, the poor performance of the highest ac-
cruals quintile is the most likely driver of a given accrual anomaly.
1Alternatively, we can rank companies by their accrual levels on a yearly basis. For a given
year, we would obviously require all companies’ balance sheet data, i.e., we would have to wait up
to the filing deadline following fiscal year end. By then, it may well be that any accruals signal
induced by companies reporting before calendar year end is already rendered useless.
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Table 2.4: Returns of Accruals Quintile Portfolios
The table gives average monthly buy-and-hold returns to quintile portfolios that are built monthly
dependent on the level of accruals. We give the return differential of a portfolio long in the lowest
accruals quintile and short in the highest accruals quintile along with the according t-statistic that
is in in bold face if significant on a 5%-level or in italics if significant on a 10%-level. All figures
refer to the period from May 1994 to February 2007.
Portfolio Accrual Ranking
Country Lowest 2 3 4 Highest Lo-Hi t-stat
Return 0.032 0.024 0.022 0.020 0.022 0.010
USA
Standard Deviation 0.072 0.054 0.051 0.058 0.069 0.021
5.93
Return 0.034 0.034 0.021 0.022 0.027 0.007
Canada
Standard Deviation 0.106 0.088 0.072 0.074 0.062 0.111
0.79
Return 0.018 0.017 0.013 0.008 0.013 0.006
Hong Kong
Standard Deviation 0.102 0.084 0.080 0.085 0.108 0.044
1.56
Return 0.014 0.012 0.014 0.010 0.013 0.001
Malaysia
Standard Deviation 0.112 0.103 0.113 0.104 0.116 0.032
0.51
Return 0.021 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.008 0.013
Thailand
Standard Deviation 0.090 0.084 0.078 0.078 0.096 0.055
2.85
Return 0.017 0.013 0.011 0.015 0.014 0.003
Singapore
Standard Deviation 0.102 0.085 0.088 0.093 0.097 0.044
0.88
Return 0.016 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.014 0.002
Australia
Standard Deviation 0.055 0.044 0.047 0.051 0.054 0.035
0.72
Return 0.013 0.020 0.013 0.014 0.012 0.001
New Zealand
Standard Deviation 0.055 0.053 0.055 0.051 0.058 0.049
0.29
Return 0.017 0.014 0.014 0.012 0.011 0.006
UK
Standard Deviation 0.052 0.043 0.042 0.041 0.048 0.024
3.10
Return 0.024 0.017 0.018 0.021 0.018 0.006
Ireland
Standard Deviation 0.084 0.072 0.059 0.071 0.065 0.086
0.92
Return 0.029 0.032 0.028 0.034 0.028 0.001
India
Standard Deviation 0.094 0.094 0.092 0.097 0.091 0.038
0.37
Return 0.016 0.013 0.013 0.011 0.010 0.006
Germany
Standard Deviation 0.052 0.041 0.043 0.047 0.054 0.030
2.33
Return 0.013 0.016 0.011 0.014 0.014 -0.001
Austria
Standard Deviation 0.046 0.058 0.043 0.051 0.055 0.056
-0.16
Return 0.017 0.014 0.017 0.014 0.009 0.008
Switzerland
Standard Deviation 0.057 0.047 0.043 0.046 0.055 0.032
2.99
Return 0.010 0.007 0.007 0.005 0.007 0.003
Japan
Standard Deviation 0.061 0.056 0.056 0.057 0.066 0.016
2.40
Return 0.014 0.021 0.018 0.013 0.009 0.005
South Korea
Standard Deviation 0.108 0.109 0.103 0.108 0.118 0.052
1.17
Return 0.017 0.018 0.019 0.018 0.019 -0.002
Taiwan
Standard Deviation 0.094 0.091 0.092 0.087 0.089 0.052
-0.48
Return 0.022 0.017 0.018 0.017 0.015 0.007
France
Standard Deviation 0.055 0.048 0.049 0.050 0.055 0.029
2.80
Return 0.016 0.012 0.007 0.009 0.010 0.006
Italy
Standard Deviation 0.071 0.061 0.059 0.066 0.069 0.049
1.50
Return 0.031 0.028 0.033 0.029 0.037 -0.006
Greece
Standard Deviation 0.126 0.113 0.123 0.128 0.151 0.090
-0.76
Return 0.029 0.035 0.032 0.031 0.042 -0.014
Indonesia
Standard Deviation 0.122 0.128 0.126 0.118 0.118 0.092
-1.82
Return 0.028 0.030 0.025 0.019 0.027 0.001
Spain
Standard Deviation 0.069 0.065 0.062 0.054 0.064 0.061
0.22
Return 0.018 0.021 0.029 0.009 0.012 0.006
Netherlands
Standard Deviation 0.071 0.073 0.084 0.064 0.070 0.089
0.87
Return 0.018 0.019 0.020 0.017 0.015 0.002
Belgium
Standard Deviation 0.064 0.058 0.058 0.058 0.061 0.049
0.62
Return 0.018 0.014 0.011 0.019 0.015 0.002
Portugal
Standard Deviation 0.057 0.055 0.057 0.058 0.065 0.064
0.47
Return 0.025 0.021 0.023 0.022 0.021 0.005
Sweden
Standard Deviation 0.077 0.064 0.069 0.065 0.073 0.046
1.25
Return 0.027 0.024 0.017 0.020 0.024 0.003
Norway
Standard Deviation 0.097 0.074 0.060 0.076 0.079 0.064
0.60
Return 0.020 0.015 0.018 0.017 0.012 0.008
Denmark
Standard Deviation 0.051 0.046 0.041 0.051 0.050 0.044
2.26
Return 0.026 0.020 0.016 0.019 0.026 0.000
Finland
Standard Deviation 0.073 0.059 0.055 0.057 0.086 0.063
0.02
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Next, we report the descriptive statistics of accrual-based quintile portfolios by
country. Tables 2.5 to 2.7 give the arithmetic means of the earnings components
and two risk proxies, beta and log-size. Consistent with prior studies, we find a
negative relation between accruals and cash flows in all countries and a positive
relation between accruals and earnings. We compute the betas of the countries’
quintile portfolios according to the classical regression
Rit − RFt = αi + βi(RMt − RFt) + εit, (2.2)
where Rit denotes the gross return of quintile i, RFt is the risk-free rate, and RMt is
the market return of the country under examination. The extreme quintile portfolios
exhibit high betas for two thirds of the countries, while the remaining portfolios
appear to be homogeneous in terms of beta. Also, there is a size bias for the two
extreme quintile portfolios. When we examine size measured in terms of total assets,
we find that the two extreme portfolios are mostly populated by smaller companies
in 26 out of 29 countries.
2.3.2 Fama-French Momentum Regressions
If we solely examine absolute returns of the hedge strategies, we might draw some
false conclusions on the accrual strategies. Since some strategies show high volatility,
the risk-adjusted performance may not be that convincing. Hence, we check whether
the long-short portfolio returns can be attributed to common risk factors. We adopt
the standard approach of Fama and French (1993), which we extend by an additional
momentum factor, hence, we estimate the regression equation
RLt − RHt = α + β(RMt − RFt) + γRSMBt + δRHMLt + ηRWMLt + εt, (2.3)
where RLt − RHt is the return difference of the lowest accruals quintile and the
highest accruals quintile. For each country we compute country-specific factors as
follows: A country’s broad market index represents its market return RMt. A small
cap index minus the risk-free rate, RSCt − RFt, mimics the size factor RSMBt. The
value factor RHMLt is the difference between a value index and the corresponding
growth index, RV t − RGt. We compute the momentum-factor using a standard
approach, i.e., each month we rank a country’s stocks according to their previous
12-month performance. The returns to the momentum factor, RWMLt, are then
given by the returns of a strategy that is long in the winner quintile and short in
the loser quintile of each month.
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Table 2.5: Descriptive Statistics of Accruals Quintile Portfolios 1/3
The table gives mean values of the earnings components as well as two risk proxies, beta and
log-size, over the whole period. Quintile portfolios are built yearly dependent on the level of
accruals. In particular, accruals are computed as given in equation 2.1, earnings are approximated
by operating income and cash flows are the difference between the two. All three components are
standardized by the companies’ total assets. As for risk proxies we consider the quintile portfolios’
betas (arising from a standard CAPM) and size being measured as the average of log(total assets).
The last column contains the difference between the extreme quintile portfolios’ mean accruals
figures.
Portfolio Accrual Ranking
Country Lowest 2 3 4 Highest Spread Hi-Lo
Panel A: Common Law Countries
Accruals -0.176 -0.072 -0.039 -0.007 0.081
Cash Flows 0.101 0.112 0.089 0.052 -0.034
USA Earnings -0.075 0.040 0.049 0.045 0.047 0.257
Beta 1.442 1.083 1.030 1.166 1.393
Size 12.062 12.914 13.083 12.639 11.933
Accruals -0.185 -0.078 -0.042 -0.010 0.077
Cash Flows 0.144 0.110 0.079 0.023 -0.063
Canada Earnings -0.041 0.032 0.037 0.014 0.014 0.262
Beta 0.777 0.562 0.495 0.594 0.540
Size 12.145 12.869 12.938 12.282 11.741
Accruals -0.200 -0.061 -0.020 0.016 0.132
Cash Flows 0.140 0.106 0.060 0.033 -0.081
Hong Kong Earnings -0.060 0.045 0.040 0.049 0.050 0.332
Beta 1.075 0.880 0.828 0.887 1.132
Size 13.631 14.375 14.748 14.611 13.777
Accruals -0.158 -0.050 -0.014 0.019 0.117
Cash Flows 0.187 0.109 0.068 0.043 -0.044
Malaysia Earnings 0.029 0.059 0.053 0.061 0.073 0.275
Beta 0.921 0.842 0.925 0.856 0.964
Size 12.889 13.346 13.299 13.171 12.952
Accruals -0.188 -0.078 -0.042 -0.004 0.112
Cash Flows 0.214 0.140 0.111 0.069 -0.053
Thailand Earnings 0.026 0.062 0.069 0.065 0.059 0.300
Beta 1.010 0.954 0.865 0.862 1.065
Size 14.974 15.241 15.273 15.279 15.170
Accruals -0.162 -0.059 -0.025 0.010 0.116
Cash Flows 0.158 0.114 0.075 0.044 -0.041
Singapore Earnings -0.004 0.055 0.051 0.053 0.075 0.278
Beta 1.048 0.878 0.910 0.949 0.987
Size 12.359 12.879 12.978 12.716 12.456
Accruals -0.209 -0.073 -0.035 -0.004 0.106
Cash Flows 0.121 0.085 0.036 -0.006 -0.128
Australia Earnings -0.089 0.012 0.001 -0.009 -0.023 0.315
Beta 0.870 0.627 0.683 0.745 0.830
Size 11.583 12.430 12.149 11.663 11.424
Accruals -0.157 -0.065 -0.030 -0.003 0.084
Cash Flows 0.250 0.172 0.111 0.098 0.011
New Zealand Earnings 0.093 0.107 0.080 0.095 0.096 0.241
Beta 1.105 0.978 1.137 0.884 1.136
Size 12.208 13.006 12.920 12.523 12.010
Accruals -0.185 -0.074 -0.039 -0.007 0.091
Cash Flows 0.142 0.129 0.097 0.057 -0.054
UK Earnings -0.043 0.055 0.058 0.050 0.037 0.276
Beta 1.156 0.922 0.901 0.872 1.048
Size 10.811 11.783 12.021 11.585 10.756
Accruals -0.142 -0.053 -0.027 -0.002 0.064
Cash Flows 0.131 0.120 0.092 0.055 -0.023
Ireland Earnings -0.011 0.067 0.065 0.052 0.042 0.206
Beta 1.187 1.183 0.857 1.085 1.068
Size 11.550 12.803 12.785 12.225 11.317
Accruals -0.144 -0.053 -0.017 0.018 0.102
Cash Flows 0.219 0.144 0.113 0.081 0.005
India Earnings 0.075 0.091 0.096 0.099 0.108 0.246
Beta 0.873 0.855 0.869 0.920 0.865
Size 15.616 16.029 15.889 15.672 15.560
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Table 2.6: Descriptive Statistics of Accruals Quintile Portfolios 2/3
The table gives mean values of the earnings components as well as two risk proxies, beta and
log-size, over the whole period. Quintile portfolios are built yearly dependent on the level of
accruals. In particular, accruals are computed as given in equation 2.1, earnings are approximated
by operating income and cash flows are the difference between the two. All three components are
standardized by the companies’ total assets. As for risk proxies we consider the quintile portfolios’
betas (arising from a standard CAPM) and size being measured as the average of log(total assets).
The last column contains the difference between the extreme quintile portfolios’ mean accruals
figures.
Portfolio Accrual Ranking
Country Lowest 2 3 4 Highest Spread Hi-Lo
Panel B: Code Law Countries
Accruals -0.226 -0.095 -0.050 -0.009 0.105
Cash Flows 0.161 0.112 0.081 0.034 -0.074
Germany Earnings -0.065 0.018 0.031 0.026 0.031 0.331
Beta 1.067 0.829 0.898 0.991 1.163
Size 11.747 12.557 12.696 12.493 11.704
Accruals -0.163 -0.081 -0.049 -0.018 0.064
Cash Flows 0.174 0.105 0.089 0.045 -0.024
Austria Earnings 0.011 0.024 0.040 0.027 0.040 0.227
Beta 1.103 1.522 1.047 1.321 1.442
Size 12.754 12.857 13.215 12.902 12.352
Accruals -0.150 -0.067 -0.041 -0.018 0.044
Cash Flows 0.164 0.118 0.101 0.070 0.013
Switzerland Earnings 0.014 0.051 0.060 0.052 0.057 0.194
Beta 1.314 1.041 0.951 1.035 1.254
Size 13.039 13.666 13.555 13.591 13.062
Accruals -0.101 -0.049 -0.029 -0.009 0.045
Cash Flows 0.139 0.092 0.074 0.054 0.005
Japan Earnings 0.038 0.043 0.044 0.045 0.050 0.146
Beta 1.018 0.937 0.935 0.952 1.109
Size 17.901 18.141 18.008 17.841 17.517
Accruals -0.171 -0.068 -0.030 0.009 0.108
Cash Flows 0.195 0.124 0.089 0.051 -0.046
South Korea Earnings 0.024 0.057 0.059 0.060 0.062 0.279
Beta 0.811 0.743 0.719 0.721 0.821
Size 19.568 19.891 19.822 19.603 19.345
Accruals -0.128 -0.053 -0.024 0.006 0.088
Cash Flows 0.163 0.102 0.073 0.051 -0.021
Taiwan Earnings 0.035 0.049 0.049 0.056 0.068 0.216
Beta 1.039 1.016 1.027 0.971 0.977
Size 16.140 16.173 16.119 16.063 15.982
Accruals -0.175 -0.074 -0.041 -0.012 0.069
Cash Flows 0.182 0.123 0.098 0.073 -0.002
France Earnings 0.007 0.049 0.056 0.061 0.068 0.244
Beta 1.224 1.046 1.014 1.129 1.248
Size 12.039 12.963 13.300 12.828 11.802
Accruals -0.156 -0.069 -0.041 -0.010 0.065
Cash Flows 0.150 0.102 0.083 0.046 -0.037
Italy Earnings -0.007 0.033 0.042 0.036 0.029 0.221
Beta 1.130 0.984 0.964 1.082 1.062
Size 12.979 13.339 13.397 13.231 12.586
Accruals -0.176 -0.054 -0.010 0.041 0.154
Cash Flows 0.224 0.125 0.073 0.026 -0.087
Greece Earnings 0.048 0.071 0.064 0.067 0.067 0.330
Beta 0.968 0.883 0.966 1.018 1.149
Size 11.304 11.609 11.479 11.235 11.130
Accruals -0.182 -0.067 -0.026 0.014 0.133
Cash Flows 0.228 0.149 0.111 0.080 -0.031
Indonesia Earnings 0.046 0.082 0.085 0.094 0.102 0.315
Beta 1.058 1.114 1.082 1.006 0.903
Size 20.464 21.020 20.925 20.715 20.523
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Table 2.7: Descriptive Statistics of Accruals Quintile Portfolios 3/3
Quintile portfolios are built yearly dependent on the level of accruals. The table gives mean values
of the earnings components as well as two risk proxies, beta and log-size, over the whole period. In
particular, accruals are computed as given in equation 2.1, earnings are approximated by operating
income and cash flows are the difference between the two. All three components are standardized by
the companies’ total assets. As for risk proxies we consider the quintile portfolios’ betas (arising
from a standard CAPM) and size being measured as the average of log(total assets). The last
column contains the difference between the extreme quintile portfolios’ mean accruals figures.
Portfolio Accrual Ranking
Country Lowest 2 3 4 Highest Spread Hi-Lo
Panel B: Code Law Countries (continued)
Accruals -0.144 -0.069 -0.042 -0.012 0.073
Cash Flows 0.191 0.132 0.099 0.071 -0.016
Spain Earnings 0.047 0.063 0.057 0.059 0.057 0.217
Beta 1.198 0.967 1.025 0.947 1.114
Size 13.047 13.677 13.678 13.381 12.730
Accruals -0.159 -0.078 -0.047 -0.014 0.055
Cash Flows 0.171 0.126 0.074 0.046 -0.030
Portugal Earnings 0.012 0.048 0.028 0.031 0.025 0.214
Beta 1.181 1.149 1.320 1.105 0.748
Size 12.600 13.212 13.178 12.832 12.450
Accruals -0.194 -0.083 -0.046 -0.012 0.079
Cash Flows 0.204 0.164 0.134 0.105 0.024
Netherlands Earnings 0.010 0.081 0.088 0.093 0.103 0.273
Beta 1.180 1.062 1.070 1.058 1.119
Size 12.081 13.361 13.308 12.787 12.173
Accruals -0.155 -0.082 -0.053 -0.021 0.064
Cash Flows 0.184 0.127 0.094 0.070 -0.010
Belgium Earnings 0.030 0.045 0.041 0.049 0.054 0.219
Beta 1.554 1.287 1.134 1.182 1.387
Size 12.465 12.935 13.144 12.624 11.821
Accruals -0.167 -0.068 -0.036 -0.007 0.072
Cash Flows 0.101 0.106 0.082 0.050 -0.038
Sweden Earnings -0.066 0.038 0.046 0.044 0.034 0.239
Beta 1.022 0.778 0.841 0.805 0.977
Size 13.467 14.453 14.793 14.201 13.564
Accruals -0.191 -0.081 -0.045 -0.009 0.092
Cash Flows 0.122 0.091 0.079 0.054 -0.063
Norway Earnings -0.069 0.010 0.035 0.045 0.030 0.283
Beta 1.429 0.984 0.847 1.105 1.221
Size 13.494 14.320 14.523 14.159 13.230
Accruals -0.157 -0.070 -0.038 -0.006 0.087
Cash Flows 0.170 0.115 0.080 0.058 -0.038
Denmark Earnings 0.013 0.046 0.042 0.051 0.049 0.244
Beta 1.222 1.060 0.978 1.199 1.217
Size 13.848 14.247 14.235 14.093 13.724
Accruals -0.159 -0.082 -0.052 -0.024 0.052
Cash Flows 0.185 0.144 0.116 0.106 0.026
Finland Earnings 0.025 0.062 0.064 0.082 0.077 0.211
Beta 1.097 0.932 0.826 0.820 1.335
Size 11.802 12.589 12.678 12.672 11.942
26 Countries in which both extreme accruals quintiles are smallest
19 Countries in which both extreme accruals quintiles exhibit the highest beta
Summary
18 Countries in which both extreme accruals quintiles are smallest and have highest beta
1 Country that does not exhibit any pattern related to size or beta
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Given the factor structure in equation (2.3), we can identify the alpha generated by
the accrual-based hedge strategy net of common risk factors. Across all countries
unreported results convey that market and size factors capture the excess returns
for the extreme quintile portfolios, thus confirming our descriptive analysis in the
previous section.2 Concerning the performance of the long-short strategies, Table
2.8 reveals that the model’s explanatory power is generally low. The remaining
positive alphas are significant at the 5% level for seven out of 29 countries, i.e.,
the U.S., Thailand, Germany, Switzerland, Japan, France, and Denmark. These
countries have already shown significant return figures in Table 2.4. However, the
U.K. drops out of the previous list indicating that the absolute return is not robust
to common risk factors. We observe that the statistically significant hedge strategies
are also promising in terms of economical significance, since their monthly alphas
range from 31 (Japan) to 139 (Thailand) basis points. The latter is followed by 104
basis points for the U.S. which is consistent with prior results. When we relax the
significance level to 10%, the South Korean hedge strategy gives a significant alpha
of 76 basis points and the Swedish hedge strategy delivers 66 basis points.
By inspecting the legal tradition of the countries in which the accrual anomaly seems
to hold, we detect the accrual anomaly at the 5% significance level for two out of 11
countries with a common law tradition and for five out of 18 countries with a code law
tradition. Therefore, we are tempted to conclude that the accrual anomaly is more
likely to occur in code law countries than in common law countries, contrasting the
view of Pincus, Rajgopal, and Venkatachalam (2007), but supporting Leuz, Nanda,
and Wysocki (2003) who argue that earnings management is less of a concern in
common law countries due to high investor protection.
In Table 2.9, we summarize and compare our results with previous studies on the
global accrual anomaly. In terms of risk-adjusted returns, our findings are closest to
those of Pincus, Rajgopal, and Venkatachalam (2007) with a correlation of alphas
equal to 0.64. As for the study of LaFond (2005) the alphas’ correlation is 0.26.
However, this figure rises to 0.61, when we exclude Canada and Denmark.
2These results can be obtained upon request.
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Table 2.8: Fama-French-Momentum-Regressions of Hedge Portfolios
The table gives the results of a regression according to equation (2.3) using 154 monthly returns
ranging from May 1994 to February 2007. Alphas significantly positive on a 10%-level are in italics
and in bold face if significantly positive on a 5%-level. The corresponding t-statistics are below
the coefficients.
Risk Factors
Country alpha Market Size Value Momentum Adj. R2
α β γ δ η
Coefficient 0.0104 0.0194 -0.0182 0.0591 -0.0367
USA
t-stat 5.9686 0.2830 -0.3382 1.0393 -1.9684
1.53
Coefficient 0.0050 0.6064 -0.0778 0.3580 -0.2098
Canada
t-stat 0.5653 1.3741 -0.2135 2.2206 -1.7606
4.55
Coefficient 0.0052 0.0259 -0.0707 -0.1018 0.0595
Hong Kong
t-stat 1.4792 0.3734 -1.1420 -1.4525 1.5404
4.05
Coefficient 0.0009 0.1232 -0.1065 0.0491 0.0398
Malaysia
t-stat 0.3615 2.6891 -2.9475 0.7077 1.2967
6.55
Coefficient 0.0139 -0.0550 0.0190 -0.1402 0.0113
Thailand
t-stat 3.1376 -0.7304 0.2309 -2.0404 0.2961
4.60
Coefficient 0.0027 -0.0373 0.0849 0.0156 0.0044
Singapore
t-stat 0.7462 -0.4330 1.2172 0.1689 0.1031
-0.82
Coefficient 0.0020 0.1680 -0.0724 -0.1443 0.0824
Australia
t-stat 0.7235 1.4215 -0.6982 -1.8310 2.0712
4.37
Coefficient 0.0012 -0.0225 0.0326 -0.0199 -0.0540
New Zealand
t-stat 0.2866 -0.2124 0.3523 -0.2867 -1.1500
-1.74
Coefficient 0.0026 0.0601 0.0909 -0.0102 0.1187
UK
t-stat 1.3255 0.9448 1.6958 -0.1571 3.8314
11.10
Coefficient 0.0041 -0.0633 0.1994 0.0124 0.1041
Ireland
t-stat 0.5733 -0.3014 1.0624 0.1171 1.8617
0.86
Coefficient 0.0009 -0.0405 0.0378 -0.0273 -0.0222
India
t-stat 0.2924 -0.6576 0.8101 -0.5338 -0.7381
-1.69
Coefficient 0.0061 -0.0990 0.1008 0.0663 -0.0239
Germany
t-stat 2.4057 -1.8301 1.2535 1.1615 -0.6936
1.01
Coefficient 0.0007 0.1039 -0.1049 -0.1983 0.0338
Austria
t-stat 0.1421 0.6712 -0.5600 -2.2071 0.6006
1.23
Coefficient 0.0078 -0.0613 -0.0290 0.1698 0.0088
Switzerland
t-stat 2.9289 -0.7611 -0.3731 2.5645 0.2675
1.67
Coefficient 0.0031 0.1554 -0.1779 0.0200 0.0269
Japan
t-stat 2.5275 3.0905 -4.0193 0.4814 1.4174
13.79
Coefficient 0.0076 -0.1103 0.0510 -0.2857 0.0454
South Korea
t-stat 1.9418 -1.6191 0.7231 -3.4277 0.9651
8.84
Coefficient -0.0025 0.2304 -0.1743 0.3598 -0.0673
Taiwan
t-stat -0.6129 2.3556 -1.9602 4.2221 -1.5851
10.66
Coefficient 0.0063 0.0718 -0.0858 -0.0980 -0.0473
France
t-stat 2.7136 1.1512 -1.2559 -1.9604 -1.3566
2.79
Coefficient 0.0055 -0.3552 0.3461 -0.1665 -0.0390
Italy
t-stat 1.3993 -2.9420 2.9700 -2.0162 -0.9123
4.65
Coefficient 0.0026 0.0761 -0.2096 -0.0024 -0.3109
Greece
t-stat 0.3774 0.5217 -1.8341 -0.0089 -5.4956
20.14
Coefficient -0.0146 0.0475 -0.1051 0.1587 -0.0431
Indonesia
t-stat -1.9324 0.5240 -1.3961 1.5784 -0.9275
0.19
Coefficient 0.0017 0.1983 -0.1386 0.1037 -0.0810
Spain
t-stat 0.3292 1.4736 -0.8436 0.8118 -1.6772
1.10
Coefficient 0.0018 0.4726 -0.0103 -0.0711 0.0133
Portugal
t-stat 0.2401 2.7464 -0.0632 -0.4061 0.2594
6.04
Coefficient 0.0050 0.0073 0.0376 -0.1220 -0.0848
Netherlands
t-stat 1.1871 0.0672 0.3034 -1.3904 -1.7659
0.54
Coefficient 0.0041 -0.0448 0.1483 -0.1250 -0.0571
Belgium
t-stat 0.7365 -0.3077 0.8259 -0.8616 -0.8548
-1.30
Coefficient 0.0066 0.0365 -0.0633 0.0253 -0.0870
Sweden
t-stat 1.7314 0.3098 -0.4671 0.3981 -2.5105
1.75
Coefficient 0.0000 0.0252 0.1222 0.2116 0.0508
Norway
t-stat -0.0043 0.1444 0.7832 1.6838 1.1052
2.60
Coefficient 0.0091 -0.1891 0.0746 0.0402 -0.0229
Denmark
t-stat 2.3596 -1.7287 0.6198 0.5572 -0.4189
1.17
Coefficient -0.0009 -0.2980 0.1786 -0.1452 0.0523
Finland
t-stat -0.1714 -2.6480 1.1945 -1.8435 0.9364
4.29
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Table 2.9: Studies on the Global Accrual Anomaly
The table summarizes the findings on the global accrual anomaly of Pincus, Rajgopal, and Venkat-
achalam (2007), LaFond (2005), Liodakis, Brar, Gadaut, and Sharma (2004), and ours. Whereas
Liodakis, Brar, Gadaut, and Sharma (2004) report average annual returns (see their Figure 7) all
other studies provide alphas net of similar risk factors. We summarize Table 2.8 of our study, Ta-
ble 6 of Pincus, Rajgopal, and Venkatachalam (2007), and Table 3 of LaFond (2005). Coefficients
that are significant on a 10%-level are in italics, coefficients significant on a 5%-level or better
appear in bold face. Yearly figures are given in percentage terms and monthly figures are given in
basis points. GV denotes Global Vantage (Industrial/Commercial), Comp. is Compustat, DS is
Datastream, and BSM stands for Balance Sheet Method. CGB-BMI denotes the Citigroup Bank
Broad Market Indexes.
Our Study Pincus et al. LaFond (2005) Liodakis et al.
(2007) (2004)
Panel A: Data Characteristics
Balance Sheet Data DS GV Comp.(USA)/DS DS
Return Data DS GV Issues CRSP (USA)/DS DS
Period 1994–2007 1994–2002 1990–2003 1989–2004
Sample Size 132,493 FY 62,027 FY 130,188 FY CGB-BMI
FY per year 10,192 FY 6,892 FY 9,299 FY 2,000 FY
Accruals Method BSM BSM BSM BSM
Panel B: Common Law Countries’ Alphas
yearly monthly yearly monthly yearly monthly yearly monthly
US 12.48 104 8.40 70 12 100 10.6 88
Canada 6.00 50 8.28 69 9 75 - -
Hong Kong 6.24 52 5.04 42 17.04 142 - -
Malaysia 1.08 9 8.64 72 - - - -
Thailand 16.68 139 20.64 172 - - - -
Singapore 3.24 27 -1.44 -12 8.28 69 - -
Australia 2.40 20 17.88 149 12.12 101 - -
New Zealand 1.44 12 - - - - - -
UK 3.12 26 9.96 83 9.96 83 5.13 43
Ireland 4.92 41 - - - - 9.09 76
India 1.08 9 4.70 39 - - 9.09 76
Panel C: Code Law Countries’ Alphas
yearly monthly yearly monthly yearly monthly yearly monthly
Germany 7.32 61 6.60 55 3.84 32 9.11 76
Austria 0.84 7 - - - - - -
Switzerland 9.36 78 4.92 41 9.6 80 8.38 70
Japan 3.72 31 5.76 48 3.84 32 4.2 35
South Korea 9.12 76 - - - - - -
Taiwan -3.00 -25 -0.48 -4 - - - -
France 7.56 63 8.16 68 10.92 91 3.28 27
Italy 6.00 55 11.76 98 10.44 87 3.82 32
Greece 3.12 26 - - - - - -
Indonesia -17.52 -146 -12.60 -105 - - - -
Spain 2.04 17 -6.96 -58 11.52 96 0.29 2
Portugal 2.16 18 - - - - - -
Netherlands 6.00 50 2.16 18 7.08 59 13.38 112
Belgium 4.92 41 - - 8.88 74 - -
Sweden 7.92 66 9.24 77 8.28 69 6.36 53
Norway 0.00 0 - - 2.76 23 -0.71 -6
Denmark 10.92 91 8.52 71 -0.96 -8 4.3 36
Finland -1.08 -9 - - - - - -
Σ at 5% 7/29 7/20 13/17 NA
Σ at 10% 9/29 10/20 15/17 NA
Chapter 3
Data Snooping Biases and Market Anomalies
From the previous chapter, we learn that out of 29 countries, seven or nine exhibit
positive and significant alphas, depending on the degree of significance enforced.
This result already casts doubt on the existence of the accrual anomaly in most
of the countries. Nevertheless, we hesitate to claim that we can safely abandon
the notion of the accrual anomaly as being a global phenomenon and that the
anomaly more likely emerges in code law countries because the detected alphas may
be spurious in the absence of multiple testing controls.
3.1 Accounting for Multiple Testing
In examining a market anomaly as a global phenomenon, we test for it in a large
number of equity markets. Hence, we are in the general set-up of testing several
hypotheses at once and must apply appropriate multiple testing procedures. These
testing procedures either control for the familywise error rate (FWE) or the false
discovery proportion (FDP). Below, we will briefly introduce the concept behind
these methods.
3.1.1 Methods Based on the Familywise Error Rate (FWE)
The traditional way to account for multiple testing is to control the familywise error
rate (FWE), defined as the probability of rejecting at least one of the true null
hypotheses. If this objective is achieved, one can be confident that all hypotheses
that have been rejected are indeed false (instead of some true ones having been
rejected by chance alone). Many methods that control the FWE exist, the simplest
one being the well-known Bonferroni (1936) method, which consists of a plain p-
value adjustment, i.e., the initial significance level α is divided by the number of
hypotheses under test. Evidently, this method is strict and would result in an
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outright rejection of any given market anomaly. However, it is also important to use
a method that provides as much power as possible so that false hypotheses have a
chance of being detected.
In our set-up, we would like to detect as many countries as possible where the
anomaly actually exists. In this respect, the recent proposal of Romano and Wolf
(2005) appears to be the state of the art. On the one hand, it improves upon
Bonferroni-type methods based on the individual p-values by incorporating the de-
pendence structure across test statistics. On the other hand, it improves on the
bootstrap reality check of White (2000) by incorporating a stepwise approach and
by employing studentized test statistics.
For our case, the most suitable method is the so-called k-StepM method, which we
will briefly discuss in the following. Consider S individual decision problems of the
form
Hs : θs ≤ 0 versus H
′
s : θs > 0, 1 ≤ s ≤ S, (3.1)
each referring to the hedge strategy in country s. We define the parameter θs in
such a way that under the null hypothesis Hs, strategy s does not beat the zero
benchmark. Given the time series of the hedge strategies, we can compute the test
statistic wT,s with an estimate of its standard deviation σˆT,s based on the returns
and the strategies’ alphas according to the Fama-French momentum regressions. In
particular, using monthly hedge returns xt,s, we compute average monthly buy-and-
hold returns as in Section 6.2. Thus, we have
wT,s = x¯T,s =
1
T
T∑
t=1
xt,s. (3.2)
To account for potential serial correlation in the return series, the studentization
of test statistics is pursued using a kernel variance estimator based on the Parzen
kernel, see Andrews (1991). Likewise, the test statistic for the alpha is the intercept
from estimating equation (2.3),
wT,s = αˆT,s, (3.3)
studentized by the estimated standard deviation of αˆT,s, again using the Parzen
kernel.
Within the k-StepM method, we first re-label strategies such that r1 corresponds to
the largest test statistic and rS to the smallest one. Then, we need to determine a
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confidence region of the form
[wT,r1 − σT,r1d1,∞)× · · · × [wT,rS − σT,rSd1,∞). (3.4)
Whenever 0 /∈ [wT,rs − σT,rsd1,∞), we reject Hs for s = 1, ..., S. To control the
FWE, d1 ideally is given by the (1 − α)-quantile of the distribution of the largest
‘centered’ studentized1 statistic
wT,s − θs
σT,s
among all true hypotheses. However, we do not know which hypotheses are true and
we do not know the true probability mechanism P . Therefore, we take the largest
difference among all hypotheses and we replace P by a bootstrap estimate Pˆ , which
implies that the StepM method will only allow for asymptotic control of the FWE.
This feature is shared by all other commonly used multiple testing procedures.
If we suppose that we have rejected R1 < k hypotheses, we can construct a new
confidence region to reexamine the remaining (S −R1) smallest test statistics
[wT,R1+1 − σT,R1+1d2,∞)× · · · × [wT,rS − σT,rSd2,∞), (3.5)
which is a smaller confidence region, because it typically holds that d1 > d2 >
· · · > dS. Hence, we can reject more false hypotheses. Therefore, such a stepwise
procedure is more powerful than the single-step method. For the computation of d2,
we again lack both P and the set of true hypotheses. For P , we use the bootstrap
estimate Pˆ . However, we now only maximize over the set of hypotheses that have
not been rejected yet. Since this is a smaller set, S − R1 versus S elements, d2 will
typically be smaller than d1 (and at most equally large). If no additional rejection
occurs, we stop. Otherwise, we proceed in the same fashion until there are no further
rejections.
3.1.2 Method Based on the False Discovery Proportion (FDP)
When the number of hypotheses under test is very large, the error control may be
based on the false discovery proportion rather than on the familywise error rate.
Let F be the number of false rejections arising from a multiple testing method and
let R be the total number of rejections. We define the FDP as the fraction F/R,
1Studentization requires that the average return be divided by its standard error. To obtain valid
confidence intervals for the expected return, we must multiply these quantiles with the country’s
return standard error. Romano and Wolf (2005) advocate the use of studentization, since it is more
powerful and gives more appropriate coverage probabilities for individual θrs , especially when test
statistics show different standard deviations. Clearly, the latter applies to our case.
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given that R > 0. Otherwise, the FDP is zero. A multiple testing method controls
the FDP at level α if P (FDP > γ) ≤ α, for any P , at least asymptotically. Typical
values of γ are 0.05 and 0.1.
Romano, Shaikh, and Wolf (2008) present a generalized version of the StepM method
that allows for controlling the FDP, the FDP-StepMγ method. The method is
somewhat complex and the reader is referred to the paper for the details. However,
the first step of the method is easy to understand and works as follows. Consider
controlling the FDP with γ = 0.1. The method starts out by applying the StepM
method. If less than nine hypotheses are rejected, the method stops. If nine or more
hypotheses are rejected, the method continues and some further hypotheses might
be rejected subsequently.
3.2 Is the Global Accrual Anomaly Due to Data Snooping?
Reconciling the results of the traditional analysis, we are left with seven or nine
positive and significant alphas out of 29 strategies, depending on the degree of
significance enforced. Such a result could occur by chance alone, hence, we now
account for multiple testing issues using the methods presented above. Clearly, it
would be undue to lump together all 29 strategies since the respective countries dif-
fer in accounting measurement rules and institutional environments. Prior literature
suggests that a country’s legal tradition might serve as an appropriate separator.
For instance, Pincus, Rajgopal, and Venkatachalam (2007) conjecture that the ac-
crual anomaly is more likely to occur in common law countries since the respective
accounting systems give managers more leeway in managing earnings through cre-
ative accruals accounting. Therefore, since the differentiation between code law and
common law countries may have some significant economic implications, we perform
the multiple hypotheses procedures on sub-samples grouped according to their legal
tradition.
To control the FWE, we use the StepM method, i.e., k = 1 is the appropriate choice
given the number of strategies under study. To control the FDP, we use the FDP-
StepMγ method with γ = 0.1. We perform the multiple testing at a significance level
of 5% and present results for the return of the hedge strategies as well as their alphas
arising from the Fama-French momentum regressions. For the bootstrap method,
we choose the stationary bootstrap with an average block size of 12 months.2
2Using the stationary bootstrap with an average block size of six months leaves results virtually
unchanged.
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Table 3.1: Multiple Testing: Code Law versus Common Law
The table gives the lower confidence band cl for the returns and alphas as obtained by the StepM
and FDP-StepM0.1 method using studentized test statistics. Both StepM methods are applied
considering common law and code law countries separately. The rej-columns contain the result-
ing decision where 1 indicates rejection of θs = 0 (capital market efficiency). Panel A provides
information on common law countries and Panel B covers code law countries.
Returns Alphas
Country Return StepM FDP-StepM0.1 Alpha StepM FDP-StepM0.1
cl rej cl rej cl rej cl rej
Panel A: Common Law Countries
USA 0.0101 0.0059 1 0.0059 1 0.0104 0.0049 1 0.0049 1
Canada 0.0070 -0.0150 0 -0.0150 0 0.0050 -0.0231 0 -0.0231 0
Hong Kong 0.0055 -0.0032 0 -0.0032 0 0.0052 -0.0059 0 -0.0059 0
Malaysia 0.0013 -0.0050 0 -0.0050 0 0.0009 -0.0071 0 -0.0071 0
Thailand 0.0127 0.0018 1 0.0018 1 0.0139 0.0001 1 0.0001 1
Singapore 0.0031 -0.0056 0 -0.0056 0 0.0027 -0.0087 0 -0.0087 0
Australia 0.0020 -0.0049 0 -0.0049 0 0.0020 -0.0068 0 -0.0068 0
New Zealand 0.0012 -0.0086 0 -0.0086 0 0.0012 -0.0116 0 -0.0116 0
UK 0.0059 0.0012 1 0.0012 1 0.0026 -0.0036 0 -0.0036 0
Ireland 0.0064 -0.0107 0 -0.0107 0 0.0041 -0.0183 0 -0.0183 0
India 0.0011 -0.0064 0 -0.0064 0 0.0009 -0.0089 0 -0.0089 0
Panel B: Code Law Countries
Germany 0.0057 -0.0013 0 -0.0013 0 0.0061 -0.0010 0 -0.0010 0
Austria -0.0007 -0.0137 0 -0.0137 0 0.0007 -0.0122 0 -0.0122 0
Switzerland 0.0076 0.0003 1 0.0003 1 0.0078 0.0004 1 0.0004 1
Japan 0.0032 -0.0006 0 -0.0006 0 0.0031 -0.0003 0 -0.0003 0
South Korea 0.0049 -0.0070 0 -0.0070 0 0.0076 -0.0033 0 -0.0033 0
Taiwan -0.0020 -0.0141 0 -0.0141 0 -0.0025 -0.0136 0 -0.0136 0
France 0.0065 -0.0001 0 -0.0001 0 0.0063 -0.0002 0 -0.0002 0
Italy 0.0059 -0.0053 0 -0.0053 0 0.0055 -0.0055 0 -0.0055 0
Greece -0.0055 -0.0262 0 -0.0262 0 0.0026 -0.0164 0 -0.0164 0
Indonesia -0.0135 -0.0346 0 -0.0346 0 -0.0146 -0.0356 0 -0.0356 0
Spain 0.0011 -0.0129 0 -0.0129 0 0.0017 -0.0130 0 -0.0130 0
Portugal 0.0062 -0.0142 0 -0.0142 0 0.0018 -0.0186 0 -0.0186 0
Netherlands 0.0024 -0.0089 0 -0.0089 0 0.0050 -0.0067 0 -0.0067 0
Belgium 0.0024 -0.0123 0 -0.0123 0 0.0041 -0.0113 0 -0.0113 0
Sweden 0.0046 -0.0059 0 -0.0059 0 0.0066 -0.0041 0 -0.0041 0
Norway 0.0031 -0.0117 0 -0.0117 0 0.0000 -0.0148 0 -0.0148 0
Denmark 0.0080 -0.0021 0 -0.0021 0 0.0091 -0.0016 0 -0.0016 0
Finland 0.0001 -0.0144 0 -0.0144 0 -0.0009 -0.0157 0 -0.0157 0
Common Law Countries 3 3 2 2
Code Law Countries Σ 1 1 1 1
All Countries 4 4 3 3
In Table 3.1, we report the results of the multiple testing procedures together with
the countries’ return statistics. Panel A of Table 3.1 provides information on com-
mon law countries and Panel B covers code law countries. We perform both the
StepM and FDP-StepM0.1 method on the countries’ returns and Fama-French mo-
mentum alphas and provide the lower confidence band cl for the monthly returns
and alphas using studentized test statistics. Since we are in a one-sided test setting,
we only report the lower limits of the confidence interval, as computed in the last
step of the StepM and FDP-StepM0.1 method, respectively. The value in the column
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labeled rej equals 1 if 0 /∈ [cl,∞), which indicates the rejection of capital market
efficiency and suggests the presence of an accrual anomaly in the respective country.
First, we focus on the results for the common law countries in Panel A. Among the
11 countries we obtain three rejections on behalf of the hedge strategy returns for
the U.S., the U.K., and Thailand. Both the StepM and the FDP-StepM0.1 method
also reject the null for the U.S. and Thailand when replacing the test statistics by
the strategies’ alphas while the U.K. alpha does not appear to be robust. Note that,
as pointed out in Section 3.1.2, controlling the FWE with the StepM method is in
this case equivalent to control of the FDP by the FDP-StepM0.1 method since the
number of hypotheses rejected is less than nine.
Second, we inspect the results for the code law countries in Panel B. Among the 17
countries only Switzerland defies capital market efficiency since both, hedge return
and alpha, are found to be robust with respect to data snooping. Thus, reconciling
the obtained multiple testing results with the ones of the na¨ıve approach we notice
that the few anomalous pattern within the common law bucket are by and large
robust whereas the original findings for the code law countries vanish when control-
ling for data snooping. Hence, our results essentially support the findings of Pincus,
Rajgopal, and Venkatachalam (2007) who also find the phenomenon to be rather
specific to common law countries.
3.3 Sensitivity Check: International Momentum Revisited
Given the striking results for the accrual anomaly, the question is whether multiple
testing methods are ‘too conservative’, since there are only few rejections of capi-
tal market efficiency deemed to be robust. In other words, based on data sets of
customary sample sizes, any asset pricing anomaly might have difficulty passing the
employed multiple testing method. To address this reasonable objection, we check
whether the momentum effect is robust to multiple testing. Given the extensive
out-of-sample evidence from both temporal and geographic perspectives, researchers
widely acknowledge the presence and robustness of abnormal momentum returns.3
Thus, momentum strategies may serve as an adequate benchmark for heuristically
validating the testing method we apply to the accrual anomaly. In contrast to the
accrual anomaly we do not apply the multiple testing procedure to specific subsets
but across all countries since the momentum phenomenon is only hinging on return
3For the U.S. markets see, e.g., Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and (2001). For international
studies see, e.g., Rouwenhorst (1998), Griffin, Ji, and Martin (2003) and (2005). Also, Schwert
(2003) and Fama and French (2008) argue that momentum is among the few robust anomalies.
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data and not on country-specific accounting data. Table 3.2 displays the multiple
testing results for momentum returns and alphas, the latter arising from a standard
Fama-French setting.
Table 3.2: Multiple Testing: Momentum
The table gives the lower confidence band cl for the returns and alphas as obtained by the StepM
and FDP-StepM0.1 method using studentized test statistics. The rej-columns contain the result-
ing decision where 1 indicates rejection of θs = 0 (capital market efficiency). Panel A provides
information on common law countries and Panel B covers code law countries.
Returns Alphas
Country Return StepM FDP-StepM0.1 Alpha StepM FDP-StepM0.1
cl rej cl rej cl rej cl rej
Panel A: Common Law Countries
USA 0.0132 0.0023 1 0.0045 1 0.0280 0.0101 1 0.0168 1
Canada 0.0100 -0.0024 0 0.0002 1 0.0159 0.0061 1 0.0098 1
Hong Kong 0.0071 -0.0106 0 -0.0070 0 0.0097 -0.0020 0 0.0024 1
Malaysia 0.0038 -0.0123 0 -0.0090 0 0.0080 -0.0009 0 0.0024 1
Thailand 0.0063 -0.0155 0 -0.0111 0 0.0069 -0.0062 0 -0.0013 0
Singapore 0.0075 -0.0085 0 -0.0052 0 0.0126 0.0043 1 0.0074 1
Australia 0.0064 -0.0043 0 -0.0021 0 0.0089 0.0004 1 0.0036 1
New Zealand 0.0099 -0.0005 0 0.0016 1 0.0101 0.0020 1 0.0050 1
UK 0.0141 0.0010 1 0.0037 1 0.0154 0.0050 1 0.0089 1
Ireland 0.0097 -0.0046 0 -0.0017 0 0.0145 0.0047 1 0.0084 1
India 0.0145 -0.0007 0 0.0024 1 0.0182 0.0068 1 0.0111 1
Panel B: Code Law Countries
Germany 0.0160 0.0051 1 0.0073 1 0.0200 0.0121 1 0.0151 1
Austria 0.0051 -0.0032 0 -0.0015 0 0.0047 -0.0014 0 0.0009 1
Switzerland 0.0149 0.0013 1 0.0041 1 0.0175 0.0064 1 0.0106 1
Japan 0.0019 -0.0090 0 -0.0068 0 0.0056 -0.0012 0 0.0014 1
South Korea 0.0028 -0.0201 0 -0.0154 0 0.0107 -0.0033 0 0.0020 1
Taiwan 0.0009 -0.0172 0 -0.0135 0 -0.0002 -0.0134 0 -0.0084 0
France 0.0121 0.0004 1 0.0028 1 0.0138 0.0046 1 0.0081 1
Italy 0.0110 -0.0027 0 0.0001 1 0.0139 0.0047 1 0.0081 1
Greece 0.0162 -0.0008 0 0.0027 1 0.0186 0.0088 1 0.0125 1
Indonesia -0.0021 -0.0237 0 -0.0193 0 0.0034 -0.0119 0 -0.0061 0
Spain 0.0123 0.0011 1 0.0034 1 0.0108 0.0024 1 0.0056 1
Portugal 0.0078 -0.0082 0 -0.0050 0 0.0104 -0.0032 0 0.0019 1
Netherlands 0.0208 0.0036 1 0.0071 1 0.0268 0.0170 1 0.0207 1
Belgium 0.0147 0.0036 1 0.0059 1 0.0185 0.0107 1 0.0137 1
Sweden 0.0215 0.0060 1 0.0091 1 0.0283 0.0171 1 0.0214 1
Norway 0.0208 0.0059 1 0.0089 1 0.0244 0.0147 1 0.0183 1
Denmark 0.0118 0.0039 1 0.0055 1 0.0149 0.0091 1 0.0112 1
Finland 0.0186 0.0060 1 0.0085 1 0.0220 0.0117 1 0.0155 1
Common Law Countries 2 5 8 10
Code Law Countries Σ 10 12 12 16
All Countries 12 17 20 26
As for the returns, the StepM gives 12 rejections among the set of 17 na¨ıve ab-
normal momentum returns as documented in Table 2.3. Notably, all of these 17
candidates are detected by the FDP-StepM0.1. As for the alphas, we even obtain
20 rejections judging by the StepM method and 26 rejections judging by the FDP-
StepM0.1 method. For most Asian countries, the multiple testing methods provide
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no statistical evidence for a momentum anomaly. This result supports the findings
of Griffin, Ji, and Martin (2003, 2005) that the momentum anomaly is less pro-
nounced in Asian countries. However, they do not account for multiple hypotheses
testing. Nevertheless, given this large number of rejections, the previous evidence on
momentum in international equity markets is reinforced. Since increasing amounts
of capital have recently sought to exploit this phenomenon, this evidence warrants
further investigation, which we provide in Chapter 5.
Chapter 4
The Demise of the Accrual Anomaly
It is puzzling why the accrual anomaly is confined to few markets. There might
be several plausible explanations worth of consideration. First, to be misled by
accruals-related earnings management, investors of a given country need to fixate
on top-down earnings. Thus, countries in which earnings are less relevant to stock
prices are less likely to exhibit anomalous patterns with respect to accruals. In
fact, some studies1 argue that value relevance of earnings is more pronounced in
market-oriented financial systems as opposed to bank-oriented ones. However, as
documented by Land and Lang (2002), the globalization of firms has led to a con-
vergence in accounting practices, which will most likely translate to convergence in
value relevance of earnings as well.
Second, Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998a, 1998b) provide evidence that intensive
accruals accounting is used for window dressing in U.S. public equity offerings. Given
that the U.S. accounts for the largest stake in worldwide equity issuances (Kim and
Weisbach, 2008), it may be that managers of non-U.S. companies are more likely
to refrain from manipulating earnings, because they lack the incentive of an equity
issuance. Still, non-U.S. companies may nonetheless exhibit earnings smoothing
prior to a given equity issuance. However, since this pattern will be confined to
a small subsample, we fail to find sufficient support for a broad market anomaly
with respect to accruals. This argument may also rationalize the observation of the
British accrual anomaly since the U.K. ranks first among the European countries in
terms of equity issuances.
Third, if earnings fixation is mostly uniform across countries, it is straightforward
to speculate about significant differences in the decomposition of earnings into cash
flows and accruals. Financial reporting standards in common law countries may
1See, e.g., Alford, Jones, Leftwich, and Zmijewski (1993) and Ali and Hwang (2000).
33
34 The Demise of the Accrual Anomaly
allow for a more discretionary use of accruals as compared to other countries. While
we have documented earlier that the level of accruals (measured as a fraction of total
assets) is on average fairly similar across countries, a given business transaction may
more easily be used for earnings smoothing under U.S. accounting standards. While
this characteristic may give rise to more accounting manipulations in the U.S and
other common law countries, there is also an antagonistic force at work inherent in
the U.S. capital market. In particular, Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003) provide
evidence that earnings management is less of a concern in common law countries
due to high investor protection. Accordingly, Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005,
2006) observe that if U.S. companies play the earnings game, they primarily do so
through “real earnings management”, such as deferring a valuable project or slashing
R&D expenditures, and to a much lesser extent through clever accrual accounting.
Irrespective of the sources to the abnormal returns in these markets, mispricing or
chance, investors will most likely try to benefit from implementing related trad-
ing strategies, causing the anomaly to weaken or even disappear. While research
published shortly after the initial study of Sloan (1996) suggests that institutional
investors do not act on information from accruals (Ali, Hwang, and Trombley, 2000;
Bradshaw and Sloan, 2001), more recent work suggests that word of potential ac-
cruals mispricing has spread. For instance, Beneish and Vargus (2002) find insiders
profiting from the accruals information. Also, Collins, Gong, and Hribar (2003)
document that stocks with high institutional ownership exhibit stock prices that
reflect more accurately the persistence of accruals. Finally, using data from 1984 to
2003, Ali, Chen, Yao, and Yu (2008) provide evidence that some mutual funds have
been successfully implementing the accruals strategy in the U.S. market.
If the anomaly is indeed exploited by investors, we can expect a significant decrease
in its profitability over time. Figure 4.1 illustrates the strategy’s performance for
the U.S. As documented in prior research, the hedge strategy exhibits a relatively
smooth path for the U.S., giving a cumulative wealth of 4.5 over the 13-year sample
period. From the left panel in Figure 4.1, we conclude that most of the profits are
made within the time period starting 1998 and ending 2003. The returns before
1998 were moderate and for the most recent time period the return path is starting
to flatten out. To further examine the evolution of the U.S. accrual anomaly over
time, we also compute the corresponding alpha via trailing Fama-French momentum
regressions according to equation (2.3). We use a 36-months window and plot the
resulting alpha in the right panel of Figure 4.1. The alpha for the U.S. strategy
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is slowly decreasing over time and is close to zero towards the end of our sample
period, indicating a potential demise of the accrual anomaly for the U.S. market.
Figure 4.1: Cumulative Returns and Trailing Alphas for the U.S.
The left panel gives cumulative total return to the accruals hedge strategy for the U.S. covering the
period from May 1994 to February 2007. In the right panel, we plot trailing Fama-French momen-
tum alphas estimated from equation (2.3) using 36-months windows, giving us an effective time
period starting May 1997 and ending February 2007. Dashed lines represent the 95%-confidence
bands.
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In the upper left panel of Figure 4.2, we observe a cumulative return pattern for
the U.K. similar to the one in the U.S., but only until mid 2000. Our evidence for
this subperiod seems to echo the findings of the robustness check in Chan, Chan,
Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (2006) using data from 1991 to 2000. They find that the
U.K. sample supports their evidence of an accrual anomaly in the U.S. and conjec-
ture that this result relates to the close resemblance of management compensation
schemes and the behavior of research analysts and investors in these two countries.
However, as we report in Table 3.2, the U.K. accrual anomaly can be subsumed
by the Fama-French momentum factors. In any case, following 2000, the cumula-
tive return of the hedge strategy for the U.K. is characterized by sideways moves.
Inspecting the alphas of the Fama-French momentum regression in the lower right
panel, we find that after July 2002 the U.K. alphas are practically zero and become
even negative in the most recent time period.
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Figure 4.2: Cumulative Returns and Trailing Alphas
The left panels give cumulative total return to the accruals hedge strategy for the U.K., Thailand,
and Switzerland covering the period from May 1994 to February 2007. In the right panels, we plot
trailing Fama-French momentum alphas estimated from equation (2.3) using 36-months windows,
giving us an effective time period starting May 1997 and ending February 2007. Dashed lines
represent the 95%-confidence bands.
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On the other hand, the Thai strategy provides a total return that is comparable
to the one of the U.S.. However, note that the strategy’s volatility is higher and,
more importantly, the anomaly does not appear to lose strength over time. While
the U.S., the U.K., and Thailand operate under common law, it is surprising to also
detect an accrual anomaly in Switzerland which is usually classified as being a code
law country. However, this classification may be undue since Swiss companies are
following different accounting practices, especially, following 2000. Hence, it seems
questionable to compare companies on behalf of accrual levels arising from different
accounting practices which may in turn explain the partially negative alpha of the
Swiss accruals strategy.
Chapter 5
Price and Earnings Momentum
5.1 Review of Momentum Strategies
According to the Oxford Dictionary momentum is a force that is gained by move-
ment. Price momentum entails the observation that past winning stocks continue
to deliver superior returns in the short run while past losing stocks subsequently
continue to disappoint. Likewise, earnings momentum refers to the observation
of momentum in stock prices following the direction of analysts’ earnings forecast
revisions.
5.1.1 Price Momentum
Momentum in individual stock prices has first been documented by Jegadeesh and
Titman (1993) and their approach to quantify price momentum has become the
industry standard. They consider a portfolio that is long in the winner decile and
short in the loser decile. These decile portfolios arise from several winner and loser
portfolios based on overlapping time periods. The stocks are ranked monthly ac-
cording to their performance over the last six months and assigned accordingly to
the respective quintile portfolios. These are held for six months. Hence, the winner
or loser decile of the associated price momentum strategy of a given month is made
up of six portfolios. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) find such a price momentum
strategy to earn more than 1% above the risk-free rate per month. Even though
the decile portfolios usually consist of smaller sized companies with high beta risk,
the associated hedge strategy’s return cannot be fully explained by significant size
or market exposure. The fact that the momentum anomaly is not arbitraged away
and still persists is even more intriguing, see Jegadeesh and Titman (2001).
In explaining the phenomenon of U.S. price momentum, Jegadeesh and Titman
(2001) examine post-holding period return patterns of momentum portfolios. These
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patterns favor a behavioral explanation of momentum to be triggered from market
participants’ under- or overreaction to new information. Overreaction will drive
stock prices to levels that are not fundamentally justified, giving rise to a subsequent
reversion back to their initial level. On the other hand, given limited information
processing capabilities, investors may underreact to news which may positively effect
a company’s fundamental value. Since overconfidence likely causes investors to cling
to their original views, this fundamental news may only gradually transmit into the
company’s stock price. In this case, one obtains a flat post-holding period return to
a momentum strategy.
Not only is the price momentum anomaly confined to the U.S., it has also been
documented in several international studies, such as in Rouwenhorst (1998) for Eu-
rope and more recently in Griffin, Ji, and Martin (2003, 2005) for a large set of
countries. While Rouwenhorst (1999) finds emerging markets to exhibit price mo-
mentum, Bekaert, Erb, Harvey, and Viskanta (1997) contend that momentum in
these markets are less consistently profitable.
5.1.2 Earnings Momentum
Ball and Brown (1968) have first documented the phenomenon of post-earnings
announcement drift which encompasses the tendency of stock prices to drift in the
direction suggested by recent earnings surprises. This observation is most likely
caused by irrational investors failing to fully appreciate the earnings information,
which results in a delayed price response, see Bernard and Thomas (1989). While
studies on the post-earnings announcement drift rely on some measure of realized
earnings surprise, one may also resort to analysts’ earnings forecasts as a more direct
measure of earnings expectations. Doing so provides a more timely measure, given
that non-U.S. companies usually report earnings on an annual basis as opposed
to quarterly reporting. The investment strategy building on the above metric is
typically referred to as earnings momentum.
The implementation of the earnings momentum strategy is similar to the one of
price momentum. However, companies are not being ranked dependent on the level
of prior returns but prior earnings revisions. As in Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok
(1996), we build a moving average of cumulated revisions over the prior six months
to capture the change in earnings expectations:
REV 6it =
6∑
j=0
fit−j − fit−j−1
pit−j−1
(5.1)
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where fit is the consensus estimate in month t of the i-th company’s earnings for
the current fiscal year, as provided by the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System
(I/B/E/S). The resulting difference, the monthly revision, is then scaled by the prior
month’s stock price. We go long in the highest earnings revisions quintile and short
in the lowest quintile in any given month according to the value of REV 6it. Given
a holding period of six months, the resulting hedge strategy’s long leg consists of six
overlapping portfolios, as does the short leg.
5.1.3 Linking Price and Earnings Momentum
It is straightforward to speculate as to whether price and earnings momentum may
reflect the very same mispricing or behavioral bias. In fact, prior studies like Chan,
Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996) find that the U.S. momentum effect is concen-
trated around subsequent earnings announcements and show that price momentum
may partially be explained by underreaction to earnings information. However, they
contend that price momentum is not subsumed by earnings momentum since each
ranking variable has some incremental predictive power for future returns. This view
is shared by Griffin, Ji, and Martin (2005) who analyze both momentum strategies
in an international context. Given that Hong and Swaminathan (2003) only detect
price momentum in countries that also exhibit earnings momentum nevertheless
makes the case for a closer relation of the two anomalies. Indeed, Chordia and
Shivakumar (2006) show that U.S. price momentum appears to be a manifestation
of earnings momentum.
5.2 Data
5.2.1 Sample Selection
We use a comprehensive sample of companies domiciled in 17 equity markets, 16
European markets and the U.S., covering the period from 1987 to 2007. All data
has been gathered from Datastream including I/B/E/S earnings revisions data.
Table 5.1 contains information on the sample countries classified by region. We col-
lect companies for each country by merging the live and dead research lists provided
by Datastream on July 2nd, 2007 and thereby obtain a total number of 65,925
companies. To arrive at our final sample, we have pruned the initial country re-
search lists as follows. First, we adjust each country list for secondary issues and
cross-country listings to prevent double-counting. In particular, we extract 30,552
companies. Hence, only one half of the initial list does refer to major listings.
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Table 5.1: Country Overview
The table contains descriptive information on the companies that have been domestically traded in the sample period (1987-2007). For further reference
we may use abbreviated country codes (Abbr.). The screening of country lists depicts the evolution of the countries’ samples. First, we give the total size
of the country lists followed by the number of companies surviving the first screen for Major listings. The column headed Region contains the number of
companies surviving the screen eliminating regional listings and the like. The Final screen excludes companies which exhibit free-floating market value
below 10 million USD. We further describe this final sample giving the number of a country’s dead companies (#Dead) and the number of companies with
at least one I/B/E/S estimate in the sample period (#I/B/E/S), along with respective percentage values (%-Dead and %-I/B/E/S). The last column gives
the earliest month with sufficient Fama-French data. The table provides information for the U.S. in Panel A, while Panel B covers European countries.
Country Abbr. Region Screening of Country Lists Sample: FMV> 10 Date
Total Major Region FMV> 10 #Dead %Dead #Return %Return #I/B/E/S %I/B/E/S FF
Panel A: USA
USA USA America 36659 20030 7279 6272 2554 40.7% 6180 98.5% 4860 77.5% Jul 92
Panel B: Europe
Europe EUR Europe 29266 10522 9383 7019 1996 28.4% 6901 98.3% 5169 73.6%
United Kingdom UK Europe 7677 3444 3232 2268 732 32.3% 2232 98.4% 1652 72.8% Jul 87
Ireland IRL Europe 187 98 94 85 26 30.6% 83 97.6% 63 74.1% Feb 91
Germany GER Europe 10740 1833 1525 1017 228 22.4% 991 97.4% 646 63.5% Jan 88
Austria A Europe 360 177 161 119 31 26.1% 115 96.6% 80 67.2% Jan 90
Switzerland CH Europe 1130 387 316 277 49 17.7% 274 98.9% 217 78.3% Jan 90
France FR Europe 2643 1458 1368 945 258 27.3% 917 97.0% 631 66.8% Jan 90
Italy IL Europe 794 390 365 345 95 27.5% 345 100 % 305 88.4% Jan 90
Greece GR Europe 523 393 360 338 57 16.9% 338 100 % 234 69.2% Jun 98
Spain ES Europe 311 204 180 170 51 30.0% 168 98.8% 160 94.1% Feb 92
Portugal POR Europe 296 146 134 92 48 52.2% 91 98.9% 66 71.7% Jun 97
Netherlands NL Europe 791 272 250 201 77 38.3% 199 99.0% 182 90.5% Jan 90
Belgium BEL Europe 1000 288 263 206 40 19.4% 200 97.1% 129 62.6% Jan 90
Sweden SWE Europe 1203 549 441 346 109 31.5% 344 99.4% 280 80.9% Jan 90
Norway NOR Europe 585 328 284 254 98 38.6% 252 99.2% 219 86.2% Jan 90
Denmark DK Europe 685 365 230 197 55 27.9% 197 100 % 167 84.8% Jan 90
Finland FN Europe 341 190 180 159 42 26.4% 155 97.5% 138 86.8% Mar 91
All 65925 30552 16662 13291 4550 34.2% 13081 98.4% 10029 75.5%
Top 5 58922 27314 13845 10848 3881 35.8% 10664 98.3% 8094 74.6%
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Second, we screen for non-equity issues, i.e., we exclude investment trusts, ADRs,
and the like. Third, we also exclude OTC stocks and stocks that are only listed on
regional exchanges. Following these two screens 16,662 companies remain. We fur-
ther exclude those having market capitalization below 10 million USD, which leaves
us with a final sample of 13,291 companies. Almost one half are U.S. companies and
the biggest five markets comprise some 80%. To avoid survivorship bias, the sample
includes 4,550 “dead” companies, i.e., one third of the whole sample, ranging from
16.9% for Greece to 52.2% for Portugal. The label “dead” applies to companies in
extreme distress and to those being merged, delisted, or converted.
Since we aim to investigate price and earnings momentum strategies, we addition-
ally check the coverage of return and earnings revisions data. Unsurprisingly, the
coverage for return data is close to 100% in each country, on average 98.4% of the
companies do exhibit at least one return observation over the course of the sample
period. As for the earnings estimates, these figures are more fragmentary. However,
the average coverage still amounts to 75.5% spanning a range from 62.6% (Belgium)
to 94.1% (Spain). Note that our sample contains a certain amount of penny stocks
that will not be included in the momentum strategies. We do not discard them right
away, since being a penny stock is not a static firm characteristic. In particular, we
do not invest in companies with stock price below 5$ at the beginning of a given
month. To give an idea of the investment universe’s size over time, we provide the
absolute number of companies to be considered for the momentum strategies across
countries in Table 5.2. All in all, we have 59,394 firm-years for the momentum
strategies of which one half is concentrated in the U.S. (32,905 firm-years), followed
by France (4,255 firm-years) and the U.K. (4,188 firm-years). Note that the number
of available companies increased over the years. However, the 1999 peak is followed
by a slight setback.
5.2.2 Return Data
We consider monthly stock returns in local currency inclusive of dividends by em-
ploying total return figures. To represent the respective markets, we choose broad
market indices as compiled by Datastream and 3-month-T-bills serve as a proxy for
the risk-free rate. As we have already shown in Chapter 2 the price momentum
effect cannot be detected when na¨ıvely using raw Datastream data. Thus, we again
follow Ince and Porter (2006) in adjusting the return data to allow for reasonable
statistical and economic inferences.
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Table 5.2: Country Universes by Year
The table gives the average number of companies which are considered for the momentum strategies. Panel A covers the U.S. and Panel B covers European
countries.
Year 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Σ
#
Panel A: USA
USA 827 859 928 925 993 1104 1242 1366 1568 1804 2038 2172 2336 2260 2041 1827 2068 2117 2183 2247 32905
Panel B: European Countries
Europe 556 638 775 846 891 1038 1141 1204 1336 1521 1641 1761 1905 1845 1611 1358 1459 1570 1628 1885 26609
UK 144 128 110 118 129 141 169 167 197 234 264 256 300 268 207 171 227 282 310 366 4188
Ireland 3 5 4 2 3 2 3 5 10 13 16 16 15 15 12 13 16 17 17 20 207
Germany 93 92 105 110 120 188 242 224 213 230 252 264 257 262 237 175 185 202 206 250 3907
Austria 16 18 19 22 25 27 30 32 37 42 38 36 37 30 31 25 27 25 24 30 571
Switzerland 73 84 94 99 100 104 106 106 107 113 121 131 134 142 148 139 128 126 122 150 2327
France 62 82 116 131 133 156 154 165 191 220 256 277 310 327 298 264 261 265 276 311 4255
Italy 13 26 28 31 29 28 27 29 33 39 50 67 67 67 78 70 74 87 97 112 1052
Greece 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 59 79 75 70 82 109 61 50 38 48 43 45 56 830
Spain 13 23 54 69 68 64 62 67 68 69 74 90 90 91 86 79 82 83 81 83 1396
Portugal 0 0 0 0 8 24 26 28 31 36 37 40 42 29 15 10 7 10 12 18 373
Netherlands 54 79 86 91 91 93 95 98 103 110 113 120 132 127 106 86 92 91 88 91 1946
Belgium 30 29 29 31 34 38 39 41 44 45 51 63 66 73 76 64 65 74 68 74 1034
Sweden 19 16 29 31 33 34 48 58 73 101 108 125 131 127 90 71 85 89 92 106 1466
Norway 8 11 12 15 17 17 19 21 27 50 49 51 59 68 51 35 45 54 59 78 746
Denmark 23 37 70 72 77 96 75 67 74 89 89 82 86 88 66 57 54 61 70 68 1401
Finland 0 3 14 18 18 21 25 30 42 49 50 55 64 64 52 54 56 55 54 66 790
Σ 1378 1492 1698 1765 1878 2137 2377 2563 2897 3319 3676 3927 4235 4099 3644 3178 3520 3681 3804 4126 59394
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Interestingly, we find our comprehensive sample to be hardly confounded by erro-
neous return data. For instance, the U.S. only requires to change 99 return obser-
vations which represents 0.01% of all observations. This fraction is even smaller for
Europe for which we adjust 54 observations across all 16 countries. We assume that
Datastream has significantly corrected the database in response to the objections of
Ince and Porter (2006) in the meantime.1 Still, the remaining issues might severely
affect statistical inferences and weeding them out renders us even more comfortable
with the quality of data.
5.3 Detecting Price and Earnings Momentum
5.3.1 Risk and Return
We next report descriptive statistics of momentum-based quintile portfolios by coun-
try. In computing momentum portfolio returns, we follow the standard approach
of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) that stipulates the use of overlapping portfolios as
described in the previous section. Tables 5.3 and 5.4 give average monthly buy-and-
hold return and volatility figures together with two risk proxies, size and beta.
First, we assess the profitability of the price momentum hedge strategy by consid-
ering the return differential along with its t-statistic. For the U.S., we obtain a
monthly hedge return of 79 basis points at a monthly volatility of 4.4% giving rise
to a t-statistic of 2.80. The latter is even higher for the European hedge strategy
providing a return of 119 basis points per month but at a lower volatility. Further,
using the t-statistic metric, we identify 12 European countries that have anomalous
returns on a 5% level or better. If we relax the significance level to 10%, Norway
appears to be anomalous as well, leaving Austria, Ireland, and Spain as the only
countries for which price momentum is not significant, albeit positive. All in all, we
recover prior evidence of pronounced international momentum effects as documented
by Rouwenhorst (1998) and Griffin, Ji, and Martin (2003, 2005).
1In fact, according to an employee of Thomson Financial Services the return time series is
constantly screened for possible glitches in the price, dividend, and adjustment factor history.
In particular, the history of several U.S. OTC stocks has been fixed recently, which presumably
accounted for a lot of issues detected by Ince and Porter (2006).
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Table 5.3: Descriptive Statistics of Momentum Quintile Portfolios 1/2
The table gives average monthly buy-and-hold returns and volatility of quintile portfolios that are built monthly dependent on the price momentum ranking (left panel) or dependent
on the earnings momentum ranking (right panel). All figures refer to the period from July 1987 to June 2007. We give the return differential of the respective hedge strategies along
with the according t-statistic in parentheses. The table also gives the two risk proxies beta and size. Both are gathered using data of the whole period, in particular beta arises from
a standard CAPM regression and size is measured as the average of log(marketvalue). Note that we do not compute the size proxy for the hedge strategies but give the t-statistic
belonging to the return differential.
Price Momentum Ranking Hedge Strategies Earnings Momentum Ranking
Country Lowest 2 3 4 Highest Price Earnings Lowest 2 3 4 Highest Country
Return 0.93 1.15 1.21 1.27 1.72 0.79 0.58 1.27 1.16 1.10 1.43 1.85 Return
Volatility 6.48 4.41 3.98 4.17 5.98 4.40 2.17 5.50 4.40 3.82 4.21 4.91 Volatility
USA
Beta 1.20 0.82 0.72 0.76 1.07 -0.14 -0.04 1.15 0.90 0.74 0.81 0.99 Beta
USA
Size 19.77 20.29 20.46 20.49 20.21 (2.80) (4.11) 19.47 20.17 20.61 20.60 20.04 Size
Return 0.56 0.88 1.10 1.25 1.75 1.19 0.83 0.91 0.98 1.06 1.28 1.74 Return
Volatility 5.76 4.24 3.93 4.02 4.77 3.69 1.71 4.82 4.28 3.82 3.74 3.99 Volatility
Europe
Beta 1.24 0.94 0.87 0.89 1.03 -0.21 -0.14 1.18 1.05 0.92 0.89 0.96 Beta
Europe
Size 20.32 20.92 21.16 21.29 21.15 (5.00) (7.52) 19.96 21.02 21.43 21.43 20.63 Size
Return 0.54 0.96 1.09 1.19 1.42 0.88 0.78 0.89 0.88 1.22 1.27 1.67 Return
Volatility 5.28 4.32 4.18 4.30 4.92 3.70 2.10 4.42 4.14 3.99 3.88 4.01 Volatility
UK
Beta 0.90 0.75 0.73 0.76 0.84 -0.06 -0.07 0.85 0.78 0.74 0.71 0.74 Beta
UK
Size 24.75 24.94 24.95 24.84 24.57 (3.68) (5.73) 24.54 24.91 25.11 24.89 24.46 Size
Return 1.73 1.43 1.78 0.98 1.84 0.39 1.23 1.12 1.73 1.49 1.71 2.49 Return
Volatility 6.91 5.72 5.62 6.20 6.23 5.74 5.67 6.59 4.99 4.97 5.38 5.60 Volatility
Ireland
Beta 0.81 0.72 0.83 0.88 0.73 0.01 -0.15 0.87 0.67 0.68 0.81 0.74 Beta
Ireland
Size 20.05 20.24 20.40 20.21 20.09 (1.04) (3.36) 19.50 20.61 21.00 20.89 19.87 Size
Return 0.22 0.66 0.80 0.99 1.25 1.03 0.76 0.49 0.62 0.73 0.84 1.24 Return
Volatility 7.47 5.34 4.53 4.41 4.57 5.25 2.30 5.49 5.23 4.90 4.68 4.91 Volatility
Germany
Beta 1.51 1.11 0.92 0.88 0.90 -0.60 -0.02 1.20 1.15 1.06 1.02 1.08 Beta
Germany
Size 19.51 19.95 20.13 20.21 20.13 (3.04) (5.10) 19.36 20.07 20.41 20.18 19.92 Size
Return 1.17 1.21 1.24 1.46 1.50 0.33 0.58 1.17 1.33 1.06 1.11 1.76 Return
Volatility 6.23 5.43 5.09 5.60 5.90 4.87 4.47 6.75 5.71 5.13 4.82 5.48 Volatility
Austria
Beta 1.15 1.12 1.07 1.11 1.18 0.03 -0.09 1.38 1.19 1.04 0.96 1.07 Beta
Austria
Size 19.00 19.39 19.60 19.70 19.65 (1.04) (2.02) 19.06 19.45 19.64 19.61 19.59 Size
Return 0.62 0.82 0.90 1.06 1.41 0.79 0.60 0.84 0.95 0.96 1.21 1.44 Return
Volatility 6.35 4.99 4.60 4.81 5.40 4.16 3.02 5.83 4.87 4.26 4.37 4.69 Volatility
Switzerland
Beta 1.29 1.06 0.98 1.02 1.11 -0.18 -0.16 1.34 1.13 0.98 1.00 1.07 Beta
Switzerland
Size 19.90 20.24 20.36 20.49 20.39 (2.94) (3.07) 19.67 20.36 20.55 20.50 20.20 Size
Return 0.82 1.06 1.17 1.34 1.73 0.92 0.77 1.08 1.14 1.31 1.40 1.85 Return
Volatility 7.37 5.61 5.04 5.16 5.74 4.66 2.81 6.38 5.64 5.16 5.00 5.21 Volatility
France
Beta 1.36 1.06 0.95 1.00 1.09 -0.27 -0.15 1.29 1.15 1.04 0.99 1.07 Beta
France
Size 19.52 20.14 20.31 20.31 20.13 (3.04) (4.24) 19.21 20.07 20.33 20.35 19.90 Size
Return 0.36 0.76 0.76 0.89 1.49 1.12 0.36 0.82 0.83 0.88 1.06 1.19 Return
Volatility 7.71 6.53 6.18 5.73 6.41 5.16 3.22 6.61 6.54 6.62 6.13 5.93 Volatility
Italy
Beta 1.16 1.02 0.97 0.88 0.94 -0.22 -0.11 1.03 1.04 1.02 0.92 0.93 Beta
Italy
Size 20.28 20.56 20.66 20.61 20.45 (3.37) (1.74) 19.87 20.69 20.78 20.69 20.19 Size
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Table 5.4: Descriptive Statistics of Momentum Quintile Portfolios 2/2
The table gives average monthly buy-and-hold returns and volatility of quintile portfolios that are built monthly dependent on the price momentum ranking (left panel) or dependent
on the earnings momentum ranking (right panel). All figures refer to the period from July 1987 to June 2007. We give the return differential of the respective hedge strategies along
with the according t-statistic in parentheses. The table also gives the two risk proxies beta and size. Both are gathered using data of the whole period, in particular beta arises from
a standard CAPM regression and size is measured as the average of log(marketvalue). Note that we do not compute the size proxy for the hedge strategies but give the t-statistic
belonging to the return differential.
Price Momentum Ranking Hedge Strategies Earnings Momentum Ranking
Country Lowest 2 3 4 Highest Price Earnings Lowest 2 3 4 Highest Country
Return 0.75 1.40 1.53 2.21 2.91 2.16 0.33 1.69 1.23 1.99 1.57 1.93 Return
Volatility 10.33 9.75 9.63 9.94 11.01 6.07 4.30 10.67 9.47 10.39 9.54 9.79 Volatility
Greece
Beta 0.81 0.78 0.78 0.77 0.83 0.02 0.01 0.84 0.75 0.82 0.76 0.77 Beta
Greece
Size 19.07 19.39 19.51 19.69 19.51 (5.53) (1.17) 19.15 19.33 19.52 19.61 19.26 Size
Return 1.08 1.15 1.32 1.43 1.54 0.46 0.85 0.88 0.84 1.21 1.35 1.84 Return
Volatility 7.38 5.39 5.21 5.31 5.47 5.00 4.41 6.87 5.49 5.16 5.04 5.97 Volatility
Spain
Beta 1.14 0.90 0.86 0.85 0.86 -0.27 -0.16 1.13 0.92 0.85 0.83 0.91 Beta
Spain
Size 19.91 20.26 20.43 20.51 20.34 (1.42) (2.98) 19.48 20.35 20.56 20.74 20.17 Size
Return 1.10 1.57 1.51 1.54 1.83 0.70 0.88 0.87 1.29 1.32 1.50 1.75 Return
Volatility 6.60 6.11 6.00 5.26 6.24 5.51 5.26 6.56 5.85 5.55 5.35 6.58 Volatility
Portugal
Beta 0.91 0.84 0.81 0.71 0.77 -0.15 -0.06 0.93 0.79 0.77 0.71 0.81 Beta
Portugal
Size 19.34 19.85 20.03 19.88 19.82 (1.97) (2.59) 19.34 20.01 19.89 19.86 19.59 Size
Return 0.84 1.18 1.31 1.35 1.72 0.87 0.85 1.11 1.16 1.20 1.58 1.96 Return
Volatility 6.45 5.01 4.69 4.64 5.47 4.40 3.57 5.91 4.80 4.41 4.44 4.79 Volatility
Netherlands
Beta 1.22 0.98 0.91 0.89 1.00 -0.21 -0.17 1.19 0.97 0.90 0.87 0.95 Beta
Netherlands
Size 19.29 19.63 19.72 19.73 19.68 (3.08) (3.69) 18.86 19.71 20.16 19.93 19.30 Size
Return 0.60 0.72 1.00 1.26 1.62 1.02 0.75 0.89 0.92 1.06 1.31 1.63 Return
Volatility 5.65 4.84 4.69 4.86 5.17 4.22 3.07 5.27 4.73 4.28 4.35 4.73 Volatility
Belgium
Beta 1.28 1.15 1.14 1.17 1.17 -0.11 -0.02 1.30 1.21 1.10 1.09 1.20 Beta
Belgium
Size 19.58 20.03 20.16 20.27 20.09 (3.73) (3.77) 19.32 20.11 20.32 20.33 19.84 Size
Return 1.03 1.34 1.38 1.56 2.09 1.05 0.77 1.07 1.34 1.53 1.75 1.84 Return
Volatility 7.64 6.02 5.69 6.07 6.69 4.82 4.07 6.81 6.19 5.94 5.64 5.79 Volatility
Sweden
Beta 0.91 0.72 0.67 0.71 0.76 -0.15 -0.13 0.82 0.75 0.71 0.65 0.67 Beta
Sweden
Size 21.79 22.04 22.10 22.22 22.18 (3.38) (2.95) 21.40 22.05 22.23 22.20 21.87 Size
Return 1.25 1.40 1.42 1.18 1.81 0.75 0.43 1.46 1.22 1.02 1.55 1.85 Return
Volatility 8.07 6.24 6.30 6.45 7.44 5.98 4.98 7.65 6.48 6.36 6.25 6.26 Volatility
Norway
Beta 1.05 0.81 0.81 0.83 0.94 -0.15 -0.15 1.01 0.87 0.83 0.79 0.79 Beta
Norway
Size 21.44 21.70 21.80 21.82 21.81 (1.94) (1.35) 21.55 21.54 21.60 21.69 21.74 Size
Return 0.81 1.11 1.06 1.55 2.04 1.22 1.16 0.97 1.02 1.32 1.39 2.13 Return
Volatility 6.02 4.29 4.07 4.32 4.98 4.54 4.22 5.14 4.44 4.32 4.19 5.05 Volatility
Denmark
Beta 1.35 1.08 1.05 1.05 1.15 -0.19 -0.03 1.29 1.13 1.07 1.03 1.16 Beta
Denmark
Size 20.75 21.06 21.15 21.19 21.26 (4.18) (4.27) 20.48 21.05 21.24 21.32 20.95 Size
Return 0.92 1.33 1.85 1.54 1.93 1.01 1.18 1.01 1.08 1.21 1.44 2.19 Return
Volatility 8.06 6.34 6.46 5.86 6.59 5.60 4.84 7.70 6.99 6.37 5.35 6.39 Volatility
Finland
Beta 1.08 0.86 0.89 0.80 0.85 -0.22 -0.11 1.05 0.99 0.88 0.75 0.83 Beta
Finland
Size 19.38 19.62 19.60 19.66 19.82 (2.79) (3.78) 19.27 19.61 19.67 19.74 19.52 Size
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While the loser quintile is sometimes contributing to the return spread, we note that
the lion’s share is due to the winner quintile. This finding confirms prior evidence
that a long-only investor may well benefit from an according momentum strategy.
However, the extreme quintile portfolios are the riskiest across all countries, since
the winner and loser portfolios prove to be more volatile than the portfolios with
less extreme price momentum. To judge a systematic risk bias of these portfolios,
we compute betas according to the classical regression
Rit − RFt = αi + βi(RMt − RFt) + εit, (5.2)
where Rit denotes the gross return of quintile i, RFt is the risk-free rate and RMt
is the market return of the respective country. For more than half of the countries,
the extreme quintile portfolios exhibit high betas, while the remaining portfolios
appear to be homogeneous in terms of beta. Moreover, in 14 countries we obtain
the highest betas for the loser quintile. Also, there is a size bias for the two extreme
quintile portfolios. When we examine size, measured in terms of the logarithm
of market value, we find that the two extreme portfolios are mostly populated by
smaller companies. Again, the bias is more severe in the loser quintile, which may
in turn explain its conspicuous market exposure. Concerning the price momentum
strategy, we usually observe betas that are slightly negative suggesting that one may
partially hedge against downside moves of the market.
Regarding earnings momentum, the U.S. strategy earns 58 basis points per month
at a volatility that is only half the size of the price momentum volatility. Thus, the
according t-statistic of 4.11 is more convincing. This observation of improved risk-
adjusted performance also applies to the European earnings momentum strategy
with a return of 83 basis points per month at 1.71% volatility, giving a t-statistic
of 7.52. Across Europe, Tables 5.3 and 5.4 give rise to 13 significant return differ-
entials while the remaining countries also show positive differentials. These usually
reflect the general pattern of price momentum outperforming earnings momentum
in terms of return at the cost of higher volatility. Even though earnings momen-
tum exhibits less volatility, risk-mitigating effects with regard to market volatility
do only occur in some countries. Compared to price momentum, these earnings
momentum differentials seem to be driven less often by the short leg. Again, the
extreme quintile portfolios are more risky than the middle portfolios. However, in
contrast to price momentum the long leg has less beta exposure while the short leg
of the earnings momentum strategy has a large exposure to this factor. Also, the
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earnings momentum strategy exhibits negative betas that are usually lower than
those of the according price momentum strategy.
In the upper graphs of Figure 5.1, we plot the cumulative returns of the winner
and loser quintiles of the earnings and price momentum strategies together with the
evolution of an equally-weighted market portfolio. By inspecting the cumulative
wealth of the extreme quintiles for the U.S., we find already strong support for
the findings in Chordia and Shivakumar (2006), namely that price and earnings
momentum are closely related. For both earnings and price momentum, the loser and
the winner quintile portfolios move almost in sync. In addition, the loser portfolio
stays well below the market portfolio and the winner portfolio stays well above it.
Figure 5.1: Cumulative Momentum Returns
The upper graphs give cumulative total returns to the winner and loser quintiles of the earnings
momentum strategy in terms of a highlighted spread while the returns of the price momentum
winners and losers are added as dashed lines. The performance of an equally-weighted market
portfolio is given by the solid line. The lower graphs give cumulative total returns to the price
momentum strategy (dashed line) and to the earnings momentum strategy (solid line). Results
are for the period from July 1987 to June 2007.
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We observe a similar behavior in Europe. However, both legs of the price mo-
mentum strategy are shifted upwards as compared to their earnings momentum
counterparts. Also, inspecting the cumulative momentum returns for the U.S. and
Europe over time in the lower graphs of Figure 5.1 confirms the above statements.
Both, price and earnings momentum, seem to be closely tied. Over the nineties, the
respective return paths nearly coincide. However, the earnings momentum strategy
is smoother. While this observation has already been deduced from the descrip-
tive statistics, we additionally learn that the higher volatility figures mainly arise
over a short period following the burst of the technology bubble in 1999. Hence,
though usually sailing in safe waters, a price momentum investor may experience
very turbulent times with volatility well in excess of common market levels.
5.3.2 Time-Series Regressions
Since most of the hedge strategies are highly volatile, we wonder whether their high
returns are solely compensating for risk. To further examine the performance of our
strategies, we therefore check if the long-short portfolio returns can be attributed to
common risk factors. We adopt the standard approach of Fama and French (1993)
and estimate a regression model of the form
RLt − RSt = α + β(RMt −RFt) + γRSMBt + δRHMLt + εt, (5.3)
where RLt−RSt is the return difference of the respective hedge strategy, i.e., the long
leg minus the short leg. Regarding the common risk factor portfolios we compute
country-specific factors as follows: The market return RMt is represented by some
broad market index, the size factor RSMBt is mimicked by a small cap index minus
the risk-free rate, RSCt−RFt, and the value factor RHMLt is the difference between
a value index and the corresponding growth index, RV t − RGt. Given the factor
structure in (5.3), we can identify the alpha generated by the hedge strategy net of
common risk factors.
Table 5.5 displays the results of a Fama-French regression for price momentum ac-
cording to equation (5.3) that uses 240 monthly returns spanning the period from
July 1987 to June 2007. Across all countries, the risk factors explain most of the
variation of the loser and winner quintiles’ excess returns, thus confirming our de-
scriptive analysis in the previous section. However, concerning the long-short strate-
gies, we note that the model’s explanatory power is generally low, confirming prior
evidence as in Fama and French (1996).
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Table 5.5: Time-Series-Regressions of Price Momentum Portfolios
The Table gives the results of a regression according to Equation (5.3) using 240 monthly returns
ranging from July 1987 to June 2007 along with the according t-statistics. Portfolio 1 refers to the
loser quintile, portfolio 5 refers to the winner quintile, and portfolio 5-1 is the long-short portfolio
(winner-loser).
Fama-French Model
α β γ δ t(α) t(β) t(γ) t(δ) Adj.
R2
1 -0.90 1.00 0.34 0.08 -5.29 19.38 5.43 1.28 84.5
USA 5 0.11 0.82 0.34 -0.30 0.63 15.64 5.45 -5.06 81.0
5-1 1.01 -0.18 0.01 -0.38 3.57 -2.07 0.08 -3.88 7.0
1 -0.41 0.76 0.41 0.21 -2.54 8.23 5.55 2.76 84.6
Europe 5 1.05 0.52 0.45 -0.20 7.82 6.80 7.32 -3.19 84.7
5-1 1.46 -0.24 0.04 -0.41 5.84 -1.68 0.33 -3.49 9.4
1 -0.18 -0.33 1.19 0.04 -1.24 -3.05 11.77 0.64 82.0
UK 5 0.72 0.28 0.57 -0.29 4.67 2.41 5.28 -4.67 76.4
5-1 0.90 0.60 -0.62 -0.32 4.02 3.65 -3.99 -3.64 12.0
1 0.11 0.64 0.25 -0.02 0.29 6.81 2.53 -0.39 42.3
Ireland 5 0.35 0.65 0.17 -0.17 1.19 10.74 2.37 -3.58 54.6
5-1 0.40 0.22 -0.27 -0.15 1.00 2.17 -2.51 -2.34 4.5
1 -0.95 1.37 0.15 -0.06 -3.83 14.55 1.67 -0.97 74.5
Germany 5 0.33 0.52 0.47 0.03 2.40 9.80 9.66 0.77 78.8
5-1 1.28 -0.85 0.33 0.09 4.36 -7.64 3.15 1.18 27.1
1 0.08 0.76 0.45 0.00 0.34 8.87 6.03 -0.04 65.0
Austria 5 0.40 0.83 0.41 -0.06 2.03 12.12 6.75 -1.61 74.7
5-1 0.32 0.08 -0.04 -0.06 0.98 0.69 -0.44 -0.95 -0.6
1 -0.55 1.11 0.15 0.15 -3.39 18.34 2.56 3.43 84.8
Switzerland 5 0.38 1.05 0.11 -0.08 2.81 20.69 2.15 -2.26 85.4
5-1 0.93 -0.06 -0.05 -0.24 3.56 -0.63 -0.48 -3.30 7.4
1 -0.85 1.03 0.41 0.19 -4.36 16.85 7.00 4.24 84.2
France 5 0.31 0.95 0.18 -0.13 2.06 20.18 3.91 -3.73 84.6
5-1 1.16 -0.08 -0.23 -0.33 4.19 -0.92 -2.81 -5.00 19.6
1 -0.65 1.27 -0.12 -0.05 -2.84 13.76 -1.25 -0.89 79.4
Italy 5 0.54 0.75 0.22 -0.14 2.71 9.24 2.72 -3.13 77.0
5-1 1.19 -0.52 0.34 -0.10 3.71 -3.97 2.59 -1.33 8.2
1 -1.19 0.52 0.40 -0.08 -4.04 10.64 7.22 -0.66 87.4
Greece 5 0.97 0.55 0.43 -0.59 2.65 9.09 6.14 -4.01 82.9
5-1 2.17 0.03 0.02 -0.51 4.49 0.40 0.25 -2.64 2.7
1 -0.45 0.85 0.34 -0.10 -1.91 9.77 3.59 -1.57 77.3
Spain 5 0.20 0.73 0.16 -0.04 1.22 11.91 2.39 -0.99 79.6
5-1 0.66 -0.12 -0.18 0.05 2.06 -1.01 -1.41 0.65 9.4
1 -0.80 0.46 0.54 0.07 -2.40 5.59 8.75 0.82 61.1
Portugal 5 0.24 0.35 0.50 -0.18 0.70 4.06 7.84 -2.13 53.0
5-1 1.02 -0.12 -0.04 -0.22 2.31 -1.05 -0.46 -1.98 2.2
1 -0.46 1.05 0.14 0.15 -2.73 17.15 2.24 3.85 84.0
Netherlands 5 0.66 0.96 0.07 -0.06 3.93 15.70 1.15 -1.62 78.0
5-1 1.13 -0.09 -0.07 -0.21 4.11 -0.91 -0.67 -3.37 9.3
1 -0.66 1.10 0.19 0.04 -3.49 14.80 3.10 0.76 75.0
Belgium 5 0.52 0.92 0.27 -0.07 3.05 13.82 4.93 -1.55 76.2
5-1 1.18 -0.18 0.08 -0.11 4.19 -1.60 0.89 -1.45 0.8
1 -0.52 0.74 0.29 0.07 -2.10 13.51 4.22 1.81 75.5
Sweden 5 0.70 0.61 0.25 0.04 2.83 11.32 3.66 1.20 68.7
5-1 1.22 -0.13 -0.04 -0.02 3.95 -1.86 -0.48 -0.50 4.0
1 -0.51 0.73 0.32 0.19 -1.69 8.55 4.03 3.18 69.9
Norway 5 0.27 0.73 0.25 -0.02 0.95 9.94 3.51 -0.32 67.3
5-1 1.06 -0.19 0.07 -0.20 2.67 -1.65 0.67 -2.48 3.9
1 -0.70 0.84 0.49 -0.09 -2.99 8.16 6.19 -1.78 66.1
Denmark 5 0.65 0.89 0.25 -0.11 3.40 10.57 3.85 -2.84 67.2
5-1 1.34 0.05 -0.24 -0.03 4.54 0.37 -2.40 -0.42 3.3
1 -0.71 0.85 0.25 -0.05 -2.56 8.90 2.68 -1.53 75.9
Finland 5 0.54 0.32 0.57 -0.09 2.46 4.31 7.85 -3.94 77.6
5-1 1.24 -0.52 0.32 -0.05 3.34 -4.07 2.60 -1.17 8.6
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Table 5.6: Time-Series-Regressions of Earnings Momentum Portfolios
The Table gives the results of a regression according to Equation (5.3) using 240 monthly returns
ranging from July 1987 to June 2007 along with the according t-statistics. Portfolio 1 refers to
the negative earnings revisions quintile, portfolio 5 refers to the positive earnings revision quintile,
and portfolio 5-1 is the long-short portfolio (positive-negative).
Fama-French Model
α β γ δ t(α) t(β) t(γ) t(δ) Adj.
R2
1 -0.63 1.00 0.22 0.12 -6.10 27.17 5.30 3.38 92.5
USA 5 0.22 0.75 0.33 -0.01 1.80 17.50 6.85 -0.16 87.3
5-1 0.85 -0.25 0.11 -0.12 6.15 -5.12 2.01 -2.67 14.5
1 -0.15 0.72 0.38 0.14 -1.59 12.73 8.56 3.06 92.5
Europe 5 0.89 0.47 0.42 0.03 10.14 9.13 10.25 0.82 90.9
5-1 1.05 -0.25 0.04 -0.10 9.68 -3.94 0.70 -2.07 24.3
1 0.04 0.11 0.72 -0.08 0.36 1.27 8.60 -1.70 83.5
UK 5 0.85 -0.06 0.77 0.00 7.33 -0.65 9.46 0.07 80.8
5-1 0.80 -0.17 0.06 0.08 6.00 -1.67 0.60 1.56 5.4
1 -0.53 0.59 0.33 -0.11 -1.33 4.45 2.75 -1.98 45.7
Ireland 5 1.05 0.50 0.32 -0.05 3.75 5.93 3.92 -1.08 47.7
5-1 1.45 -0.19 0.03 0.02 3.14 -1.24 0.24 0.34 0.2
1 -0.66 0.84 0.40 0.08 -4.25 12.12 6.54 1.87 81.8
Germany 5 0.20 0.64 0.47 0.01 1.57 11.35 9.44 0.29 84.9
5-1 0.87 -0.20 0.07 -0.07 5.80 -3.00 1.22 -1.71 4.8
1 -0.17 1.02 0.37 0.08 -0.75 11.78 5.02 1.95 73.9
Austria 5 0.71 0.67 0.43 0.01 3.49 8.77 6.75 0.13 69.6
5-1 0.89 -0.35 0.07 -0.08 3.07 -3.28 0.73 -1.48 7.9
1 -0.50 1.33 0.00 0.01 -3.87 19.74 -0.01 0.33 89.2
Switzerland 5 0.31 0.85 0.22 0.00 2.99 15.62 4.52 -0.08 89.0
5-1 0.81 -0.48 0.22 -0.01 4.37 -4.92 2.55 -0.27 14.8
1 -0.68 1.05 0.25 0.16 -4.65 19.97 5.41 4.93 89.1
France 5 0.28 0.94 0.14 -0.01 2.25 20.61 3.39 -0.51 87.8
5-1 1.00 -0.13 -0.10 -0.18 5.86 -2.18 -1.85 -4.51 21.7
1 -0.32 0.88 0.15 0.08 -1.85 11.64 1.97 2.03 84.0
Italy 5 0.10 0.99 -0.07 0.07 0.65 14.78 -1.00 1.99 84.7
5-1 0.42 0.10 -0.22 -0.01 2.03 1.14 -2.40 -0.24 4.4
1 -0.38 0.52 0.45 -0.20 -1.24 10.21 7.63 -1.55 86.7
Greece 5 0.11 0.45 0.45 -0.33 0.37 9.45 8.25 -2.84 86.7
5-1 0.45 -0.06 -0.01 -0.13 1.34 -1.10 -0.17 -0.95 3.0
1 -0.66 0.78 0.41 -0.06 -3.87 11.84 5.83 -1.28 86.7
Spain 5 0.40 0.82 0.10 -0.05 1.95 10.80 1.23 -0.86 73.7
5-1 1.03 -0.02 -0.25 0.01 3.65 -0.22 -2.11 0.15 9.5
1 -1.02 0.43 0.60 0.01 -3.46 5.90 11.03 0.07 67.2
Portugal 5 0.04 0.45 0.44 -0.08 0.10 4.70 6.27 -0.81 45.9
5-1 1.06 0.01 -0.16 -0.08 2.58 0.13 -2.09 -0.80 2.0
1 -0.29 0.87 0.29 0.10 -1.92 12.78 4.66 2.86 85.6
Netherlands 5 0.79 0.90 0.06 -0.04 5.58 13.98 1.08 -1.34 80.5
5-1 1.08 0.03 -0.23 -0.14 4.89 0.31 -2.47 -2.80 13.9
1 -0.42 1.04 0.24 0.01 -2.42 11.91 3.68 0.25 76.6
Belgium 5 0.46 0.86 0.30 -0.03 3.21 12.23 5.72 -0.70 81.0
5-1 0.88 -0.17 0.06 -0.04 4.19 -1.67 0.80 -0.68 0.7
1 -0.50 0.62 0.32 0.11 -2.25 11.61 5.00 3.36 75.8
Sweden 5 0.43 0.41 0.40 0.10 2.09 8.34 6.71 3.30 71.7
5-1 0.93 -0.21 0.08 -0.01 3.55 -3.32 1.02 -0.26 6.5
1 -0.23 0.70 0.31 0.12 -0.82 8.72 4.22 2.17 71.2
Norway 5 0.44 0.51 0.30 0.04 1.75 7.09 4.42 0.74 64.8
5-1 0.71 -0.18 -0.03 -0.07 2.16 -1.88 -0.35 -1.01 6.6
1 -0.58 0.92 0.34 0.00 -3.26 10.77 5.34 0.00 73.8
Denmark 5 0.64 0.97 0.17 -0.05 3.00 9.47 2.20 -1.15 60.6
5-1 1.23 0.05 -0.17 -0.05 4.32 0.37 -1.70 -0.87 1.3
1 -0.52 0.80 0.26 0.03 -2.06 9.25 3.16 0.96 77.5
Finland 5 0.88 0.32 0.55 -0.02 4.15 4.40 7.73 -0.79 76.5
5-1 1.40 -0.48 0.28 -0.05 4.44 -4.39 2.71 -1.30 10.1
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The resulting alphas are positive and significant at the 5%-level for 15 out of 17
countries, whereas Ireland and Austria are the exception to the rule. Note that the
hedge strategies are also promising in terms of economical significance. Except for
Austria, Ireland, and Spain, 14 countries generate monthly alphas in excess of 90
basis points, the Greek alpha even amounts to 217 basis points, followed by 134
basis points for Denmark and 128 basis points for Germany. Across countries, we
note that the alphas are mostly driven equally by the long and the short leg, with
a slight tendency towards the long leg. However, the U.S. alpha of 101 basis points
is almost entirely due to the short leg.
Table 5.6 gives the analogous results of the Fama-French regression for earnings
momentum which is not captured by common risk factors as well. All countries
exhibit positive alphas that are significant on a 5%-level in 16 cases—the odd one
out is Greece. Hence, this analysis significantly hardens our pure return diagnostics.
As for the sources to the earnings momentum alphas, we note that long and short
legs contribute in equal shares.
To further examine the evolution of both hedge strategies over time, we compute the
related alphas for the U.S. and Europe via trailing Fama-French regressions accord-
ing to equation (5.3). We use a 36-month window and plot the resulting alphas in
the upper graphs of Figure 5.2 for price momentum and in the lower graphs of Fig-
ure 5.2 for earnings momentum. To address statistical significance, we additionally
provide 95% confidence bands. Regarding price momentum, the hedge strategies’
alphas prove to be consistently positive throughout the sample period. While the
evolution of price momentum alphas is rather volatile, earnings momentum alphas
behave more steadily. Interestingly, the U.S. momentum strategies have experienced
severe drawdowns at the end of the nineties while European momentum strategies
have not faltered.
5.4 Momentum Strategies and Data Snooping
From the previous section we learn that 15 out of 17 countries exhibit positive and
significant price momentum alphas and 16 exhibit positive and significant earnings
momentum alphas. However, these alphas may be spurious since they arise from
single hypothesis tests performed for each country. Therefore, we will subject both
momentum strategies to the methods of Chapter 3 that additionally account for
multiple testing.
To control the FWE, we consider the k-StepM method for k = 1 which is the
appropriate choice given the number of strategies under study. To control the FDP,
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Figure 5.2: Trailing Alphas of Momentum Hedge Portfolios
We plot trailing Fama-French momentum alphas estimated from equation (5.3) using 36-months
windows, thus results cover July 1990 to June 2007. Also, we give 95%-confidence bands (dashed
lines). The upper graphs refer to the price momentum strategy, the lower graphs refer to the
earnings momentum strategy, respectively.
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we pursue the FDP-StepMγ using γ = 0.1. We keep the significance level constant
at 5% across all multiple testing procedures and we present results for the return
of the hedge strategies as well as their alphas arising from the Fama-French time
series regressions. To account for potential serial correlation in the return series, we
use a kernel variance estimator based on the Parzen kernel to studentize the test
statistics, see Andrews (1991). The bootstrap method is the stationary bootstrap
with an average block size of 12 months.2
Panel A of Table 5.7 reports the countries’ return statistics for price momentum. We
provide the lower confidence band cl for the returns using studentized test statistics
according to the StepM and FDP-StepMγ method, respectively. Since we are in a
2Using the stationary bootstrap with an average block size of 6 months leaves results virtually
unchanged.
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one-sided test setting, we give the lower limits of the confidence interval as computed
in the last step of the respective method. The value in the column labeled rej equals
1 if 0 /∈ [cl,∞), which indicates the rejection of capital market efficiency and suggests
the presence of an anomaly in the respective country.
Concerning the results for the price momentum returns, we observe 13 rejections by
the StepM method. Thus, the FDP-StepMγ is not equivalent to the StepM, since
the number of rejections exceeds nine. Moreover, the FDP-StepMγ rejects market
efficiency for 15 countries. Panel B of Table 5.7 displays the multiple testing results
using the Fama-French price momentum alphas as test statistics. With this metric,
price momentum is found to be overwhelmingly robust to data snooping. Already
the StepM method yields 16 rejections of capital market efficiency. Hence, the results
mirror those of the na¨ıve screen that are also obtained using the FDP-StepMγ .
As for the earnings momentum strategies, Table 5.7 reveals results that are qual-
itatively similar to the ones obtained for price momentum. However, considering
returns as test statistic, the StepM gives only nine rejections of capital market ef-
ficiency, while the FDP-StepMγ method rejects 16 countries. Considering alphas
as test statistic, the StepM method detects 15 and the FDP-StepMγ method 16
significant alphas.
To conclude, the detected price and earnings momentum anomalies are confirmed
by our battery of tests that account for multiple testing issues. By and large,
both phenomena prove to be quite persistent and raise the need of sound economic
inference.
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Table 5.7: Multiple Testing in International Momentum Strategies
The table gives the lower confidence band cl for the returns as obtained by the StepM method and
the FDP-StepM0.1using studentized test statistics as illustrated in Section 3.1. The rej-columns
contain the resulting decision where 1 indicates rejection of θs = 0 (capital market efficiency).
Panel A provides results for returns as test statistics and Panel B provides results for Fama-French
alphas as test statistics.
Price Momentum Earnings Momentum
Country θs StepM FDP-StepM0.1 θs StepM FDP-StepM0.1
cl rej cl rej cl rej cl rej
Panel A: Return
USA 0.0079 0.0027 1 0.0048 1 0.0058 0.0018 1 0.0037 1
Europe 0.0119 0.0059 1 0.0082 1 0.0083 0.0046 1 0.0064 1
UK 0.0088 0.0024 1 0.0049 1 0.0078 0.0040 1 0.0058 1
Ireland 0.0039 -0.0040 0 -0.0010 0 0.0123 -0.0015 0 0.0051 1
Germany 0.0103 0.0033 1 0.0060 1 0.0076 0.0030 1 0.0052 1
Austria 0.0033 -0.0043 0 -0.0014 0 0.0058 -0.0028 0 0.0013 1
Switzerland 0.0079 0.0007 1 0.0035 1 0.0060 -0.0006 0 0.0025 1
France 0.0092 0.0027 1 0.0052 1 0.0077 0.0031 1 0.0053 1
Italy 0.0112 0.0043 1 0.0070 1 0.0036 -0.0021 0 0.0006 1
Greece 0.0216 0.0110 1 0.0151 1 0.0033 -0.0065 0 -0.0019 0
Spain 0.0046 -0.0029 0 0.0000 0 0.0085 0.0000 0 0.0040 1
Portugal 0.0070 -0.0017 0 0.0017 1 0.0088 -0.0008 0 0.0038 1
Netherlands 0.0087 0.0019 1 0.0046 1 0.0085 0.0006 1 0.0044 1
Belgium 0.0102 0.0034 1 0.0060 1 0.0075 0.0022 1 0.0047 1
Sweden 0.0105 0.0036 1 0.0063 1 0.0077 -0.0003 0 0.0035 1
Norway 0.0075 -0.0011 0 0.0022 1 0.0043 -0.0050 0 -0.0005 0
Denmark 0.0122 0.0059 1 0.0084 1 0.0116 0.0032 1 0.0072 1
Finland 0.0101 0.0017 1 0.0050 1 0.0118 0.0032 1 0.0073 1
Panel B: Fama-French Alpha
USA 0.0101 0.0046 1 0.0067 1 0.0085 0.0054 1 0.0067 1
Europe 0.0146 0.0082 1 0.0106 1 0.0105 0.0079 1 0.0090 1
UK 0.0090 0.0037 1 0.0057 1 0.0080 0.0052 1 0.0063 1
Ireland 0.0040 -0.0041 0 -0.0011 0 0.0145 0.0030 1 0.0076 1
Germany 0.0128 0.0060 1 0.0086 1 0.0087 0.0049 1 0.0064 1
Austria 0.0032 -0.0036 0 -0.0010 0 0.0089 0.0030 1 0.0054 1
Switzerland 0.0093 0.0025 1 0.0051 1 0.0081 0.0035 1 0.0054 1
France 0.0116 0.0063 1 0.0083 1 0.0100 0.0063 1 0.0078 1
Italy 0.0119 0.0056 1 0.0080 1 0.0042 -0.0003 0 0.0015 1
Greece 0.0217 0.0120 1 0.0156 1 0.0045 -0.0031 0 0.0000 0
Spain 0.0066 0.0008 1 0.0030 1 0.0103 0.0042 1 0.0067 1
Portugal 0.0102 0.0006 1 0.0042 1 0.0106 0.0031 1 0.0061 1
Netherlands 0.0113 0.0057 1 0.0078 1 0.0108 0.0052 1 0.0074 1
Belgium 0.0118 0.0052 1 0.0077 1 0.0088 0.0045 1 0.0062 1
Sweden 0.0122 0.0055 1 0.0080 1 0.0093 0.0035 1 0.0058 1
Norway 0.0106 0.0025 1 0.0056 1 0.0071 0.0003 1 0.0030 1
Denmark 0.0134 0.0077 1 0.0099 1 0.0123 0.0055 1 0.0082 1
Finland 0.0124 0.0047 1 0.0076 1 0.0140 0.0077 1 0.0103 1
Return 13 15 9 16
Σ
Alpha 16 16 16 17
Price and Earnings Momentum 57
5.5 Linking Price and Earnings Momentum
Having ruled out data snooping biases as possible explanations to the momentum
effects, we will further delve into the economic nature of these phenomena. In fact,
one may wonder whether both price and earnings momentum may be traced back
to similar sources, be it a behavioral bias or a compensation for risk.
5.5.1 Correlation of Price and Earnings Momentum
When inspecting the cumulative returns in Figure 5.1, we have already noted that
price and earnings momentum do follow very similar return paths. To quantify this
similarity, we simply compute the correlation of selected price and earnings momen-
tum portfolios in Table 5.8. In particular, we compare portfolios with identical price
and earnings momentum ranking. For instance, in the U.S. we observe a correla-
tion of 0.933 between the loser portfolio and the portfolio with the lowest earnings
revisions. The winner portfolio is also highly correlated with the highest earnings
revision portfolio, exhibiting a correlation of 0.902. Unsurprisingly, these figures are
significantly different from zero. Moreover, this relation also holds in the remaining
countries with the same order of magnitude. Most of the correlations range between
0.8 and 0.95. However, among the different countries’ quintile portfolios, the winner
quintiles usually have the smallest correlation.
Given these results, we suspect the price and earnings momentum hedge strategies
to be positively correlated as well. Indeed, while Greece unsurprisingly exhibits
rather zero correlation, all of the remaining time series of returns exhibit significantly
positive correlation with correlation coefficients between 0.161 and 0.670. Among
the 17 countries we find ten (seven) with correlation in excess of 0.3 (0.4). We
also compute the correlation of price and earnings momentum alphas using the
respective time-series arising from the trailing Fama-French regressions of Section
5.3. While the resulting correlation figures often exceed those of the return time
series, Spain has a negative correlation and for two countries, the alphas’ correlation
is not distinguishable from zero. These countries are Greece and the U.S.. Especially
for the U.S., this observation is unanticipated given a return time series correlation
of 0.319. Nevertheless, the general pattern of alpha correlations is consistent with
the return correlations, giving 15 significant figures ranging from 0.224 (Switzerland)
to 0.630 (France).
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Table 5.8: Correlation of Price and Earnings Momentum Returns
The table gives correlation figures of quintile portfolio returns built monthly dependent on the
price and earnings momentum ranking. We compare momentum portfolios that belong to the
same quintile ranking. The p-Value arises from a test of zero correlation in the return of the
respective portfolios. The two rightmost columns give the correlation coefficients for the return
and the Fama-French alpha of both strategies.
Price-Earnings Momentum Ranking Hedge Strategies
Country Lowest 2 3 4 Highest Return Alpha
Correlation 0.933 0.967 0.971 0.948 0.902 0.319 0.099
USA
p-Value 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.157
Correlation 0.952 0.978 0.970 0.976 0.932 0.651 0.825
Europe
p-Value 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Correlation 0.898 0.952 0.959 0.956 0.869 0.161 0.521
UK
p-Value 0 0 0 0 0 0.013 0
Correlation 0.749 0.772 0.830 0.754 0.804 0.348 0.624
Ireland
p-Value 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Correlation 0.928 0.958 0.919 0.893 0.917 0.508 0.538
Germany
p-Value 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Correlation 0.813 0.848 0.881 0.867 0.864 0.262 0.573
Austria
p-Value 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Correlation 0.948 0.946 0.951 0.954 0.907 0.567 0.224
Switzerland
p-Value 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.001
Correlation 0.952 0.969 0.966 0.962 0.935 0.670 0.630
France
p-Value 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Correlation 0.904 0.942 0.924 0.932 0.858 0.253 0.328
Italy
p-Value 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Correlation 0.924 0.968 0.964 0.960 0.932 0.076 0.095
Greece
p-Value 0 0 0 0 0 0.344 0.273
Correlation 0.885 0.950 0.955 0.956 0.861 0.177 -0.439
Spain
p-Value 0 0 0 0 0 0.007 0
Correlation 0.866 0.830 0.867 0.873 0.783 0.280 0.573
Portugal
p-Value 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Correlation 0.947 0.954 0.934 0.943 0.913 0.663 0.616
Netherlands
p-Value 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Correlation 0.908 0.916 0.936 0.915 0.865 0.471 0.551
Belgium
p-Value 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Correlation 0.878 0.913 0.915 0.937 0.881 0.318 0.486
Sweden
p-Value 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Correlation 0.847 0.891 0.834 0.854 0.852 0.240 0.617
Norway
p-Value 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Correlation 0.861 0.888 0.869 0.813 0.839 0.454 0.313
Denmark
p-Value 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Correlation 0.895 0.907 0.902 0.876 0.899 0.541 0.528
Finland
p-Value 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5.5.2 Does Earnings Momentum Subsume Price Momentum?
So far we have compiled considerable evidence that price and earnings momentum
are closely connected in the U.S. and several European markets. In fact, Chordia
and Shivakumar (2006) show that the U.S. price momentum alpha vanishes when
additionally controlling for earnings momentum, while the U.S. earnings momen-
tum alpha is robust when vice versa controlling for price momentum. Chordia and
Shivakumar (2006) thus reason that price momentum is just a noisy proxy for earn-
ings momentum. While this reasoning is quite persuasive, we wonder whether this
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observation carries over to other markets. Therefore, when testing for price momen-
tum, we extend the Fama-French setting of Equation (5.3) to a four-factor model
by adding an earnings momentum factor:
RLt − RSt = α + β(RMt − RFt) + γRSMBt + δRHMLt + ζRPMNt + εt, (5.4)
where RPMNt refers to the returns to the earnings momentum strategy (positive
minus negative earnings revisions). Accordingly, Table 5.9 contrasts the Fama-
French results to those of the above four-factor model for all countries’ respective
hedge strategies. For the U.S. and the aggregate European strategy we additionally
give the results for the quintile portfolios. While the returns of the quintile portfolios
are usually reasonably captured by the Fama-French factors, the returns of the price
momentum strategies are not. Even though these strategies sometimes load to one
common factor or another, the adjusted R2s are typically quite low. Only for the
U.K., France, and Germany do we observe two-digit adjusted R2s.
Considering the alphas of quintile portfolios, we note a monotonic increase from
loser to winner portfolios. For instance, the monthly U.S. price momentum alpha of
101 basis points results from -90 basis points for the loser quintile and from 11 basis
points from the winner quintile. However, this huge spread is fairly persistent when
controlling for the earnings momentum factor. The loser quintile’s alpha is -80 basis
points and the winner quintile’s alpha reduces to 1 basis point. As a consequence,
the U.S. price momentum is still significant under the four-factor model, contrasting
with the results of Chordia and Shivakumar (2006).
The general pattern in Europe is different. For instance, for the European strategy
we observe the following. While the Fama-French model attains an adjusted R2
of 9.4%, the four-factor model explains 42.9% of the variation in European price
momentum returns, cutting down the Fama-French alpha of 146 basis points to
insignificant 16 basis points. Across all countries, the addition of the earnings mo-
mentum strategy in (5.4) seems reasonable, since many portfolios exhibit significant
loadings to this factor. In particular, the adjusted R2 of the hedge strategies usually
increases by a considerable amount. In this sense, all countries’ price momentum
alphas are clearly reduced in the four-factor model and so are the corresponding
t-statistics. The latter reductions imply statistical insignificance in seven out of 16
European countries: The price momentum alphas of Germany, Switzerland, France,
Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, and Finland are subsumed by the respective earn-
ings momentum factor.
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Table 5.9: Time-Series-Regressions of Price Momentum Portfolios
The table’s left panel gives the results of a regression according to Equation (5.3) using 240 monthly returns ranging from July 1987 to June 2007 followed
by the according t-statistics. The right panel gives the results of a regression according to Equation (5.4). We use the country abbreviations introduced
in Table 5.1. We give the quintile portfolios 1 (loser) to 5 (winner) together with the long-short portfolio (winner-loser).
Fama-French Model 4-Factor Model
α β γ δ t(α) t(β) t(γ) t(δ) Adj. α β γ δ ζ t(α) t(β) t(γ) t(δ) t(ζ) Adj.
R2 R2
1 -0.90 1.00 0.34 0.08 -5.29 19.38 5.43 1.28 84.5 -0.80 0.99 0.32 0.06 -0.17 -4.20 15.09 4.58 0.94 -2.02 83.7
2 -0.24 0.75 0.14 0.21 -2.10 21.70 3.30 5.33 84.8 -0.30 0.72 0.18 0.23 0.16 -2.38 16.68 4.03 6.01 2.83 83.7
3 -0.07 0.69 0.07 0.19 -0.63 19.44 1.63 4.75 80.3 -0.17 0.63 0.15 0.23 0.27 -1.43 15.39 3.54 6.22 5.10 80.5
USA
4 -0.04 0.70 0.12 0.07 -0.34 18.99 2.64 1.57 81.0 -0.15 0.62 0.22 0.11 0.32 -1.33 15.50 5.31 3.07 6.38 83.0
5 0.11 0.82 0.34 -0.30 0.63 15.64 5.45 -5.06 81.0 0.01 0.74 0.45 -0.26 0.30 0.04 11.69 6.73 -4.53 3.74 80.9
5-1 1.01 -0.18 0.01 -0.38 3.57 -2.07 0.08 -3.88 7.0 0.80 -0.25 0.13 -0.32 0.47 2.65 -2.42 1.17 -3.31 3.51 14.5
1 -0.41 0.76 0.41 0.21 -2.54 8.23 5.55 2.76 84.6 0.36 0.64 0.41 0.11 -0.81 2.22 7.63 6.47 1.68 -9.71 88.6
2 0.15 0.41 0.46 0.16 1.74 8.50 11.76 4.06 92.3 0.35 0.37 0.45 0.15 -0.19 3.50 7.35 11.62 3.75 -3.66 91.7
3 0.47 0.30 0.49 0.06 6.01 6.86 13.76 1.53 92.4 0.40 0.30 0.49 0.08 0.11 4.41 6.54 13.87 2.29 2.31 91.7
EUR
4 0.64 0.33 0.49 -0.05 7.64 6.94 12.85 -1.38 91.7 0.41 0.36 0.49 -0.01 0.27 4.51 7.74 13.75 -0.25 5.84 91.9
5 1.05 0.52 0.45 -0.20 7.82 6.80 7.32 -3.19 84.7 0.52 0.62 0.44 -0.13 0.56 3.60 8.41 7.77 -2.25 7.55 85.6
5-1 1.46 -0.24 0.04 -0.41 5.84 -1.68 0.33 -3.49 9.4 0.16 -0.02 0.03 -0.24 1.37 0.66 -0.13 0.27 -2.49 11.13 42.9
UK 5-1 0.90 0.60 -0.62 -0.32 4.02 3.65 -3.99 -3.64 12.0 0.71 0.65 -0.66 -0.34 0.32 2.95 3.83 -4.19 -3.81 2.94 15.3
IRL 5-1 0.40 0.22 -0.27 -0.15 1.00 2.17 -2.51 -2.34 4.5 0.41 -0.08 -0.01 -0.20 0.32 1.01 -0.62 -0.08 -3.37 4.71 16.8
GER5-1 1.28 -0.85 0.33 0.09 4.36 -7.64 3.15 1.18 27.1 0.53 -0.82 0.37 0.16 0.97 1.91 -6.95 3.68 2.28 8.45 44.2
A 5-1 0.32 0.08 -0.04 -0.06 0.98 0.69 -0.44 -0.95 -0.6 0.05 0.29 -0.12 -0.04 0.33 0.17 2.41 -1.26 -0.75 4.56 8.0
CH 5-1 0.93 -0.06 -0.05 -0.24 3.56 -0.63 -0.48 -3.30 7.4 0.45 -0.08 0.07 -0.18 0.73 1.92 -0.63 0.64 -3.00 9.11 34.2
FR 5-1 1.16 -0.08 -0.23 -0.33 4.19 -0.92 -2.81 -5.00 19.6 0.23 0.00 -0.10 -0.16 0.98 0.90 -0.02 -1.28 -2.77 10.83 46.7
IL 5-1 1.19 -0.52 0.34 -0.10 3.71 -3.97 2.59 -1.33 8.2 1.07 -0.62 0.49 -0.10 0.40 3.37 -4.51 3.50 -1.44 3.98 14.3
GR 5-1 2.17 0.03 0.02 -0.51 4.49 0.40 0.25 -2.64 2.7 2.11 0.04 0.02 -0.50 0.11 4.33 0.49 0.27 -2.56 0.92 2.6
ES 5-1 0.66 -0.12 -0.18 0.05 2.06 -1.01 -1.41 0.65 9.4 0.54 -0.29 0.01 0.03 0.09 1.70 -2.44 0.06 0.42 1.19 11.8
POR5-1 1.02 -0.12 -0.04 -0.22 2.31 -1.05 -0.46 -1.98 2.2 0.70 -0.12 0.01 -0.19 0.27 1.59 -1.11 0.10 -1.73 3.49 8.3
NL 5-1 1.13 -0.09 -0.07 -0.21 4.11 -0.91 -0.67 -3.37 9.3 0.24 -0.03 0.05 -0.11 0.79 1.02 -0.33 0.54 -2.19 12.06 44.2
BEL 5-1 1.18 -0.18 0.08 -0.11 4.19 -1.60 0.89 -1.45 0.8 0.74 -0.27 0.16 -0.08 0.63 2.78 -2.09 1.74 -1.11 7.83 22.8
SWE5-1 1.22 -0.13 -0.04 -0.02 3.95 -1.86 -0.48 -0.50 4.0 0.95 -0.16 0.03 -0.03 0.30 3.18 -2.18 0.32 -0.76 4.11 12.6
NOR5-1 1.06 -0.19 0.07 -0.20 2.67 -1.65 0.67 -2.48 3.9 0.89 -0.12 0.06 -0.17 0.25 2.26 -1.04 0.55 -2.11 3.13 6.8
DK 5-1 1.34 0.05 -0.24 -0.03 4.54 0.37 -2.40 -0.42 3.3 0.82 0.00 -0.15 0.00 0.47 2.87 0.01 -1.54 0.03 7.36 21.5
FN 5-1 1.24 -0.52 0.32 -0.05 3.34 -4.07 2.60 -1.17 8.6 0.48 -0.24 0.15 -0.02 0.57 1.41 -2.07 1.39 -0.62 8.04 29.8
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According to Chordia and Shivakumar (2006), for earnings momentum to be the
crucial driver of price momentum the former should be robust when controlling for
the latter. Hence, we determine the earnings momentum alphas arising from the
following four-factor model
RLt − RSt = α+ β(RMt −RFt) + γRSMBt + δRHMLt + ηRWMLt + εt, (5.5)
where the original Fama-French model is augmented by the return to the price
momentum strategy, RWMLt (winner minus loser). In Table 5.10 we contrast the
Fama-French results to those of the above four-factor model for all countries’ respec-
tive hedge strategies. As before, results for the quintile portfolios according to the
U.S. and the European aggregate strategy are also depicted. Again, we note that
the additional factor leads to a considerable increase in statistical fit. In fact, the
adjusted R2 of the Fama-French model and the four-factor model almost resemble
the figures obtained in the price momentum case. Consistent with Chordia and
Shivakumar (2006), the U.S. earnings momentum alpha remains large at 72 basis
points with a highly significant t-statistic of 5.14. Given that the European earnings
momentum alpha has a t-statistic of 6.76, we suspect that this observation carries
over to other countries. Indeed, 13 of 15 original European anomalies remain signif-
icant after controlling for price momentum; only Italy and Norway do cease to have
significant earnings momentum alphas.
To summarize, among 17 countries we initially find 15 countries exhibiting signif-
icant price momentum alphas in a classical Fama-French setting. Among these
15 countries, seven countries follow the explanation offered by Chordia and Shiv-
akumar (2006), i.e., earnings momentum subsumes price momentum. These coun-
tries include Germany, Switzerland, France, Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, and
Finland. Among the eight remaining four-factor price momentum anomalies, five
countries also have four-factor earnings momentum anomalies (the U.S., the U.K.,
Belgium, Sweden, and Denmark). Two countries’ earnings momentum alphas cease
to be significant (Italy and Norway) and Greece exhibits no earnings momentum at
all. In summary, we obtain an aggregate European pattern that suggests a trans-
lation of Chordia and Shivakumar (2006)’s argument to European equity markets.
Thus, it is all the more surprising why we are refuting their rationale for the U.S..
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Table 5.10: Time-Series-Regressions of Earnings Momentum Portfolios
The table’s left panel gives the results of a regression according to Equation (5.3) using 240 monthly returns ranging from July 1987 to June 2007 followed
by the according t-statistics. The right panel gives the results of a regression according to Equation (5.5). We use the country abbreviations introduced
in Table 5.1. We give the quintile portfolios 1 (negative earnings revisions) to 5 (positive earnings revisions) together with the long-short portfolio
(positive-negative earnings revisions).
Fama-French Model 4-Factor Model
α β γ δ t(α) t(β) t(γ) t(δ) Adj. α β γ δ ζ t(α) t(β) t(γ) t(δ) t(ζ) Adj.
R2 R2
1 -0.63 1.00 0.22 0.12 -6.10 27.17 5.30 3.38 92.5 -0.57 0.98 0.23 0.10 -0.05 -5.35 26.13 5.54 2.76 -2.18 92.6
2 -0.37 0.70 0.28 0.09 -3.88 20.55 7.41 2.91 89.9 -0.30 0.68 0.29 0.07 -0.06 -3.02 19.62 7.80 2.13 -2.95 90.3
3 -0.18 0.52 0.31 0.07 -1.60 12.85 6.99 1.78 82.2 -0.11 0.49 0.32 0.05 -0.06 -0.97 12.08 7.25 1.20 -2.23 82.5
USA
4 0.06 0.56 0.33 -0.12 0.46 12.89 6.96 -2.88 82.4 0.09 0.55 0.34 -0.13 -0.03 0.69 12.32 7.01 -3.02 -0.92 82.4
5 0.22 0.75 0.33 -0.01 1.80 17.50 6.85 -0.16 87.3 0.15 0.77 0.32 0.01 0.06 1.20 17.62 6.65 0.36 2.08 87.5
5-1 0.85 -0.25 0.11 -0.12 6.15 -5.12 2.01 -2.67 14.5 0.72 -0.21 0.09 -0.08 0.11 5.14 -4.28 1.68 -1.78 3.51 18.5
1 -0.15 0.72 0.38 0.14 -1.59 12.73 8.56 3.06 92.5 0.10 0.66 0.39 0.08 -0.16 1.08 12.70 9.69 1.82 -6.98 93.7
2 0.13 0.47 0.49 0.00 1.77 10.84 14.08 0.04 94.3 0.28 0.44 0.49 -0.03 -0.09 3.60 10.45 14.95 -0.98 -4.89 94.8
3 0.34 0.36 0.48 -0.06 4.57 8.23 13.66 -1.67 92.8 0.42 0.35 0.48 -0.08 -0.04 5.12 7.75 13.90 -2.14 -2.23 92.9
EUR
4 0.57 0.34 0.48 -0.11 6.97 7.03 12.65 -2.98 91.0 0.49 0.36 0.48 -0.09 0.05 5.58 7.39 12.67 -2.44 2.39 91.2
5 0.89 0.47 0.42 0.03 10.14 9.13 10.25 0.82 90.9 0.74 0.51 0.41 0.07 0.09 8.06 10.00 10.43 1.71 4.21 91.5
5-1 1.05 -0.25 0.04 -0.10 9.68 -3.94 0.70 -2.07 24.3 0.64 -0.16 0.02 -0.01 0.26 6.76 -3.05 0.40 -0.17 11.13 50.6
UK 5-1 0.80 -0.17 0.06 0.08 6.00 -1.67 0.60 1.56 5.4 0.70 -0.24 0.13 0.12 0.11 5.08 -2.31 1.34 2.20 2.94 8.4
IRL 5-1 1.45 -0.19 0.03 0.02 3.14 -1.24 0.24 0.34 0.2 1.11 -0.14 0.04 0.10 0.39 2.49 -0.93 0.27 1.45 4.71 11.9
GER5-1 0.87 -0.20 0.07 -0.07 5.80 -3.00 1.22 -1.71 4.8 0.53 0.05 -0.04 -0.09 0.24 3.89 0.75 -0.71 -2.60 8.45 27.0
A 5-1 0.89 -0.35 0.07 -0.08 3.07 -3.28 0.73 -1.48 7.9 0.80 -0.40 0.09 -0.06 0.25 2.88 -3.82 1.05 -1.19 4.56 15.2
CH 5-1 0.81 -0.48 0.22 -0.01 4.37 -4.92 2.55 -0.27 14.8 0.43 -0.32 0.14 0.06 0.37 2.62 -3.79 1.83 1.29 9.11 37.1
FR 5-1 1.00 -0.13 -0.10 -0.18 5.86 -2.18 -1.85 -4.51 21.7 0.58 -0.09 -0.03 -0.06 0.34 4.05 -1.75 -0.75 -1.88 10.83 47.9
IL 5-1 0.42 0.10 -0.22 -0.01 2.03 1.14 -2.40 -0.24 4.4 0.22 0.20 -0.28 0.01 0.16 1.07 2.17 -3.16 0.14 3.98 10.1
GR 5-1 0.45 -0.06 -0.01 -0.13 1.34 -1.10 -0.17 -0.95 3.0 0.42 -0.07 -0.02 -0.10 0.05 1.18 -1.22 -0.25 -0.69 0.92 3.8
ES 5-1 1.03 -0.02 -0.25 0.01 3.65 -0.22 -2.11 0.15 9.5 0.98 0.00 -0.25 0.01 0.07 3.47 -0.02 -2.11 0.12 1.19 9.7
POR5-1 1.06 0.01 -0.16 -0.08 2.58 0.13 -2.09 -0.80 2.0 0.94 0.04 -0.16 -0.07 0.25 2.26 0.35 -2.11 -0.65 3.49 8.9
NL 5-1 1.08 0.03 -0.23 -0.14 4.89 0.31 -2.47 -2.80 13.9 0.55 0.04 -0.16 -0.03 0.49 3.05 0.45 -2.26 -0.78 12.06 47.1
BEL5-1 0.88 -0.17 0.06 -0.04 4.19 -1.67 0.80 -0.68 0.7 0.45 -0.05 -0.01 0.00 0.34 2.29 -0.50 -0.08 -0.09 7.83 21.3
SWE5-1 0.93 -0.21 0.08 -0.01 3.55 -3.32 1.02 -0.26 6.5 0.65 -0.16 0.07 0.00 0.23 2.48 -2.56 0.90 -0.05 4.11 12.5
NOR5-1 0.71 -0.18 -0.03 -0.07 2.16 -1.88 -0.35 -1.01 6.6 0.53 -0.15 -0.04 -0.04 0.17 1.62 -1.62 -0.45 -0.55 3.13 10.1
DK 5-1 1.23 0.05 -0.17 -0.05 4.32 0.37 -1.70 -0.87 1.3 0.66 0.04 -0.08 -0.04 0.41 2.47 0.32 -0.85 -0.80 7.36 19.8
FN 5-1 1.40 -0.48 0.28 -0.05 4.44 -4.39 2.71 -1.30 10.1 0.82 -0.27 0.16 -0.02 0.41 2.88 -2.74 1.73 -0.81 8.04 31.4
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To uncover whether this reasoning may be confined to special circumstances, we
investigate the time series of price momentum alphas arising from a trailing regres-
sion. First, we consider price momentum and contrast the respective Fama-French
alpha (dashed line) and the four-factor alpha (solid line) in the upper graphs of
Figure 5.3. For the U.S., we see that the large Fama-French alpha is substantially
reduced when additionally controlling for earnings momentum. However, by the
end of 1999, which coincides with the end of the sample period in Chordia and
Shivakumar (2006), this relation breaks down for some years. Obviously, price and
earnings momentum have decoupled following the burst of the tech bubble. This
reasoning supports the general view that price momentum typically will be a result
of investors’ underreaction to fundamental news, while the market frenzy at the end
of the nineties is more likely the result from overreaction. This observation suggests
that U.S. investors will most likely have put less weight on earnings information
following several accounting scandals at the beginning of the century. On the other
hand, the European Fama-French price momentum alpha is literally neutralized by
the earnings momentum factor for the whole sample period. Hence, while earnings
momentum is a crucial driver of price momentum there seem to be other forces at
work, too.
5.6 Origins of Momentum: Risk or Behavioral Bias?
The results of the previous section essentially suggest that any momentum rationale
will be closely linked to the drivers of earnings momentum. In further rational-
izing the momentum anomaly, we consider the following ideas. First, we mimic
Chordia and Shivakumar (2006) in examining the link between momentum and the
macroeconomy. Second, we will analyze the interaction of momentum with mea-
sures of information uncertainty. Third, we will investigate the role of liquidity risk
in momentum profits.
5.6.1 Momentum and the Macroeconomy
It may well be that momentum is closely related to the macroeconomy since momen-
tum may simply reflect future macroeconomic activity or the mispricing of certain
macroeconomic variables. To test the respective relation, we follow Liew and Vas-
salou (2000) and Chordia and Shivakumar (2006) in regressing future GDP growth
on lagged values of the Fama-French factors and one of the two momentum factors.
Table 5.11 gives the results of a regression of 12-month ahead growth in real GDP
on 12-month compounded momentum, either price momentum WML or earnings
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Figure 5.3: Momentum: Fama-French versus Four-Factor Alphas
In the upper graphs we plot trailing price momentum alphas arising from equations (5.3) and (5.4)
using 36-months windows, thus results cover July 1990 to June 2007. Likewise, the lower graphs
give trailing earnings momentum alphas arising from equations (5.3) and (5.5). The dashed line
gives the Fama-French alpha and the solid line is the respective four-factor alpha.
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momentum PMN , and Fama-French factorsMKT , SMB, andHML. GDP growth
is measured as the change in the log of GDP. Given that GDP is available on a
quarterly basis, the regressions are also on a quarterly basis. Since the regressions
rely on overlapping data, the reported t-statistics are based on Newey-West standard
errors, see Newey and West (1987). The sample period is from July 1987 to June
2007.
The following results can be inferred from Table 5.11. First, we recover the market
factor—if significant— to be a leading indicator of future economic growth in some of
the countries, i.e., both are positively related as indicated by the positive coefficient
estimates. Second, while Liew and Vassalou (2000) report SMB and HML to
also be positively related to future GDP growth in major equity markets until the
middle of the nineties, we find a negative relation in many countries. That is,
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Table 5.11: Momentum and the Macroeconomy
The Table gives the results of a regression of 12-month ahead growth in real GDP on 12-month
compounded momentum MOM and Fama-French factorsMKT , SMB, and HML. GDP growth
is measured as the change in the log of GDP and given that GDP is available on a quarterly
basis the regressions are also on a quarterly basis. The regressions’ intercept is denoted by ICT .
Since the regressions rely on overlapping data the reported t-statistics are based on Newey-West
standard errors. The upper Panel refers to price momentum and the lower panel refers to earnings
momentum. We use the country abbreviations introduced in Table 5.1. The sample period is from
July 1987 to June 2007.
Coefficients t-statistics
ICT MOM MKT SMB HML ICT MOM MKT SMB HML Adj.
R2
Panel A: Price Momentum
USA 0.037 -0.045 -0.014 0.020 -0.036 7.46 -1.32 -0.68 0.71 -2.31 11.0
EUR 0.014 0.023 0.051 -0.032 -0.030 2.91 1.86 1.38 -0.84 -1.31 45.4
UK 0.019 0.031 0.003 0.023 0.021 2.97 2.33 0.14 0.70 0.71 14.3
IRL 0.071 -0.034 0.062 -0.082 -0.030 11.38 -2.46 1.58 -1.71 -1.84 21.5
GER 0.013 0.000 0.041 -0.025 0.003 2.64 0.00 0.78 -0.56 0.19 10.0
A 0.021 -0.005 -0.002 0.019 0.005 5.67 -0.75 -0.07 0.90 0.33 13.7
CH 0.014 -0.003 0.103 -0.076 -0.014 3.24 -0.32 3.43 -3.32 -1.03 25.0
FR 0.018 0.006 -0.013 0.033 -0.008 2.57 0.40 -0.36 0.98 -0.94 10.5
IL 0.013 0.010 0.098 -0.084 0.009 2.26 0.66 2.89 -2.42 0.91 18.0
GR 0.047 -0.009 0.011 -0.010 -0.026 24.56 -2.33 0.75 -0.82 -1.91 15.5
ES 0.070 -0.017 -0.009 0.019 0.015 16.81 -1.08 -1.12 1.36 0.96 11.3
POR 0.024 -0.019 -0.022 0.037 -0.024 1.72 -1.01 -0.84 3.78 -0.65 25.5
NL 0.021 0.023 0.085 -0.062 0.008 4.90 1.37 2.32 -2.19 0.50 30.4
BEL 0.010 0.026 0.036 -0.010 0.040 3.26 4.43 1.26 -0.31 1.85 52.0
SWE 0.029 0.006 -0.014 0.034 -0.001 7.32 0.35 -0.90 1.46 -0.13 8.6
NOR 0.030 -0.023 0.039 -0.045 -0.006 6.50 -1.47 1.60 -1.72 -0.39 21.7
DK 0.025 -0.018 0.017 -0.009 -0.006 3.23 -0.89 0.49 -0.38 -0.36 -1.1
FN 0.018 0.035 -0.021 0.064 -0.029 1.78 1.09 -1.27 4.51 -1.84 39.0
Panel B: Earnings Momentum
USA 0.022 0.086 0.030 -0.029 -0.019 4.48 2.75 1.31 -0.93 -1.26 27.1
EUR 0.007 0.083 0.076 -0.055 -0.027 1.30 2.78 2.95 -1.72 -1.36 51.1
UK 0.022 0.010 0.009 0.013 0.007 2.84 0.36 0.34 0.28 0.22 6.6
IRL 0.058 0.003 0.075 -0.082 -0.002 10.62 0.17 1.85 -1.84 -0.11 0.2
GER 0.009 0.031 0.045 -0.029 0.007 1.78 1.25 1.14 -0.73 0.52 15.8
A 0.024 -0.021 -0.013 0.030 0.004 11.07 -1.66 -0.57 1.93 0.29 30.2
CH 0.012 0.015 0.119 -0.086 -0.021 3.93 1.06 3.19 -3.21 -1.30 26.2
FR 0.018 0.016 -0.015 0.036 -0.007 2.00 0.63 -0.37 0.96 -0.85 11.4
IL 0.014 0.012 0.104 -0.091 0.010 2.35 0.45 2.61 -2.28 1.04 17.9
GR 0.046 -0.012 0.004 -0.002 -0.028 43.25 -1.54 0.28 -0.19 -4.34 31.1
ES 0.069 0.008 -0.019 0.029 0.016 15.64 0.55 -1.85 1.78 0.98 7.6
POR 0.009 0.039 -0.017 0.029 0.020 0.87 2.71 -0.82 1.97 0.52 36.0
NL 0.023 0.003 0.102 -0.072 0.007 5.10 0.14 2.63 -2.14 0.38 22.5
BEL 0.013 0.024 0.037 -0.012 0.042 2.96 2.34 1.15 -0.36 1.70 32.1
SWE 0.026 0.020 -0.014 0.040 -0.002 5.25 1.42 -0.90 1.63 -0.26 16.3
NOR 0.028 -0.024 0.048 -0.061 0.010 7.84 -1.53 2.27 -2.78 0.66 20.4
DK 0.023 -0.003 0.014 -0.007 -0.010 3.09 -0.19 0.45 -0.32 -0.68 -3.7
FN 0.021 0.009 -0.034 0.078 -0.026 1.99 0.24 -2.09 4.19 -2.20 33.6
small cap or value stocks suffer prior to periods of economic growth, whereas they
thrive before an economic slowdown. Third, the link between earnings momentum
and macroeconomy appears to be strongest in the U.S. and the European aggregate.
Given a positive relation instead of a negative one suggests that earnings momentum
is a proxy for a macroeconomic risk factor. However, besides the U.S. and the Europe
aggregate, we can only obtain two further countries in which earnings momentum
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significantly predicts GDP growth: Portugal and Belgium exhibit a positive relation.
Hence, there appears to be no definite pattern in linking earnings momentum to the
macroeconomy, an observation that carries over to the regression results obtained
using the price momentum factor.
While our findings sharply contrast with the U.S. result of Chordia and Shivakumar
(2006), who detect a negative relation but for a different time period, it is by and
large affirmative of the international study of Liew and Vassalou (2000). They fail
to find a link between WML and GDP growth. Given the strong link between price
and earnings momentum documented in this paper, we are thus bound to uncover a
similar result for PMN . Also, using alternative measures of the macroeconomy like
industrial production growth or consumption growth reveals (unreported) results
that are qualitatively similar to the ones for GDP growth.
Furthermore, our evidence aligns with the study of Griffin, Ji, and Martin (2003)
who also fail to establish a link between price momentum and macroeconomic risk
factors in many countries. However, one may argue that momentum may be more
of a common factor phenomenon when focussing on bigger companies. For instance,
Scowcroft and Sefton (2005) argue that the finding of industry momentum driving
price momentum is confined to large cap universes. Since we are dealing with a very
comprehensive sample we may thus be prone to refute any common factor effects
in momentum. However, Kang and Li (2005) show that traditional approaches of
separating common from stock-specific factors are flawed in that they have a stock-
specific component implicit in the common factor component. This problem is reme-
died within their model and their empirical results suggest that the stock-specific
component is probably the only source of U.S. momentum profits. To conclude,
failing to find a definite relation between momentum and the macroeconomy may
suggest that momentum is rather due to a behavioral bias, an idea we will explore
in the following.
5.6.2 Momentum and Information Uncertainty
In this section, we will analyze the interaction of momentum and information un-
certainty. The theoretical model of Hong and Stein (1999) posits that firm-specific
information only gradually spreads across investors resulting in underreaction and,
as a consequence, short-term return continuation. If momentum is due to investors’
underreaction to fundamental news, the respective price drift should be higher in
more opaque information environments for which information diffusion is slowest. In
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fact, Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000) find empirical support for their theory by demon-
strating that U.S. momentum strategies are more effective in companies of small size
or in companies with low analyst coverage. Besides these two metrics, Zhang (2006)
recently provides evidence that the U.S. price momentum strategy is also more ef-
fective when limited to high uncertainty stocks as measured by firm age, dispersion
in analysts’ earnings forecasts, stock volatility, and cash flow volatility. Especially,
the dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts has been used in prior studies to proxy
for differences in opinion, see Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002). For instance,
this heterogeneity in beliefs is a necessary condition for price drift in the model of
Banerjee, Kaniel, and Kremer (2008), a link that is empirically corroborated for the
U.S. by Verardo (2008).
Of course, establishing a link between international momentum and information un-
certainty would further substantiate the momentum rationale of investors underre-
acting to fundamental news. Hence, we will examine price and earnings momentum
profits for different degrees of information uncertainty. We consider four measures
to monthly proxy for information uncertainty: Analyst coverage, size, total stock
volatility, and idiosyncratic volatility. Total stock volatility is estimated using the
last three year’s monthly stock returns, and idiosyncratic volatility arises from a
standard Fama-French regression that also uses the last three year’s monthly stock
returns.
Table 5.12 gives the results for the price momentum strategy in the upper panel
A. In particular, we first sort stocks into five quintiles based on past returns. For
each quintile the stocks are further sorted into three terciles based on one of the
four information uncertainty proxies. Obviously, this procedure requires a sufficient
number of companies in a given country to deliver meaningful results and we there-
fore exclude the seven smallest countries from the analysis, i.e., Austria, Belgium,
Finland, Greece, Ireland, Norway, and Portugal.
Our findings are as follows. First, we confirm the empirical evidence for the U.S.:
Price momentum is indeed more pronounced for stocks with low analyst coverage,
smaller size or higher volatility, be it total or idiosyncratic volatility. Second, the
latter findings do not only translate to the European momentum strategy, but also
to most of the European country strategies. In fact, only Denmark does refute
the underreaction rationale. Third, while the earnings momentum results are quite
similar among the major equity markets, we note that the results for some smaller
countries are somewhat muted.
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Table 5.12: Momentum and Information Uncertainty
The table gives return differentials of the price and earnings momentum hedge strategies by terciles
of different information uncertainty metrics. In Panel A we first sort stocks into five quintiles based
on past returns. For each quintile the stocks are further sorted into three terciles based on analyst
coverage, size, total stock volatility and idiosyncratic volatility. Below the return differentials we
give t-statistics. The last two rows collect the number of countries that exhibit the highest return
differential among the respective terciles and the terciles mean ranking in terms of returns. Panel
B gives analogous results for earnings momentum.
Analyst Coverage Size Volatility Idiosyncratic
Country
Low Mid High Low Mid High Low Mid High Low Mid High
Panel A: Price Momentum
1.38 1.04 0.87 1.53 0.91 0.48 0.29 1.02 1.28 0.97 0.98 1.41
USA
5.77 4.15 2.69 6.87 3.24 1.37 1.69 3.93 4.62 3.01 3.79 5.49
1.66 1.69 1.16 2.10 1.41 1.04 1.07 1.47 1.60 1.47 1.22 1.71
Europe
6.77 7.21 4.83 7.54 5.46 3.87 6.15 6.39 6.25 5.50 5.23 6.74
1.50 1.44 0.67 1.56 1.25 0.50 0.77 0.99 1.42 1.12 1.24 1.31
UK
4.83 4.55 2.02 4.95 4.15 1.57 3.86 3.39 4.73 3.90 4.33 4.49
0.98 1.14 1.04 1.48 1.03 0.78 0.75 0.94 1.11 1.29 0.99 1.36
Germany
3.40 4.10 3.32 4.46 3.01 2.24 2.86 3.54 3.45 3.49 3.06 4.39
1.42 1.60 1.21 1.41 1.20 0.77 1.83 1.33 1.46 1.76 1.00 1.53
Switzerland
4.38 5.36 4.18 4.14 3.67 2.37 5.98 4.63 4.90 5.25 3.79 4.95
1.21 1.24 0.82 1.75 1.32 0.46 1.32 1.16 1.21 1.45 1.06 1.51
France
3.98 3.94 2.72 5.53 3.97 1.38 5.87 4.17 3.80 4.21 3.20 5.11
1.13 1.63 0.68 1.60 0.93 0.85 0.10 0.96 1.21 1.24 0.97 1.21
Italy
2.55 3.67 1.74 3.62 1.92 1.84 0.25 2.50 2.86 2.78 2.27 2.94
0.90 0.51 0.13 1.45 0.79 -0.04 0.94 0.69 0.62 0.58 0.35 0.64
Spain
1.90 1.32 0.29 2.33 1.96 -0.11 2.25 2.11 1.40 1.52 0.97 1.64
1.24 0.95 0.82 1.08 1.00 0.57 0.90 0.77 1.13 1.00 0.72 1.22
Netherlands
3.79 2.89 2.38 3.37 2.86 1.46 2.83 2.73 3.30 2.91 2.43 3.77
0.93 1.30 0.73 0.83 1.79 0.62 0.98 0.91 1.10 1.32 0.64 1.02
Sweden
1.96 3.38 1.92 1.79 3.77 1.44 2.97 2.27 3.02 3.00 1.62 2.52
0.60 0.97 1.01 0.42 1.66 1.29 1.55 0.60 0.91 1.44 0.54 1.16
Denmark
1.56 3.41 3.48 1.07 3.66 3.47 4.24 2.10 3.02 3.51 1.99 3.39
# max 4 6 1 9 2 0 4 0 7 4 0 7
ranking 1.82 1.45 2.73 1.27 1.82 2.91 2.09 2.45 1.45 1.82 2.82 1.36
Panel B: Earnings Momentum
1.04 0.60 0.16 1.08 0.58 0.24 0.48 0.52 0.68 0.50 0.63 0.70
USA
7.41 3.77 0.75 7.02 3.55 1.22 3.99 3.87 4.62 3.56 4.28 4.26
0.92 1.00 0.58 1.20 0.71 0.70 0.68 0.68 0.88 0.87 0.89 0.89
Europe
8.42 7.35 3.48 8.09 6.06 4.42 6.51 6.73 7.07 7.62 7.97 5.99
1.22 1.00 0.29 1.50 0.83 0.35 0.61 0.59 0.93 0.62 0.89 1.00
UK
5.71 4.66 1.52 6.50 4.16 1.70 3.80 3.28 5.05 3.99 4.73 4.48
0.83 0.92 0.55 1.01 0.83 0.24 0.76 0.76 0.70 0.79 0.72 0.73
Germany
3.09 3.96 2.16 3.50 3.71 1.26 4.02 4.31 3.37 4.06 3.77 2.94
0.57 0.80 0.69 0.95 0.46 0.66 0.45 0.31 0.76 0.65 0.60 0.71
Switzerland
1.95 2.86 2.35 3.09 1.83 2.36 2.20 1.30 2.98 2.83 2.51 2.23
0.45 0.99 0.60 0.60 0.78 0.66 0.92 0.67 0.67 0.86 0.89 0.73
France
1.86 3.39 2.16 1.92 3.17 2.60 4.48 3.04 3.04 4.23 3.84 2.71
0.03 0.66 0.52 0.03 0.52 0.33 -0.13 0.57 0.03 0.28 0.84 0.45
Italy
0.11 1.85 1.69 0.09 1.53 1.01 -0.54 2.02 0.11 0.96 2.89 1.19
0.73 0.71 1.00 1.64 0.16 0.75 0.65 0.88 1.23 1.12 0.83 0.44
Spain
2.11 1.86 1.84 2.42 0.47 2.31 2.75 2.60 2.72 3.43 2.16 1.19
1.26 1.17 0.04 1.39 1.08 0.06 0.97 0.60 0.52 1.01 0.82 1.11
Netherlands
4.47 3.50 0.13 4.43 3.45 0.14 3.41 2.13 1.82 4.02 2.89 3.21
1.01 1.61 0.51 0.93 1.75 -0.06 1.02 0.90 0.93 0.42 0.88 1.20
Sweden
2.89 4.59 1.24 2.92 4.63 -0.15 3.60 2.69 3.07 1.33 2.46 3.08
1.22 0.94 0.93 1.32 1.13 0.74 2.19 0.67 1.12 1.57 1.34 0.89
Denmark
2.80 1.88 2.41 1.61 3.33 2.31 1.91 2.06 3.36 2.81 4.93 2.29
# max 4 6 1 8 3 0 5 2 5 3 3 6
ranking 1.91 1.55 2.55 1.45 1.91 2.64 1.82 2.18 1.73 2.18 2.00 1.73
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Thus, having gathered substantial support for the underreaction theory, one may
wonder as to why the momentum anomaly is not arbitraged away. For the U.S.,
recent research contends that high arbitrage costs prevent rational investors from
exploiting the momentum anomaly, see Arena, Haggard, and Yan (2008) for price
momentum and Mendenhall (2004) for post-earnings announcement drift. Presum-
ably, the cost of short-selling small stocks is not offset by the expected momentum
profits. In fact, a stock’s idiosyncratic volatility is a common proxy for arbitrage
costs. The fact that we find momentum to be most pronounced in stocks with
high idiosyncratic volatility additionally provides a persuasive explanation for the
persistence of the momentum effect.
5.6.3 Momentum and Liquidity
In further elaborating on the above argument we next examine the role of liquidity
when implementing momentum strategies. Lesmond, Schill, and Zhou (2004) and
Korajczyk and Sadka (2004) evidence that exploiting U.S. price momentum is costly,
in fact, trading costs appear to erode all of the potential profits rendering the mo-
mentum arbitrage opportunity an illusion. The trading costs basically derive from
frequent trading in mostly illiquid stocks. Consequently, Sadka (2006) documents
a close relation between liquidity risk and U.S. momentum strategies. Moreover,
Liu (2006)’s liquidity-augmented two-factor asset pricing model almost completely
subsumes the U.S. price momentum alpha. Hence, we expect liquidity to also play a
crucial role in inhibiting profitable execution of the European momentum strategies.
To operationalize this conjecture we will analyze the profitability of the momentum
strategies when restricting to winner and loser stocks characterized by different
degrees of liquidity. Liu (2006) aptly describes liquidity “as the ability to trade
large quantities quickly at low cost with little price impact”. To account for the
according distinct dimensions of liquidity we compute different metrics. A stock’s
dollar volume or its turnover allow to capture the trading quantity dimension. As for
the price impact dimension we resort to the ILLIQ measure of Amihud (2002) which
is the absolute daily return over the associated dollar volume. To obtain an aggregate
monthly value of ILLIQ we simply compute its mean over the corresponding daily
values. The fourth measure is the one introduced by Liu (2006) which has been
designed to capture multiple dimensions of liquidity, such as trading speed and
trading quantity. Its definition is as follows:
Liu Measure = Number of No-Trading Days over the prior 12 months+
1/Turnover
1, 000, 000
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where turnover is the average daily turnover over the prior 12 months. This measure
addresses the trading speed dimension of liquidity since it very well captures lock-
in-risk, i.e., the danger of being locked in a certain position that cannot be sold.3
Table 5.13 displays the profitability of momentum strategies restricted to winner
and loser stocks characterized by different degrees of liquidity. In particular, we
first sort stocks into five quintiles based on past returns or earnings revisions. For
each quintile the stocks are further sorted into three terciles based on one of the four
liquidity measures. Again, we exclude the seven smallest countries from the analysis,
i.e., Austria, Belgium, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Norway, and Portugal. Panel A of
Table 5.13 gives the results for the price momentum strategy. Across most countries
and liquidity metrics the general pattern is that the least momentum profits occur
for the most liquid stocks and that profitability is increasing with illiquidty. For
instance, U.S. price momentum for stocks with the lowest ILLIQ values is only
significant at the 10%-level and price momentum for high volume stocks is also
significantly smaller than the result obtaining for the whole sample.
However, this pattern of momentum profitability decreasing with liquidity is less
pronounced for the aggregate European strategy. The according hedge returns
still amount to at least 120 basis points per month with t-statistics well above
4—suggesting that momentum may be less costly to implement in Europe than in
the U.S.. This observation especially seems to derive from the U.K., Germany and
Switzerland in which price momentum is rather strong among more liquid securities.
On the other hand, France, Spain and the Netherlands do not exhibit sustainable
momentum in the most liquid securities. However, Italy, Sweden and Denmark
even reverse the expected outcome by exhibiting no momentum in the least liquid
securities.
3Note that while the first three measures only take into account the stocks’ liquidity over the
precedent month the Liu measure hinges on data of the preceding year.
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Table 5.13: Momentum and Liquidity
The table gives return differentials of the price and earnings momentum hedge strategies by terciles
of different liquidity metrics. In Panel A we first sort stocks into five quintiles based on past returns.
For each quintile the stocks are further sorted into three terciles based on dollar volume, share
turnover, the ILLIQ measure of Amihud, and Liu’s measure. Below the return differentials we
give t-statistics. The last two rows collect the number of countries that exhibit the highest return
differential among the respective terciles and the terciles mean ranking in terms of returns. Panel
B gives analogous results for earnings momentum.
Dollar Volume Share Turnover ILLIQ Liu Measure
Country
High Mid Low High Mid Low Low Mid High Low Mid High
Panel A: Price Momentum
0.72 0.92 1.15 1.08 0.70 0.76 0.63 0.97 1.29 0.94 0.56 1.34
USA
2.06 3.42 5.61 3.55 2.80 3.57 1.81 3.56 5.66 3.21 2.08 5.96
1.25 1.55 1.36 1.63 1.18 1.19 1.23 1.55 1.39 1.41 1.33 1.49
Europe
4.64 6.24 6.87 6.00 5.14 6.02 4.70 6.01 6.62 5.18 5.40 7.47
0.91 1.19 1.29 1.18 1.00 1.19 0.88 1.16 1.33 1.02 1.02 1.29
UK
3.12 4.23 4.59 4.15 3.66 4.22 3.04 3.98 4.85 3.70 3.60 4.58
1.14 1.15 1.06 1.21 1.03 0.87 1.08 1.07 1.16 1.07 1.17 1.11
Germany
3.33 3.82 4.29 3.74 3.61 3.79 3.50 3.16 4.17 3.23 4.04 4.51
1.51 0.85 1.15 1.34 0.97 1.17 1.33 1.01 1.18 1.29 1.17 1.19
Switzerland
4.20 2.75 3.82 3.78 3.29 4.56 3.79 3.07 3.99 3.78 3.67 4.11
0.66 1.36 1.22 1.08 1.25 0.95 0.71 1.38 1.14 1.06 1.22 1.06
France
1.94 4.52 4.42 3.30 4.25 3.50 2.09 4.37 4.29 3.26 3.98 3.71
1.39 1.30 0.65 1.16 0.82 0.61 1.16 1.17 0.88 1.34 1.34 0.72
Italy
3.18 3.09 1.65 2.56 2.15 1.57 2.79 2.76 2.29 2.80 3.84 1.53
0.35 0.33 0.98 0.78 0.54 0.16 0.23 0.34 0.93 0.69 0.08 0.51
Spain
0.87 0.87 1.80 1.87 1.31 0.43 0.54 0.86 2.02 1.72 0.21 1.09
0.67 0.79 1.24 0.75 0.89 1.15 0.73 0.95 0.89 0.80 1.23 0.60
Netherlands
1.69 2.14 3.70 1.98 2.85 3.43 1.80 2.78 2.87 2.09 3.52 1.97
1.02 1.52 0.27 1.47 0.92 -0.18 1.10 0.92 0.40 1.25 0.84 0.58
Sweden
2.50 3.25 0.58 3.42 2.26 -0.45 2.63 2.06 0.94 2.94 2.03 1.44
1.16 0.95 0.92 1.08 0.76 1.34 1.32 0.97 0.72 1.26 1.18 0.79
Denmark
3.57 3.06 2.42 3.12 2.44 3.61 4.14 3.14 2.09 3.60 3.71 1.97
#
max
3 4 4 7 1 3 3 4 5 5 4 3
ranking 2.18 1.82 2.00 1.45 2.36 2.18 2.27 1.82 1.82 1.64 2.00 2.09
Panel B: Earnings Momentum
0.27 0.45 0.97 0.31 0.57 0.79 0.23 0.54 1.01 0.4 0.42 1.02
USA
1.38 2.62 6.96 1.55 3.66 5.94 1.19 3.16 6.97 2.11 2.58 8.18
0.77 0.86 0.90 0.91 0.74 0.91 0.79 0.80 0.94 0.89 0.83 0.95
Europe
4.85 6.84 8.17 6.14 5.56 8.59 5.40 6.27 8.20 5.67 6.73 9.68
0.89 0.87 1.00 1.07 0.65 0.97 0.88 0.98 0.92 0.88 0.78 1.03
UK
5.11 5.18 5.51 6.38 4.08 5.14 5.42 5.70 5.04 5.38 4.70 5.61
0.56 0.83 0.98 0.80 0.68 0.91 0.54 0.80 0.82 0.60 0.79 0.80
Germany
2.78 4.76 4.05 3.75 4.07 4.57 2.87 4.52 3.39 3.11 4.76 3.25
0.71 0.48 0.64 0.78 0.43 0.66 0.85 0.23 0.54 0.72 0.47 0.73
Switzerland
2.42 1.76 2.38 2.59 1.67 2.65 2.95 0.75 2.07 2.41 1.82 2.76
0.38 0.93 0.49 0.65 0.78 0.73 0.69 0.74 0.53 0.70 1.01 0.39
France
1.32 4.30 2.11 2.48 3.42 3.32 2.69 3.16 2.38 2.58 4.83 1.75
0.86 0.25 -0.05 0.93 0.07 0.13 0.80 0.21 -0.08 0.62 0.13 0.13
Italy
3.09 0.87 -0.15 2.62 0.25 0.46 3.02 0.76 -0.24 2.02 0.47 0.45
1.00 0.88 0.92 1.11 0.78 0.88 0.85 0.89 1.05 0.85 0.90 0.99
Spain
1.96 2.05 2.34 2.37 1.91 2.38 2.06 2.17 2.70 1.88 2.37 2.47
0.40 0.77 1.37 0.42 0.50 1.42 0.56 1.07 0.99 0.57 0.97 1.04
Netherlands
0.99 2.15 5.22 1.23 1.68 4.89 1.35 3.35 3.69 1.64 2.69 4.03
0.39 0.65 0.97 0.64 0.94 0.84 0.54 0.63 1.15 0.59 1.01 0.87
Sweden
0.91 1.92 2.60 1.56 2.43 2.40 1.28 1.87 3.12 1.33 3.34 2.33
0.97 1.66 2.36 1.15 1.25 2.26 1.25 1.46 1.85 1.43 1.65 1.77
Denmark
2.13 3.76 2.58 2.62 2.26 2.75 2.56 2.91 2.84 2.20 4.07 2.47
#
max
3 1 7 5 2 5 2 3 6 1 2 8
ranking 2.36 2.18 1.45 2.00 2.36 1.55 2.45 1.91 1.64 2.45 2.09 1.36
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Interestingly, when using the metric share turnover the direction of the liquidity-
momentum profitability relationship is sometimes reversed. For instance, judging by
share turnover both the U.S. and European aggregate price momentum strategy are
most profitable in the most liquid securities. This puzzling result is in line with Hou,
Peng, and Xiong (2006) who argue that trading volume as measured by turnover is
a proxy for investor attention. When price momentum is mainly an overreaction-
driven phenomenon it should be relatively stronger among high turnover stocks. Vice
versa, earnings momentum that is likely to be more related to underreaction should
be relatively stronger among low turnover stocks since investor attention is presum-
ably lower. Considering Panel B of Table 5.13 we do in fact recover this result for
U.S. earnings momentum—regardless of the liquidity measure. The finding is most
pronounced for the ILLIQ measure for which we obtain an insignificant monthly
return spread of 23 basis points. This result complements the findings of Chordia,
Goyal, Sadka, Sadka, and Shivakumar (2007) who show the post-earnings announce-
ment drift to be equally useless among illiquid stocks as measured by ILLIQ.
For Europe, the results for the aggregate earnings momentum are quite different;
in fact, across all liquidity measures the strategy earns at least 74 basis points
with t-statistics in excess of 5. However, the country-level results are more in line
with the persuasive U.S. story. For example, Germany, France, the Netherlands,
Sweden and Denmark exhibit considerably less earnings momentum for highly liquid
stocks. All in all, our results suggest that liquidity appears to be a more severe
impediment to implementing earnings momentum strategies as opposed to price
momentum strategies. Corroborating the rationale of Hou, Peng, and Xiong (2006)
we also find the highest U.S. price momentum among high turnover stocks, however,
all of the remaining liquidity measures do not support this finding. Still, we think
that overreaction may play a role in driving the differences between the price and
earnings momentum findings.
Chapter 6
The Dispersion Effect
Earnings estimates of financial analysts serve as a timely measure for assessing a
company’s current value. Comprising the expertise of different analysts the Insti-
tutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S) provides a consensus estimate, which
basically is a mean value of all available earnings forecasts for a given company. To
judge the credibility of the earnings signal, one can resort to additional information
embedded in the distribution of analysts’ earnings forecasts. Especially, the latter’s
second moment is a natural candidate to capture the dispersion of analysts’ earn-
ings forecasts. Intuitively, one may well expect companies with higher dispersion in
analysts’ earnings forecast to earn higher returns, thus compensating investors for
bearing uncertain earnings prospects. However, empirical evidence for the U.S. is
at odds with dispersion being a priced risk factor. Even more so, Diether, Malloy,
and Scherbina (2002) document that low dispersion stocks are significantly outper-
forming high dispersion stocks.
In rationalizing this striking result Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) contend
that dispersion may thus not be viewed as a risk factor, but rather as a metric for dif-
ferences of opinion. Invoking an argument of Miller (1977), they suggest that prices
tend to reflect the view of the optimistic investors whenever there is disagreement
about a stock’s value since the pessimistic investors’ views are often not revealed
due to short-sale constraints. In fact, Boehme, Danielsen, and Sorescu (2006) show
that the dispersion effect is most prominent among short-sale constrained firms. Of
course, the high dispersion stocks’ prices are bound to fall once the uncertainty is
resolved.
We wonder whether this dispersion effect is common to various markets or whether
it is unique to the U.S.. In that regard, we provide original evidence of a dispersion
effect in some European markets.
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6.1 Data
6.1.1 Sample Selection
The sample that we use is almost identical to the one employed for our study of the
momentum effect in Chapter 5. The sole difference lies in the exclusion of Ireland
for which we lack sufficient dispersion observations. However, for this chapter’s ex-
position to be self-contained we again describe the sample selection process: We use
a comprehensive sample of companies domiciled in 16 equity markets, 15 European
markets and the U.S., covering the period from 1987 to 2007. All data has been
gathered from Datastream including I/B/E/S earnings revisions data.
Table 6.1 contains descriptive characteristics on the sample countries classified by
region. We collect companies for each country by merging the live and dead research
lists provided by Datastream on July 2nd, 2007 and thereby obtain a total number
of 65,738 companies. To arrive at our final sample, we have pruned the initial
country research lists as follows. First, we adjust each country list for secondary
issues and cross-country listings to prevent us from double-counting. In particular,
we extract 30,454 companies. Hence, one half of the initial list does refer to major
listings. Second, we screen for non-equity issues, i.e., we exclude investment trusts,
ADRs, and the like. Third, we also exclude OTC stocks and stocks that are only
listed on regional exchanges. After these two screens 16,568 companies remain. We
further exclude those companies having market capitalization below 10 million USD,
which leaves us with a final sample of 12,998 companies. Almost one half are U.S.
companies and the biggest five markets comprise around 80%. To avoid survivorship
bias, the sample includes 4,524 “dead” companies, i.e., one third of the whole sample,
ranging from 16.9% for Greece to 52.2% for Portugal. The label “dead” applies to
companies in extreme distress and to those being merged, delisted, or converted.
Since we aim to investigate the dispersion effect, we additionally check the coverage
of return and earnings revisions data. Unsurprisingly, the coverage for return data
is close to 100% in each country, on average 98.4% of the companies do exhibit at
least one return observation over the course of the sample period. On the other
hand, the earnings estimate figures are more fragmentary. However, the average
coverage still amounts to 75.5% spanning a range from 62.6% (Belgium) to 94.1%
(Spain). Note that our sample contains a certain amount of penny stocks that will
not be included in the investment strategies. We do not discard them right away,
since being a penny stock is not a static firm characteristic. In particular, we do not
invest in companies with stock price below $5 at the beginning of a given month.
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Table 6.1: Country Overview
The table contains descriptive information on the companies that have been domestically traded in the sample period (1987-2007). For further reference
we may use abbreviated country codes (Abb.). The screening of country lists depicts the evolution of the countries’ samples. First, we give the total size
of the country lists followed by the number of companies surviving the first screen for Major listings. The column headed Region contains the number of
companies surviving the last screen eliminating regional listings and the like. The Final screen excludes companies which exhibit free-floating market value
below 10 million USD. We further describe this final sample giving the number of a country’s dead companies (#Dead) and the number of companies with
at least one I/B/E/S estimate in the sample period (#I/B/E/S), along with respective percentage values (%-Dead and %-I/B/E/S). The last column gives
the earliest month with sufficient Fama-French data. The table provides information for the U.S. in Panel A, while Panel B covers European countries.
Country Abb. Region Screening of Country Lists Sample: FMV> 10 Date
Total Major Region FMV> 10 #Dead %Dead #Return %Return #I/B/E/S %I/B/E/S FF
Panel A: USA
USA USA America 36659 20030 7279 6272 2554 40.7% 6180 98.5% 4860 77.5% Jul 92
Panel B: Europe
Europe Europe 29266 10522 9383 7019 1996 28.4% 6901 98.3% 5169 73.6%
United Kingdom UK Europe 7677 3444 3232 2268 732 32.3% 2232 98.4% 1652 72.8% Jul 87
Germany GER Europe 10740 1833 1525 1017 228 22.4% 991 97.4% 646 63.5% Jan 88
Austria A Europe 360 177 161 119 31 26.1% 115 96.6% 80 67.2% Jan 90
Switzerland CH Europe 1130 387 316 277 49 17.7% 274 98.9% 217 78.3% Jan 90
France FR Europe 2643 1458 1368 945 258 27.3% 917 97.0% 631 66.8% Jan 90
Italy IL Europe 794 390 365 345 95 27.5% 345 100 % 305 88.4% Jan 90
Greece GR Europe 523 393 360 338 57 16.9% 338 100 % 234 69.2% Jun 98
Spain ES Europe 311 204 180 170 51 30.0% 168 98.8% 160 94.1% Feb 92
Portugal POR Europe 296 146 134 92 48 52.2% 91 98.9% 66 71.7% Jun 97
Netherlands NL Europe 791 272 250 201 77 38.3% 199 99.0% 182 90.5% Jan 90
Belgium BEL Europe 1000 288 263 206 40 19.4% 200 97.1% 129 62.6% Jan 90
Sweden SWE Europe 1203 549 441 346 109 31.5% 344 99.4% 280 80.9% Jan 90
Norway NOR Europe 585 328 284 254 98 38.6% 252 99.2% 219 86.2% Jan 90
Denmark DK Europe 685 365 230 197 55 27.9% 197 100 % 167 84.8% Jan 90
Finland FN Europe 341 190 180 159 42 26.4% 155 97.5% 138 86.8% Mar 91
All 65738 30454 16568 13206 4524 34.3% 12998 98.4% 9966 75.5%
Top 5 58922 27314 13845 10848 3881 35.8% 10664 98.3% 8094 74.6%
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To give an idea of the investment universe’s size over time, we provide the absolute
number of companies to be considered for the dispersion strategies across countries
in Table 6.2. All in all, we have 58,510 firm-years of which one half is concentrated
in the U.S. (32,787 firm-years), followed by the U.K. (4,514 firm-years) and France
(4,182 firm-years). Note that the number of available companies usually increases
over the years, with a peak in 1999 followed by a slight setback.
6.1.2 Return Data
We consider monthly stock returns in local currency inclusive of dividends by em-
ploying total return figures. To represent the respective markets, we choose broad
market indices as compiled by Datastream and 3-month-T-bills serve as a proxy for
the risk-free rate. As we have already shown in Chapter 2 the price momentum
effect cannot be detected when na¨ıvely using raw Datastream data. Thus, we again
follow Ince and Porter (2006) in adjusting the return data to allow for reasonable
statistical and economic inferences. As mentioned in Section 5.2.2 our comprehen-
sive sample is hardly confounded by erroneous return data. Still, the remaining
issues might severely affect statistical inferences and weeding them out renders us
even more comfortable with the quality of data.
6.2 Testing for the Dispersion Effect
6.2.1 Risk and Return
We implement the dispersion strategy as in Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002),
defining dispersion as the standard deviation of earnings forecasts over the abso-
lute value of its mean. Based on the previous month’s dispersion, we assign stocks
monthly into five quintiles for larger countries or terciles for smaller countries, de-
pending on the number of available companies. Adopting a holding period of one
month the dispersion strategy is to long stocks with low dispersion and to short
stocks with high dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts.
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Table 6.2: Country Universes by Year
The table gives the average number of companies to be considered for the dispersion strategy. Panel A covers the U.S. and Panel B covers European
countries.
Year 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Σ
#
Panel A: USA
USA 803 867 937 936 1006 1131 1288 1409 1612 1861 2070 2151 2339 2197 1926 1772 2000 2095 2190 2197 32787
Panel B: European Countries
Europe 605 714 823 886 966 1024 1075 1187 1368 1466 1628 1742 1924 1804 1466 1215 1355 1419 1614 1776 26057
UK 152 146 127 141 159 161 191 189 220 264 291 279 328 268 207 171 247 291 319 363 4514
Germany 103 99 108 115 135 156 165 177 180 179 204 207 264 268 199 151 160 163 195 230 3458
Austria 14 19 22 27 31 33 33 38 41 40 36 36 37 31 24 18 20 19 28 34 581
Switzerland 70 83 95 95 93 96 97 95 100 105 112 119 127 133 129 109 108 105 129 132 2132
France 86 100 136 131 146 151 159 179 204 233 254 272 300 307 272 242 242 237 257 274 4182
Italy 17 29 37 37 39 34 30 35 41 41 55 65 68 75 68 61 66 75 99 114 1086
Greece 0 0 0 0 0 10 29 58 86 70 72 94 86 63 55 39 50 40 44 56 852
Spain 17 40 73 76 71 65 65 67 69 68 79 90 96 91 83 74 77 74 79 84 1438
Portugal 0 0 0 0 6 23 26 30 34 33 38 42 42 27 12 8 5 10 14 16 366
Netherlands 56 72 84 91 94 94 95 99 109 113 118 130 137 124 101 87 88 85 85 86 1948
Belgium 24 25 25 29 31 31 35 41 46 48 58 70 72 73 72 55 60 57 62 65 979
Sweden 10 12 13 34 36 37 38 46 63 78 101 119 132 116 77 61 76 82 92 96 1319
Norway 9 11 13 15 19 19 20 22 38 47 54 53 59 62 45 28 36 45 66 76 737
Denmark 33 62 75 77 89 93 56 59 67 72 80 80 79 77 52 39 45 61 61 58 1315
Finland 7 9 8 12 9 11 24 40 52 56 52 63 75 66 52 52 53 52 60 63 816
Σ 1401 1574 1753 1816 1964 2145 2351 2584 2962 3308 3674 3870 4241 3978 3374 2967 3333 3491 3780 3944 58510
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Table 6.3 gives average monthly buy-and-hold return and volatility figures of dis-
persion-based portfolios by country. First, we assess the profitability of the dis-
persion hedge strategy by considering the return differential—low dispersion minus
high dispersion stocks—along with its t-statistic. For the U.S., we confirm prior ev-
idence of Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) or Avramov, Chordia, Jostova, and
Philipov (2008). We obtain a monthly hedge return of 49 basis points at a monthly
volatility of 3.85%, which give rise to a t-statistic of 1.98. Note that the returns of
the dispersion-based portfolios decrease monotonically with increasing dispersion,
while their volatility is positively related to dispersion. The aggregate European
hedge strategy provides a somewhat smaller return of 38 basis points per month,
but at a considerably lower volatility of 2.87%. Further, using the t-statistic metric,
we identify the Netherlands to have an anomalous returns on a 5% level. If we relax
the significance level to 10%, Germany, Italy and Sweden appear to be anomalous as
well. With the exception of Norway, all of the remaining countries exhibit positive
return differentials. While the low dispersion portfolio is sometimes contributing
significantly to the return spread, we note that the lion’s share is typically due to
the high dispersion portfolio.
Given this persuasive evidence of international dispersion effects, we seek to fur-
ther characterize the involved dispersion portfolios by examining some descriptive
statistics in Table 6.4. First of all, inspecting the average dispersion of the avail-
able dispersion-based portfolios suggests that the dispersion in analysts’ earnings
forecasts follows a heavily right-skewed distribution. Especially, the average dis-
persion of the high dispersion is rather large. For instance, while the fourth U.S.
quintile portfolio has an average dispersion of 7.52%, the high dispersion portfolio
figure amounts to 55.32%. Note that this pattern is even more pronounced for the
European countries. Just consider the high dispersion portfolio of the European
strategy, which is characterized by a mean dispersion in excess of 100% indicating
considerable disagreement among the analysts. On the other hand, the low disper-
sion portfolio has mean dispersion of 2.39%, which is indicative of a strong consensus
among the analysts. Moreover, across all countries the dispersion-based portfolios’
volatility is increasing with dispersion, which calls for controlling of a systematic
risk bias possibly inherent in these portfolios. Thus, we compute betas according to
the classical regression
Rit − RFt = αi + βi(RMt − RFt) + εit, (6.1)
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Table 6.3: Return and Volatility of Dispersion Portfolios
The table gives average monthly buy-and-hold returns and volatility of quintile or tercile portfolios
that are built monthly dependent on the level of dispersion. All figures refer to the period from
July 1987 to June 2007. We give the return differential of the respective hedge strategies along
with the according t-statistic.
Portfolio Dispersion Ranking
Country Low 2 Mid 4 High Low −High t-statistic
Return 1.56 1.16 1.11 1.23 1.07 0.49
USA
Volatility 4.32 4.32 4.91 5.66 6.71 3.85
1.98
Return 1.24 1.14 1.13 1.10 0.87 0.38
Europe
Volatility 3.96 4.27 4.71 4.86 5.68 2.87
2.04
Return 1.15 1.13 1.00 1.05 0.99 0.16
UK
Volatility 4.09 4.51 4.42 4.88 5.71 3.44
0.72
Return 0.94 0.87 0.75 0.92 0.45 0.49
Germany
Volatility 5.11 5.46 5.56 5.77 7.28 3.88
1.95
Return 1.56 1.25 1.26 0.30
Austria
Volatility 5.63 5.70 6.38 4.58
0.93
Return 0.93 1.08 0.95 0.80 0.87 0.05
Switzerland
Volatility 4.69 5.14 5.82 5.85 6.32 3.56
0.24
Return 1.35 1.32 1.25 1.00 1.05 0.30
France
Volatility 5.15 5.46 6.03 6.27 7.05 3.92
1.20
Return 0.94 0.94 0.91 0.93 0.39 0.52
Italy
Volatility 6.22 6.85 6.43 6.39 7.52 4.16
1.92
Return 2.15 1.75 1.99 0.16
Greece
Volatility 9.50 9.37 10.72 3.55
1.17
Return 1.47 1.48 0.99 1.28 1.12 0.38
Spain
Volatility 5.06 6.10 6.46 6.84 7.68 4.62
1.29
Return 1.67 1.22 1.20 0.31
Portugal
Volatility 5.96 5.59 6.58 5.50
0.66
Return 1.51 1.30 1.38 1.21 0.86 0.63
Netherlands
Volatility 4.39 5.02 5.11 5.82 6.67 4.38
2.22
Return 1.12 1.19 0.85 0.26
Belgium
Volatility 4.56 5.19 5.48 2.91
0.62
Return 1.75 1.73 1.57 1.61 1.11 0.65
Sweden
Volatility 5.92 6.47 6.54 6.89 8.09 5.47
1.83
Return 1.42 1.49 1.43 -0.01
Norway
Volatility 6.62 6.92 8.45 5.87
-0.19
Return 1.35 1.33 1.24 1.27 1.02 0.33
Denmark
Volatility 4.68 4.88 4.73 4.70 5.61 4.21
1.21
Return 1.57 1.56 1.45 0.12
Finland
Volatility 6.57 7.29 8.04 5.18
0.72
where Rit denotes the gross return of quintile i, RFt is the risk-free rate and RMt is
the country’s market return. Unsurprisingly, the beta of the dispersion-based port-
folios is also increasing with dispersion. Moreover, in all countries the highest betas
obtain for the high dispersion quintile. Also, while the remaining portfolios with
lower dispersion have rather homogenous size characteristics, we observe a severe
size bias on behalf of the high dispersion portfolio. In particular, measuring size in
terms of the logarithm of market value, we find that the high dispersion portfolio is
mostly populated by small caps, which may in turn explain its conspicuous market
exposure. Finally, turning to the hedge strategy we almost always observe consider-
able negative exposure to the market portfolio, suggesting distinct hedge potential
with respect to market risk.
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Table 6.4: Descriptive Statistics of Dispersion Portfolios
The table gives mean values of dispersion as well as two risk proxies, beta and log-size, over the
whole period. Quintile and tercile portfolios are built monthly dependent on the level of dispersion.
As for risk proxies we consider the quintile portfolios’ betas (arising from a standard CAPM) and
size being measured as the average of log(marketvalue).
Portfolio Dispersion Ranking
Country Low 2 Mid 4 High Low −High
Dispersion 0.66 2.14 3.83 7.52 55.32
USA Beta 0.77 0.79 0.94 1.09 1.30 -0.53
Size 20.53 20.74 20.45 20.14 19.78
Dispersion 2.39 5.68 9.51 16.70 101.82
Europe Beta 0.87 0.95 1.05 1.10 1.28 -0.41
Size 21.92 21.65 21.15 20.65 20.08
Dispersion 1.59 3.11 4.70 7.37 38.24
UK Beta 0.71 0.76 0.76 0.85 0.99 -0.29
Size 24.57 25.00 25.08 25.19 24.87
Dispersion 3.34 7.24 11.73 21.02 122.71
Germany Beta 1.06 1.12 1.17 1.23 1.52 -0.45
Size 20.25 20.56 20.51 20.26 19.71
Dispersion 3.71 9.89 59.95
Austria Beta 1.09 1.10 1.27 -0.18
Size 19.68 19.88 19.31
Dispersion 3.61 7.76 12.55 21.05 113.53
Switzerland Beta 0.97 1.07 1.21 1.22 1.29 -0.32
Size 20.60 20.76 20.59 20.41 20.00
Dispersion 3.02 6.26 9.80 16.30 114.66
France Beta 0.96 1.03 1.18 1.22 1.38 -0.38
Size 20.13 20.61 20.40 20.18 19.63
Dispersion 4.16 8.88 13.00 19.39 61.32
Italy Beta 0.91 1.00 0.94 0.98 1.17 -0.27
Size 20.63 20.81 20.71 20.40 20.17
Dispersion 6.05 14.36 42.74
Greece Beta 0.76 0.73 0.88 -0.11
Size 19.59 19.57 19.14
Dispersion 3.54 7.18 11.05 17.08 70.31
Spain Beta 0.77 0.90 0.93 1.01 1.13 -0.40
Size 20.69 20.79 20.46 20.21 19.50
Dispersion 6.90 15.89 60.98
Portugal Beta 0.74 0.77 0.88 -0.14
Size 20.35 20.07 19.46
Dispersion 2.12 4.51 7.29 12.61 97.50
Netherlands Beta 0.79 0.94 0.95 1.13 1.25 -0.46
Size 19.93 20.01 19.87 19.61 18.83
Dispersion 4.48 11.41 73.16
Belgium Beta 1.07 1.25 1.30 -0.23
Size 20.44 20.33 19.70
Dispersion 3.78 7.84 12.62 21.59 116.86
Sweden Beta 0.61 0.71 0.72 0.73 1.01 -0.40
Size 22.22 22.62 22.47 22.31 22.03
Dispersion 6.21 14.81 140.81
Norway Beta 0.81 0.88 1.07 -0.26
Size 21.71 22.02 21.62
Dispersion 3.66 8.06 13.81 24.21 147.75
Denmark Beta 1.10 1.00 1.07 1.10 1.29 -0.18
Size 21.22 21.49 21.31 21.26 20.83
Dispersion 6.45 17.48 76.61
Finland Beta 0.87 0.95 1.12 -0.25
Size 19.62 19.81 19.59
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6.2.2 Time-Series Regressions
Some of the examined dispersion strategies are highly volatile and we thus wonder
whether their high returns are solely compensating for risk. To check if the long-
short portfolio returns can be attributed to common risk factors one usually adopts
the standard approach of Fama and French (1993) and estimates a regression model
of the form
RLt − RSt = α + β(RMt −RFt) + γRSMBt + δRHMLt + εt, (6.2)
where RLt − RSt is the return difference of the respective hedge strategy, i.e., the
long leg minus the short leg. Regarding the country-specific common risk factor
portfolios, the market return RMt is represented by some broad market index, the
size factor RSMBt is mimicked by a small cap index minus the risk-free rate, RSCt−
RFt, and the value factor RHMLt is the difference between a value index and the
corresponding growth index, RV t −RGt. Given the factor structure in (6.2), we can
identify the hedge strategy’s alpha net of common risk factors.
In addition to the Fama-French factors, one commonly considers momentum as a
further factor to control for. We conjecture earnings momentum to be closely related
to the dispersion effect. Indeed, in untabulated results, we find earnings momentum
and the dispersion effect to be highly correlated in terms of returns and Fama-French
alphas. While a high return correlation may simply be picking up systematic risk
factor tilts shared by both anomalies, the high correlation in Fama-French alphas
suggests that there is a common unsystematic component at work as well. Therefore,
when testing for the dispersion effect, we extend the Fama-French setting of equation
(6.2) to a four-factor model by adding an earnings momentum factor:
RLt − RSt = α + β(RMt − RFt) + γRSMBt + δRHMLt + ζRPMNt + εt, (6.3)
where RPMNt refers to the returns of the earnings momentum strategy (positive
minus negative earnings revisions). In computing the earnings momentum factor,
we follow the standard methodology of Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996).
Table 6.5 displays the results of the four-factor regression for dispersion-based port-
folios according to equation (6.3) that uses 240 monthly returns spanning the period
from July 1987 to June 2007. First, we examine the results for the U.S.. We observe
that the risk factors explain most of the variation in the excess returns of both legs
of the dispersion strategy.
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Table 6.5: Time-Series-Regressions of Dispersion Portfolios
The Table gives the results of a regression according to Equation (6.3) using 240 monthly returns
ranging from July 1987 to June 2007 along with the according t-statistics.
Fama-French Model
α β γ δ ζ t(α) t(β) t(γ) t(δ) t(ζ) Adj.
R2
Low -0.01 0.70 0.17 0.03 0.44 -0.05 14.88 3.33 0.62 7.45 79.4
USA High -0.57 0.91 0.48 -0.17 -0.27 -4.47 20.64 10.10 -4.14 -4.78 92.8
Low-High 0.56 -0.22 -0.31 0.19 0.71 3.24 -3.61 -4.82 3.52 9.26 62.9
Low 0.45 0.37 0.45 0.00 0.23 4.88 7.81 12.64 -0.04 4.83 91.2
Europe High 0.26 0.86 0.34 -0.21 -0.43 1.97 12.73 6.54 -4.12 -6.30 92.2
Low-High 0.19 -0.49 0.12 0.21 0.65 1.15 -5.86 1.81 3.29 7.76 55.7
Low 0.39 -0.12 0.80 -0.13 0.18 3.58 -1.58 11.06 -3.23 3.51 82.2
UK High 0.53 0.46 0.47 -0.01 -0.40 2.84 3.48 3.77 -0.16 -4.63 75.4
Low-High -0.14 -0.59 0.34 -0.12 0.57 -0.68 -4.07 2.51 -1.60 6.18 29.9
Low -0.13 0.79 0.29 -0.03 0.19 -0.83 11.96 5.07 -0.71 3.01 79.6
Germany High -0.56 1.43 0.11 -0.15 -0.31 -2.56 15.55 1.38 -2.75 -3.50 82.2
Low-High 0.43 -0.64 0.18 0.12 0.51 2.06 -7.29 2.39 2.35 5.97 44.2
Low 0.49 0.82 0.35 -0.02 0.04 2.37 10.58 5.47 -0.65 0.88 71.2
Austria High 0.03 0.88 0.37 0.03 -0.05 0.15 10.59 5.42 0.63 -0.95 72.4
Low-High 0.46 -0.06 -0.02 -0.05 0.09 1.53 -0.58 -0.26 -0.92 1.32 1.0
Low -0.09 0.86 0.11 0.01 0.14 -0.79 14.84 2.21 0.39 3.66 86.0
Switzerland High -0.06 1.06 0.20 0.07 -0.41 -0.43 14.99 3.27 2.09 -9.10 90.4
Low-High -0.03 -0.20 -0.09 -0.06 0.55 -0.16 -2.08 -1.08 -1.31 9.01 46.8
Low -0.03 0.87 0.13 -0.03 0.11 -0.17 15.29 2.56 -0.82 1.79 79.4
France High -0.25 0.95 0.38 0.00 -0.35 -1.51 16.56 7.45 -0.01 -5.89 89.1
Low-High 0.22 -0.08 -0.25 -0.03 0.47 0.99 -1.07 -3.84 -0.59 5.95 40.2
Low -0.04 0.84 0.08 -0.14 0.14 -0.21 9.79 0.92 -3.28 2.23 76.4
Italy High -0.51 1.10 0.04 -0.09 -0.34 -2.90 14.38 0.45 -2.23 -6.05 87.2
Low-High 0.47 -0.26 0.04 -0.06 0.48 2.02 -2.58 0.41 -1.07 6.44 27.5
Low 0.12 0.51 0.36 -0.41 0.03 0.45 11.69 7.17 -3.81 0.51 88.0
Greece High -0.15 0.60 0.38 -0.35 -0.09 -0.51 12.58 6.86 -2.97 -1.39 89.0
Low-High 0.27 -0.09 -0.02 -0.06 0.13 1.00 -2.05 -0.32 -0.56 2.01 14.2
Low 0.04 0.64 0.21 -0.06 0.14 0.23 10.71 3.29 -1.43 3.95 79.5
Spain High -0.40 0.93 0.23 -0.04 -0.19 -2.11 13.08 3.04 -0.93 -4.53 85.8
Low-High 0.43 -0.29 -0.02 -0.01 0.34 1.76 -3.12 -0.21 -0.21 5.98 33.8
Low -0.33 0.37 0.52 -0.01 0.33 -1.06 4.87 9.13 -0.10 6.00 59.0
Portugal High -0.33 0.44 0.54 -0.16 -0.12 -1.02 5.50 9.12 -2.02 -2.14 62.6
Low-High 0.00 -0.07 -0.03 0.15 0.45 0.01 -0.70 -0.35 1.56 6.36 19.3
Low 0.48 0.78 0.04 -0.03 0.17 3.37 12.67 0.62 -1.11 4.23 75.1
NetherlandsHigh -0.06 1.07 0.08 0.04 -0.37 -0.33 14.27 1.15 1.06 -7.48 84.8
Low-High 0.53 -0.29 -0.05 -0.08 0.54 2.33 -3.01 -0.51 -1.51 8.43 45.7
Low 0.07 0.67 0.35 0.04 0.08 0.56 10.57 7.35 1.08 1.99 80.9
Belgium High -0.14 0.97 0.27 0.02 -0.20 -0.86 12.71 4.73 0.50 -4.23 81.2
Low-High 0.21 -0.30 0.08 0.02 0.28 1.10 -3.25 1.17 0.33 4.91 16.1
Low 0.35 0.44 0.29 0.06 0.20 1.44 7.36 4.08 1.70 3.28 58.8
Sweden High -0.34 0.79 0.27 -0.06 -0.17 -1.48 14.35 4.15 -1.92 -3.04 81.9
Low-High 0.69 -0.35 0.02 0.12 0.37 2.34 -4.98 0.18 2.90 5.08 36.9
Low 0.08 0.53 0.32 -0.01 0.17 0.34 7.41 4.80 -0.15 3.45 66.4
Norway High -0.04 0.55 0.50 0.09 -0.06 -0.15 6.43 6.38 1.55 -1.00 71.0
Low-High 0.13 -0.01 -0.18 -0.10 0.23 0.36 -0.13 -1.96 -1.42 3.32 13.1
Low 0.03 0.73 0.33 -0.02 0.02 0.14 8.85 5.37 -0.44 0.52 68.6
Denmark High -0.50 0.93 0.39 -0.07 -0.07 -2.34 9.46 5.42 -1.78 -1.38 71.3
Low-High 0.53 -0.20 -0.06 0.06 0.09 1.87 -1.52 -0.68 1.08 1.38 5.4
Low 0.28 0.57 0.32 -0.03 -0.01 1.10 6.55 3.93 -1.13 -0.15 72.2
Finland High 0.09 0.61 0.50 -0.02 -0.20 0.36 7.11 6.22 -0.78 -3.91 81.9
Low-High 0.19 -0.04 -0.18 -0.01 0.19 0.53 -0.33 -1.58 -0.26 2.65 11.4
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In particular, the low dispersion portfolio heavily loads to the market and earnings
momentum factor and exhibits a minor size bias, rendering the remaining alpha
of -1 basis points insignificant. On the other hand, the high dispersion portfolio
generally behaves like small-sized growth stocks with a significant negative earnings
momentum loading. Still, an unexplained alpha of -57 basis points remains; thus,
the long-short strategy earns a highly significant monthly alpha of 56 basis points.
Interestingly, while this alpha is large, the statistical fit of the regression is fairly good
considering the fact that one is analyzing a long-short strategy. More than one half of
the variation in the dispersion strategy’s excess returns is captured by the four-factor
model. In particular, we confirm the considerate negative market exposure together
with a negative loading on size. Finally, we identify a close relation between earnings
momentum and the dispersion effect. However, the dispersion effect is not subsumed
by earnings momentum suggesting that both represent distinct phenomena.
By and large, these observations extend to other countries as well. Of the 15 Eu-
ropean countries, we document four alphas that are significant on the 5%-level and
relaxing the latter to 10%, we obtain six significant alphas—ranging from 43 basis
points for the German and Spanish strategy to 69 basis points for the Swedish strat-
egy. Also, it appears to be a stylized fact that the alpha of the dispersion effect is
governed by the underperformance of the high dispersion portfolio. While the ad-
justed R2 for European strategies usually do not reach the level of the U.S. strategy
we still observe remarkably high values. Half of the regressions for the long-short
strategies are characterized by adjusted R2s in excess of 30%. These figures are
quite sizeable given that typical values for long-short strategies are single-digited.
Note that the returns for the aggregate European strategy are fully captured by the
common factor controls.
To further examine the evolution of both hedge strategies over time, we compute
the related country alphas via trailing four-factor regressions according to equation
(6.3). We use a 36-month window and plot the resulting alphas in Figure 6.1 for the
six strategies exhibiting significant hedge returns. To also visualize the importance
of adjusting for the earnings momentum factor, we additionally plot the alphas
arising from a Fama-French regression according to equation (6.2).
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Figure 6.1: Trailing Alpha of the Dispersion Effect
We plot trailing dispersion strategy alphas arising from equations (6.2) and (6.3) using 36-months
windows, thus results cover July 1990 to June 2007. The dashed line gives the Fama-French alpha
and the solid line is the respective four-factor alpha.
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First of all, we note that the inclusion of the earnings momentum factor is relevant,
since the Fama-French alpha is significantly reduced in many countries. Also, while
this reduction typically is present throughout the whole sample period, it appears
to be weakest at the turn of the century. Second, the U.S. strategy exhibits the
most sizeable alpha, which is significantly positive for the the whole sample period.
Third, across the remaining countries the evolution of alpha appears downward
shifted when compared to the U.S..
6.3 Data Snooping Biases and the Dispersion Effect
Recapitulating the results of the traditional analysis, we are left with six positive
and significant dispersion effect return differentials as well as seven positive and
significant dispersion effect alphas. Since this result could have occurred by chance
alone, we will subject the dispersion hedge strategies to the econometric methods of
Chapter 3 that additionally account for multiple testing issues.
To control the FWE, we consider the k-StepM method for k = 1, which is the
appropriate choice given the number of strategies under study. To control the FDP,
we pursue the FDP-StepMγ using γ = 0.1. We keep the significance level constant
at 5% across all multiple testing procedures and we present results for the return
of the hedge strategies as well as their alphas arising from the four-factor time
series regressions. To account for potential serial correlation in the return series, we
use a kernel variance estimator based on the Parzen kernel to studentize the test
statistics, see Andrews (1991). The bootstrap method is the stationary bootstrap
with an average block size of 12 months.
The left panel of Table 6.6 reports the multiple testing results for the countries’
return statistics. We provide the lower confidence band cl for the returns using
studentized test statistics according to the StepM and FDP-StepMγ method, re-
spectively. Since we are in a one-sided test setting, we give the lower limits of the
confidence interval as computed in the last step of the respective method. The
value in the column labeled rej equals 1 if 0 /∈ [cl,∞), which indicates the rejection
of capital market efficiency and suggests the presence of a dispersion effect in the
respective country.
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Table 6.6: Accounting for Multiple Testing in the Dispersion Effect
The table gives the lower confidence band cl for the returns as obtained by the StepM method and
the FDP-StepM0.1using studentized test statistics as illustrated in Section 3.1. The rej-columns
contain the resulting decision where 1 indicates rejection of θs = 0 (capital market efficiency).
The left panel provides results for returns as test statistics and the right panel provides results for
4-factor alphas as test statistics.
Return 4-Factor Alpha
Country θs StepM FDP-StepM0.1 θs StepM FDP-StepM0.1
cl rej cl rej cl rej cl rej
USA 0.0049 -0.0032 0 -0.0032 0 0.0056 -0.0015 0 -0.0015 0
Europe 0.0038 -0.0037 0 -0.0037 0 0.0019 -0.0028 0 -0.0028 0
UK 0.0016 -0.0074 0 -0.0074 0 -0.0014 -0.0092 0 -0.0092 0
Germany 0.0049 -0.0043 0 -0.0043 0 0.0043 -0.0021 0 -0.0021 0
Austria 0.0030 -0.0060 0 -0.0060 0 0.0046 -0.0050 0 -0.0050 0
Switzerland 0.0005 -0.0072 0 -0.0072 0 -0.0003 -0.0056 0 -0.0056 0
France 0.0030 -0.0050 0 -0.0050 0 0.0022 -0.0057 0 -0.0057 0
Italy 0.0052 -0.0031 0 -0.0031 0 0.0047 -0.0030 0 -0.0030 0
Greece 0.0016 -0.0061 0 -0.0061 0 0.0027 -0.0048 0 -0.0048 0
Spain 0.0038 -0.0064 0 -0.0064 0 0.0043 -0.0040 0 -0.0040 0
Portugal 0.0031 -0.0091 0 -0.0091 0 0.0000 -0.0115 0 -0.0115 0
Netherlands 0.0063 -0.0033 0 -0.0033 0 0.0053 -0.0005 0 -0.0005 0
Belgium 0.0026 -0.0028 0 -0.0028 0 0.0021 -0.0024 0 -0.0024 0
Sweden 0.0065 -0.0065 0 -0.0065 0 0.0069 -0.0020 0 -0.0020 0
Norway -0.0001 -0.0120 0 -0.0120 0 0.0013 -0.0076 0 -0.0076 0
Denmark 0.0033 -0.0061 0 -0.0061 0 0.0053 -0.0027 0 -0.0027 0
Finland 0.0012 -0.0097 0 -0.0097 0 0.0019 -0.0085 0 -0.0085 0
Σ 0 0 0 0
Concerning the results for the returns, we do not observe any rejection of capital
market efficiency by the StepM method. In this case the FDP-StepMγ coincides with
the StepM, since the number of rejections does not exceed nine. The right panel of
Table 6.6 displays the multiple testing results using the four-factor alphas as test
statistics. With this metric the dispersion effect is again found to be vulnerable
to data snooping biases. The StepM method yields no rejection of capital market
efficiency, which implies equivalent results of the FDP-StepMγ. Therefore, regardless
of controlling the FWE or the FDP, none of the na¨ıvely derived dispersion effects
is really refuting capital market efficiency. This surprising result raises the need for
sound economic inference.
6.4 Explaining the Dispersion Effect
Taking the results of the previous section at face value, one may be tempted to reject
the notion of international dispersion effects right away. However, we hesitate to do
so given the intriguing fact of almost always positive return differentials together
with positive alphas. In reconciling these results with intuition, we further delve
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into the economic nature of the dispersion effect. First, we consider the evolution
of the related strategies over time. Second, we will analyze the interaction of the
dispersion effect with measures of information uncertainty. Third, we examine the
profitability of dispersion strategies among varying levels of liquidity.
6.4.1 The Dispersion Effect over Time
In the following, we seek to sharpen our intuition about the time series nature of
the dispersion effect. Therefore, Figure 6.2 depicts the cumulative return for the six
strategies exhibiting significant hedge returns, i.e., the U.S., Europe, Germany, Italy,
the Netherlands, and Sweden. Across countries a striking common pattern emerges:
Following a steady build-up of wealth until the end of 1998 we observe a severe
drawdown. For example, the U.S. strategy erodes half of its accumulated wealth
within the subsequent year. The decline in performance is reversed for almost all
countries in March 2000. Even more so, the dispersion strategy is soaring to a new
height within the following three years. The most recent history is characterized by
rather flat return paths across all countries.
Note that the general evolution of the European dispersion effects only resembles the
one of the U.S. for the second half of the sample period. While the U.S. dispersion
effect amasses significant wealth in the first half of the sample period, we state that
the positive European return differentials mainly derive from a narrow time frame,
namely March 2000 to March 2003. Comparing the dispersion strategy performance
to the evolution of a broad market index, it appears that the dispersion strategy
would have been a quite effective hedge against the burst of the tech bubble at
the beginning of the century. To further disentangle the performance drivers of the
dispersion effect, we investigate the performance of the low dispersion and the high
dispersion portfolio in Figure 6.3.
Focussing on the time frame March 2000 to March 2003, we find the U.S. low disper-
sion portfolio significantly accumulating wealth, while the high dispersion portfolio
is eroding wealth. On the other hand, the European low dispersion portfolios move
sideways in the respective period. Hence, the resulting dispersion effects are solely
driven by a severe underperformance of the short legs. This observation is quantified
by the subperiod analysis conducted in Table 6.7 capturing the years 1998 to 2003.
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Figure 6.2: Cumulative Returns: Dispersion versus Market Portfolio
The figures give cumulative total returns the dispersion hedge portfolios (solid line) and to a broad
market index (dashed line). Results are for the period from July 1987 to June 2007.
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Figure 6.3: Cumulative Returns: Dispersion Legs versus Market Portfolio
The figures give cumulative total returns to the long and short leg of the dispersion hedge strategy.
Results are for the period from July 1987 to June 2007. The solid line is for the market portfolio,
the dotted line represents the low dispersion portfolio, and the dashed line represents the high
dispersion portfolio.
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The choice of breakpoints in Table 6.7 is motivated as follows: At the starting
point April 1998 all of the dispersion strategies exhibit a total return level close or
equal to their peak prior the subsequent decline in performance. This pattern of
declining performance ends for almost all countries in April 2000 defining the second
breakpoint. The following three years are marked by significant outperformance of
the dispersion strategy reaching a global peak in April 2003, the end of the subperiod.
Interestingly, the last breakpoint coincides with the dawn of the Iraq War in 2003.
Considering the subperiod 1998-2003 in Table 6.7, we find results that are quite sim-
ilar to the ones documented for the whole sample period in Table 6.3. These results
have been expected from our visual inspection of the cumulative return patterns. Of
course, the resulting return differentials are more sizeable than those of the whole
sample period, given that the European countries are characterized by rather flat
return patterns outside the 5 year sub-period. Confirming our earlier assessment,
the declining performance of the dispersion hedge strategy from 1998-2000 is almost
always due to the extraordinary performance of the short leg. With the technology
bubble bursting in March 2000, these high dispersion stocks then suffered extremely
negative returns that have more than outweighed the dispersion strategies’ previ-
ous losses. Of course, being short these companies would have been a favorable
thing to do. However, we conjecture that the respective real-world implementation
would have been rather unfeasible—just think of the up-tick rule. Of course, one
may argue that most of the involved shorts would have already been in place at the
beginning of 1999. However, with stock prices subsequently reaching unwarranted
levels, one would have had trouble filling the according margin calls. Thus, many
investors would have not been able to follow the dispersion strategy when it had
really been profitable. These findings corroborate the doubts raised by the data
snooping controls. Prior to 1999, only the U.S. dispersion effect has consistently
provided abnormal returns. On the other hand the most sizeable part of the effects
derive from a narrow time frame of 3 years. Hence, for really capturing the respec-
tive excess returns, it would have required a rather patient investor, equipped with
13 years waiting time, who is not wiped out of the strategy following the violent
swing in 1999.
6.4.2 The Dispersion Effect and Information Uncertainty
In this section, we will analyze the interaction of the dispersion effect and informa-
tion uncertainty. Presumably, the respective price drift should be higher in more
opaque information environments for which information diffusion is slowest. In fact,
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Table 6.7: The Dispersion Effect: Sub-Period Analysis
The table gives average monthly buy-and-hold returns and volatility of quintile or tercile portfolios
that are built monthly dependent on the level of dispersion. The figures refer to the period from
April 1998 to April 2003, the sub-period is further split in two at April 1st, 2000. We give the
return differential of the respective hedge strategies, Lo-Hi, along with the according t-statistic.
1998-2003 1998-2000 2000-2003
Country
Low High Lo-Hi t Low High Lo-Hi t Low High Lo-Hi t
0.71 0.12 0.58 0.51 2.52 -2.01 0.83 -1.37 2.19
USA
4.93 9.80 6.55 0.69 5.60 8.79 5.18 -1.86 4.54 10.21 6.85 1.95
0.13 -0.93 1.06 1.25 2.89 -1.64 -0.57 -3.31 2.75
EUR
4.40 7.44 4.03 2.04 4.64 6.62 2.69 -2.93 4.16 6.99 3.83 4.36
0.17 -0.27 0.44 0.63 3.55 -2.92 -0.12 -2.65 2.53
UK
4.33 7.97 5.69 0.60 4.59 8.45 6.36 -2.20 4.19 6.74 4.09 3.76
-0.54 -2.65 2.12 1.90 2.41 -0.50 -2.05 -5.80 3.74
GER
6.96 10.60 5.84 2.81 6.62 8.02 4.03 -0.60 6.81 10.88 6.23 3.66
0.03 -0.60 0.63 -0.55 0.55 -1.09 0.39 -1.31 1.70
A
4.94 4.72 4.71 -0.16 5.67 4.59 4.28 -1.11 4.47 4.72 4.70 0.58
-0.26 -0.99 0.73 0.87 2.49 -1.62 -0.96 -3.15 2.19
CH
5.09 8.12 4.65 1.22 5.63 8.30 3.28 -2.37 4.66 7.31 4.81 2.77
0.26 -0.48 0.74 1.70 2.81 -1.11 -0.63 -2.52 1.89
FR
5.44 9.10 5.35 1.07 6.01 7.77 3.91 -1.36 4.92 9.36 5.84 1.97
-0.25 -1.14 0.88 1.78 2.15 -0.37 -1.51 -3.18 1.66
IL
7.02 8.87 4.75 1.44 8.24 8.43 4.16 -0.43 5.93 8.62 4.98 2.03
1.77 1.93 -0.16 10.07 11.52 -1.44 -3.39 -4.02 0.64
GR
13.67 15.56 4.18 -0.62 16.45 18.71 5.26 -1.36 8.35 9.35 3.17 0.78
0.35 -0.17 0.52 -0.34 0.88 -1.22 0.78 -0.82 1.60
ES
5.02 6.97 3.90 1.03 6.82 8.55 3.31 -1.77 3.51 5.82 3.89 2.50
0.75 -0.70 1.45 2.68 0.32 2.36 -0.45 -1.34 0.89
POR
7.91 6.98 6.85 1.62 11.24 6.73 8.12 1.13 4.64 7.14 5.98 1.16
-0.48 -1.77 1.30 -0.12 0.41 -0.53 -0.70 -3.13 2.43
NL
4.62 8.40 5.76 1.74 5.14 7.31 5.11 -0.50 4.33 8.83 5.92 2.50
-0.51 -1.09 0.58 0.31 0.05 0.27 -1.02 -1.80 0.78
BEL
4.51 5.38 3.19 0.63 5.10 5.29 3.60 0.74 4.10 5.38 2.94 0.12
0.63 -0.33 0.95 1.28 3.53 -2.25 0.22 -2.72 2.95
SWE
4.97 10.53 7.41 1.00 4.98 11.73 8.04 -1.34 4.98 9.08 6.30 2.84
-0.13 -0.98 0.85 0.53 0.40 0.13 -0.54 -1.84 1.30
NOR
6.57 7.39 4.81 0.85 8.17 9.06 4.61 -0.64 5.42 6.10 4.93 1.33
-0.18 -0.40 0.22 0.34 -0.24 0.58 -0.50 -0.50 -0.01
DK
4.88 6.40 4.97 0.34 3.81 4.96 3.62 0.76 5.47 7.21 5.70 -0.01
0.21 -0.42 0.63 1.78 1.00 0.78 -0.77 -1.30 0.53
FN
5.97 7.15 3.13 0.90 8.10 8.78 2.75 0.77 3.98 5.87 3.39 0.56
dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts itself is a common proxy for information
uncertainty. Besides this metric, Zhang (2006) recently provides evidence that the
U.S. price momentum strategy is more effective when limited to highly uncertainty
stocks as measured by size, firm age, analyst coverage, stock volatility, or cash flow
volatility. If the dispersion effect is confined to highly uncertain information envi-
ronments investors would certainly be less prone to follow such a strategy. Hence, we
will examine dispersion effect profits for different degrees of information uncertainty.
We consider four measures to monthly proxy for information uncertainty: Analyst
coverage, size, total stock volatility, and idiosyncratic volatility. Total stock volatil-
ity is estimated using the last three year’s monthly stock returns, and idiosyncratic
volatility arises from a standard Fama-French regression that also uses the last three
year’s monthly stock returns.
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Table 6.8 gives the according results using a similar sorting procedure as in the
previous section. In particular, we first sort stocks into five quintiles based on
dispersion. For each quintile the stocks are further sorted into three terciles based
on one of the three information uncertainty proxies. Obviously, this double-sorting
procedure requires a sufficient amount of companies in a given country to deliver
meaningful results. Hence, we exclude the six smallest countries, which are Austria,
Belgium, Finland, Greece, Norway, and Portugal.
Our findings are as follows. First, the dispersion effect is hardly present when
limited to high and low dispersion stocks with high analyst coverage. Nevertheless,
the effect is not confined to low coverage stocks. Second, using size as the metric of
information uncertainty provides the most poignant results: The dispersion effect
cannot be detected when focussing on large cap companies.
Table 6.8: The Dispersion Effect and Information Uncertainty
The table gives return differentials of the dispersion hedge strategy by terciles of different infor-
mation uncertainty metrics. We first sort stocks into five quintiles based on the prior month’s
dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts. For each quintile the stocks are further sorted into
three terciles based on analyst coverage, size, total stock volatility, and idiosyncratic volatility
(arising from a rolling 36-months Fama-French regression). Below the return differentials we give
t-statistics. The two last rows collect the number of countries that exhibit the highest return
differential among the respective terciles and the terciles mean ranking in terms of returns.
Analyst Coverage Size Volatility Idiosyncratic
Country
Low Mid High Low Mid High Low Mid High Low Mid High
0.74 0.58 0.26 0.76 0.60 0.32 0.32 0.78 1.49 0.92 1.05 1.42
USA
3.41 2.43 0.79 3.17 2.33 1.09 1.62 4.05 6.36 3.04 4.52 6.17
0.44 0.49 0.32 0.76 0.41 0.24 0.41 0.33 0.69 0.83 0.66 0.68
EUR
2.59 2.51 1.31 3.69 2.47 1.01 3.21 2.28 3.64 4.08 3.38 3.49
0.48 0.06 -0.13 1.19 0.03 -0.09 0.18 0.36 0.43 0.07 0.38 0.50
UK
1.48 0.19 -0.58 2.92 0.09 -0.35 0.92 1.60 1.26 0.25 1.48 1.66
-0.10 0.83 0.31 1.09 0.54 0.09 0.11 0.81 0.83 0.60 0.72 0.95
GER
-0.23 2.72 0.91 2.35 1.56 0.27 0.33 2.85 2.54 1.81 2.21 3.03
-0.66 0.29 0.18 0.56 -0.33 0.06 -0.09 0.12 0.49 0.46 0.24 0.32
CH
-1.87 0.95 0.55 1.17 -1.15 0.19 -0.35 0.43 1.44 1.71 0.80 0.94
0.79 0.55 -0.32 0.43 0.25 0.18 0.30 -0.03 1.30 0.94 0.92 1.02
FR
2.22 1.71 -0.87 0.89 0.73 0.58 1.07 -0.09 3.99 3.48 2.89 2.99
-0.81 1.23 0.60 -0.93 0.43 0.58 0.28 0.10 1.21 0.98 0.61 0.77
IL
-1.66 2.33 1.55 -1.81 0.98 1.48 0.76 0.26 2.28 2.20 1.33 1.68
0.03 0.54 0.41 -0.09 0.41 0.68 0.57 1.22 0.29 0.73 0.66 0.22
ES
0.07 1.26 0.81 -0.18 1.06 1.08 1.00 2.73 0.55 1.66 1.98 0.55
1.30 0.44 0.16 1.35 0.59 -0.33 0.35 0.48 0.96 0.93 0.92 1.18
NL
3.73 1.06 0.35 3.22 1.52 -0.69 0.96 1.28 1.89 2.62 2.69 2.87
0.04 1.05 0.26 -0.25 0.85 0.19 0.27 0.80 1.26 0.56 1.47 1.10
SWE
0.07 2.32 0.56 -0.34 1.56 0.45 0.56 1.77 2.02 1.03 2.86 2.08
0.61 0.45 -0.08 -0.01 0.46 -0.17 1.95 0.42 -0.28 1.31 0.89 -0.27
DK
1.25 1.16 -0.18 -0.02 1.08 -0.47 2.98 1.10 -0.59 2.00 2.18 -0.60
#
max
5 6 0 7 2 2 1 1 9 5 1 5
ranking 2.00 1.45 2.55 1.64 1.91 2.45 2.45 2.18 1.36 1.91 2.36 1.73
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Also, the dispersion effect is most pronounced when restricted to high volatility
stocks. This relates to our finding that the dispersion effect is crucially driven by
the short leg, which is mostly populated by high volatility stocks. Third, inspecting
the results for idiosyncratic volatility reveals a more diverse pattern, in particular,
the dispersion effect works either good when limited to low or high idiosyncratic
volatility stocks. The latter result is especially telling as to why the dispersion
effect has been difficult to arbitrage. In fact, a stock’s idiosyncratic volatility is
a common proxy for arbitrage costs and we find the dispersion effects to be most
pronounced in stocks exhibiting high idiosyncratic volatility. Therefore, we con-
tend that high arbitrage costs have prevented rational investors from exploiting the
dispersion effect.
6.4.3 The Dispersion Effect and Liquidity
In further elaborating on the above argument we next examine the role of liquid-
ity when implementing dispersion strategies. In fact, Sadka and Scherbina (2007)
evidence that high dispersion companies happen to entail high trading cost. Also,
the authors observe the highest mispricing for the less liquid stocks suggesting that
trading costs erode all of the potential profits rendering the arbitrage opportunity an
illusion. Hence, we expect liquidity to also play a crucial role in inhibiting profitable
execution of European dispersion strategies.
To operationalize this conjecture we will analyze the profitability of the dispersion
strategies when restricting to high and low dispersion stocks characterized by dif-
ferent degrees of liquidity. In doing so, we will resort to the very same liquidity
metrics introduced in Section 5.6.3: A stock’s dollar volume or its turnover allow
to capture the trading quantity dimension. As for the price impact dimension we
use the ILLIQ measure of Amihud (2002) which is the absolute daily return over
the associated dollar volume. To obtain an aggregate monthly value of ILLIQ we
simply compute its mean over the corresponding daily values. The fourth measure
is the one introduced by Liu (2006) which captures multiple dimensions of liquidity,
such as trading speed and trading quantity. We recapitulate its definition:
Liu Measure = Number of No-Trading Days over the prior 12 months+
1/Turnover
1, 000, 000
where turnover is the average daily turnover over the prior 12 months.1
1Note that while the first three measures only take into account the stocks’ liquidity over the
precedent month the Liu measure hinges on data of the preceding year.
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This measure addresses the trading speed dimension of liquidity since it very well
captures lock-in-risk, i.e., the danger of being locked in a certain position that cannot
be sold.
Table 6.9 displays the profitability of dispersion strategies restricted to high and low
dispersion stocks characterized by different degrees of liquidity. In particular, we
first sort stocks into five quintiles based on dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts.
For each quintile the stocks are further sorted into three terciles based on one of
the four liquidity measures. Again, we exclude the six smallest countries from the
analysis, i.e., Austria, Belgium, Finland, Greece, Norway, and Portugal.
Table 6.9: The Dispersion Effect and Liquidity
The table gives return differentials of the dispersion hedge strategy by terciles of different liquidity
metrics. We first sort stocks into five quintiles based on the prior month’s dispersion in analysts’
earnings forecasts. For each quintile the stocks are further sorted into three terciles based on
dollar volume, share turnover, the ILLIQ measure of Amihud (2002), and Liu’s measure. Below
the return differentials we give t-statistics. The last two rows collect the number of countries that
exhibit the highest return differential among the respective terciles and the terciles mean ranking
in terms of returns. We use the country abbreviations introduced in Table 5.1.
Dollar Volume Share Turnover ILLIQ Liu Measure
Country
High Mid Low High Mid Low Low Mid High Low Mid High
0.34 0.41 0.48 0.59 0.42 0.46 0.28 0.42 0.61 0.74 0.29 0.35
USA
1.08 1.65 2.25 2.09 1.66 2.26 0.97 1.57 2.70 2.64 1.19 1.74
0.07 0.39 0.59 0.13 0.46 0.40 0.12 0.33 0.49 0.43 0.19 0.48
EUR
0.31 2.09 3.55 0.55 2.31 2.51 0.56 1.73 2.79 1.77 1.06 3.36
0.04 0.35 0.57 0.27 0.17 0.55 0.05 0.12 0.66 0.27 0.19 0.41
UK
0.17 1.39 2.04 1.00 0.74 2.15 0.21 0.45 2.51 1.07 0.73 1.56
0.33 0.64 0.56 0.69 0.27 0.65 0.31 0.36 0.90 0.43 0.60 0.67
GER
0.98 2.28 1.54 2.08 1.02 1.80 1.06 1.29 2.33 1.43 2.17 1.82
-0.22 -0.19 0.49 0.04 -0.19 0.14 -0.28 -0.29 0.29 0.05 0.22 0.10
CH
-0.68 -0.62 1.43 0.14 -0.63 0.49 -0.96 -0.91 0.89 0.16 0.70 0.27
-0.24 0.77 0.09 -0.01 0.59 -0.07 -0.05 0.46 0.22 0.03 0.40 0.31
FR
-0.78 2.64 0.23 -0.03 1.97 -0.23 -0.16 1.41 0.64 0.09 1.43 0.85
0.80 0.52 0.13 0.53 0.59 0.66 0.80 0.46 -0.11 0.83 0.75 0.02
IL
2.31 1.25 0.26 1.36 1.72 1.51 2.42 1.23 -0.23 2.12 2.09 0.04
0.05 0.69 -0.03 0.39 0.27 0.49 -0.23 0.43 0.06 0.79 -0.37 0.20
ES
0.11 1.65 -0.08 0.95 0.66 1.28 -0.51 0.98 0.16 1.98 -0.89 0.50
0.30 0.31 1.39 0.19 0.79 1.10 0.33 0.77 0.92 0.93 0.54 0.64
NL
0.64 0.67 3.74 0.39 2.07 2.96 0.71 1.85 2.54 1.98 1.42 1.48
0.27 1.02 1.14 0.36 0.58 1.12 0.47 0.74 1.57 0.37 0.67 0.73
SWE
0.59 1.94 1.80 0.71 1.09 2.19 1.08 1.30 2.52 0.83 1.28 1.25
0.46 0.15 0.14 0.66 -0.17 0.69 0.40 0.19 -0.38 0.35 0.38 -0.30
DK
1.38 0.31 0.29 1.74 -0.41 1.21 1.13 0.43 -0.67 1.03 0.97 -0.59
#
max
2 3 6 2 2 7 2 2 7 4 3 4
ranking 2.55 1.73 1.73 2.18 2.36 1.45 2.55 1.91 1.55 2.00 2.18 1.82
Across most countries and liquidity metrics the general pattern is that the largest
dispersion effects occur for the least liquid stocks and that profitability is increasing
with illiquidty. For instance, the U.S. dispersion effect is only significant for the
least liquid stocks—measuring liquidity by dollar volume or ILLIQ. Using share
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turnover or the measure of Liu (2006) the dispersion strategy’s profitability behaves
differently.
The pattern of profitability decreasing with liquidity can also be observed for the
aggregate European strategy. Judging by dollar volume, share turnover and ILLIQ
the strategy is only useless among the most illiquid stocks while the other buck-
ets do show similar returns. While most of the country-level results comply with
this liquidity-profitability relationship Italy is the odd one out since the dispersion
strategy is only profitable among the most liquid stocks—regardless of the liquidity
measure. Nevertheless, among the six na¨ıvely derived significant dispersion effects
we find five to be significantly affected by liquidity issues. Given that illiquidity is a
common proxy for financial distress our results complement the finding of Avramov,
Chordia, Jostova, and Philipov (2008) that the U.S. dispersion effect is confined
to the worst rated companies. All in all, this evidence questions the successful
implementation of any examined dispersion effect.
Chapter 7
Conclusion
The investigation of a given security mispricing typically addresses two questions: Is
the anomaly simply a compensation for risk or is the anomaly real and, if yes, what
behavioral bias is driving it? Of course, these questions are only meaningful if the
security mispricing is not spurious in the first place. Hence, one needs to safeguard
against data snooping biases.
We first demonstrate the importance of multiple testing issues in the case of the
global accrual anomaly. For this anomaly to exist, we must be able to find statistical
evidence for abnormal returns generated by a trading rule that goes short in the
highest accrual quintile and long in the lowest quintile. For the U.S., a growing
body of empirical research reports the accrual anomaly. Recent studies have also
documented anomalous returns from this hedge strategy in other developed equity
markets. We have raised the concern that these studies do not account for the
multitude of tests involved. Without adjusting for multiple hypotheses testing, we
confirm the global accrual anomaly patterns uncovered in prior studies. Only some
of the hedge strategies do show promising performance in terms of risk-adjusted
return. Controlling for common risk factors in an extended Fama-French model, we
see that only a small number of markets provide returns that are both statistically
and economically significant.
Given the abnormal return of hedge strategies in some countries, one may still feel
that they might have happened by chance alone. Therefore, we examine our results
as to their robustness to multiple testing. To be fair, we use the recent proposals
of Romano and Wolf (2005) and Romano, Shaikh, and Wolf (2008). They are more
powerful than previous suggestions in the literature and, therefore, true anomalies
have a better chance to actually manifest. While international momentum strategies
are robust to this battery of tests, few of the risk-adjusted returns from accrual-based
hedge strategies continue to be anomalous in this more appropriate setting. Besides
97
98 Conclusion
offering potential explanations as to why the accrual anomaly may be specific to the
detected countries, we document that the returns to the associated hedge strategy
are diminishing in recent times. Regardless of the anomaly’s true nature, statistical
fluke or actual mispricing, the decrease in returns may indicate that investors seek to
benefit from Sloan’s (1996) initial study, eventually rendering the associated trading
strategy useless.
Discovering that both price and earnings momentum are robust with respect to
multiple testing issues, we reinforce the growing body of research documenting mag-
nitude and persistence of both anomalies. Researchers have long been speculating
about a link between price and earnings momentum. Inspired by the work of Chor-
dia and Shivakumar (2006), we find that European price momentum most likely
is subsumed by earnings momentum. However, there are some European countries
that do not support such a conclusion. As for the U.S., we especially observe some
decoupling of price and earnings momentum following the burst of the tech bub-
ble. In any case, our findings suggest that the price momentum rationale will most
likely be related to earnings momentum. Given that momentum does not appear to
proxy for macroeconomic risk, we narrow the search in favor of a behavioral-based
explanation of the momentum anomaly. In particular, winner and loser portfolios
characterized by high information uncertainty give rise to even larger momentum
profits. Thus, given that price momentum largely is earnings momentum in dis-
guise, our evidence supports the rationale of momentum being driven by investors’
underreaction to fundamental news. Moreover, we attribute the persistence of the
momentum anomaly to the fact that significant arbitrage costs prevent investors
from its exploitation. Also, liquidity is a crucial driver in governing the momentum
effects. However, while the U.S. momentum effects clearly are most pronounced
among illiquid winner and loser stocks, there are some European markets that ex-
hibit very profitable momentum strategies even for highly liquid stocks. Especially,
the momentum strategies designed for the aggregate European sample appear quite
robust.
Finally, we find that the dispersion effect does not prevail when subjected to multiple
testing controls. This startling finding is resolved by examining the time series
evolution of the international dispersion effects. Most of the associated returns amass
in a rather narrow time frame of 3 years. Moreover, we find the dispersion effect to
be most pronounced among high and low dispersion portfolios characterized by high
information uncertainty. Since the dispersion effect is especially pronounced when
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limited to high idiosyncratic risk or highly illiquid stocks, we further corroborate
that high arbitrage costs additionally deter investors from its exploitation.
To conclude, accounting for data snooping biases in global market anomalies pro-
vides a fresh view when assessing capital market efficiency. Ex ante, we expect this
paradigm shift to lead to fewer statistically significant anomalies, however, even if
an anomaly is deemed to be robust with respect to data snooping biases there are
some important economic issues to be considered. As for the accrual anomaly we
document that the anomalous patterns in the U.S. and the U.K. have been exploited
by investors following their publication. While investors’ learning has rendered mar-
kets efficient with respect to accruals mispricing it is all the more surprising why the
momentum effect is not being taken advantage of. We evidence that arbitraging mo-
mentum is simply too costly, especially, it appears that our common factor controls
are missing an important factor, namely liquidity risk. The latter also significantly
affects the dispersion strategy which would have additionally required implementing
rather infeasible positions. Taken together, we have gathered considerable evidence
that global equity markets are more efficient than they appear by revealing many
anomalies to be more apparent than real.
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